Internationalizing Like China

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We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by selectively opening up its domestic bond market to foreign investors and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this internationalization strategy. The Chinese government deliberately controlled the entry of foreign investors into its market, first allowing in relatively stable long-term investors like central banks before allowing in flightier investors like mutual funds. Our framework explains these patterns as the result of a government strategy to build its reputation as an international currency issuer while attempting to reduce the cost of potential capital flight as it tries to gain credibility. The dynamics of reputation make Chinese debt a substitute for emerging market risky debt in the early stage of internationalization and more of a substitute for developed countries safe debt in the later stages. We extend our framework to explore how countries compete to become a reserve currency. Competition worsens the incentives to build up reputation by reducing the benefits of having a higher reputation. The framework is tractable and can make sense of both new entrants like China and established players like the United States.

Keywords: International Currency, Reserve Currency Competition, Exorbitant Privilege, Safe Assets, Reputation, Capital Controls, Chinese Financial Markets, Renminbi.

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1 Introduction

With the third largest domestic bond market in the world behind the United States and the Euro Area, China is often described as a possible future international currency provider. However, unlike the US and Eurozone bond markets, the Chinese bond market has been largely closed to foreign investors, severely limiting the use of the Chinese Renminbi as an international currency. Over the last decade, that has begun to change and China has progressively opened its domestic bond market to foreign investment. While the internationalization process is in its relatively early stages, the size of the market and the ongoing opening-up process makes the evolution of China’s bond market an important dynamic at the core of international monetary system. This paper makes two contributions. First, it empirically characterizes the Renminbi’s internationalization and the changing nature of foreign investment. Second, it provides a tractable framework to shed light on the gradual strategy that the Chinese government is pursuing in the internationalization of the Renminbi.

We begin our analysis by providing a comprehensive characterization of foreign investment in China’s domestic bond market. We document three stylized facts. First, after being largely segmented from global capital markets, foreigners have now started investing in Renminbi-denominated bonds. The initial increase in foreign investment was driven by central banks while the more recent increase has been driven by private investors. Second, we demonstrate that this pattern of early investment by stable investors like central banks followed by flightier private investment was driven by deliberate policy choices of the Chinese government aimed at selecting the investor base. Third, by the time the Chinese government allowed in flightier private capital, foreign investors were holding Renminbi-denominated bonds not merely as part of emerging market debt portfolios, but also in developed markets debt portfolios.

We begin by documenting that while the initial foreign flows into Renminbi (RMB) bonds were driven by central banks, a share of the growth over the last few years has been coming from private sector investors around the world. We then demonstrate that the changing investor composition was a deliberate policy choice of the Chinese government. By introducing a series of foreign investment schemes with varying quotas, lock-up periods, and registration requirements, China was able to stagger the entry of different investor types into its domestic market. China began by allowing in more stable, long-term investors, such as central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and non-profits. After creating this stable investor base, China gradually loosened its array of restrictions to increasingly allow in flightier foreign investors such as passive and active mutual funds, exchange traded funds, and some hedge funds.

We provide evidence that by the time China allowed in relatively flighty foreign investors, RMB bonds were in many cases held in foreign private portfolios in conjunction with safer developed market debt rather than riskier emerging market debt. To demonstrate these substitutability patterns, we use micro data at the security level for private foreign investors like mutual funds, exchange traded funds (ETFs), and insurance companies to analyze the portfolios shifts corresponding to
increased holdings of RMB bonds. While there is substantial heterogeneity, funds do tend to specialize in the broad types of assets that they hold. For example, a fund that holds bonds in a given emerging (developed) market currency is substantially more likely to invest in other emerging (developed) currencies bonds. In our sample, RMB bonds occupy a middle position between developed and emerging market debt, with funds that hold them likely to have both types of debt in the rest of their portfolio. We also document which assets funds sold in order to purchase RMB bonds in recent years. We find that funds purchasing RMB bonds are generally substituting away from developed currency bonds, such as the U.S. Dollar, Euro and Japanese Yen, rather than emerging market currencies like the Brazilian Real or Mexican Peso.

The patterns documented above raise many interesting questions on how a large economy can or should internationalize its currency, what is the rationale for gradualism and selecting the investors base, and the effect of Chinese capital market liberalization on other bond markets around the world and interest rates. We develop a theoretical framework to make sense of the above facts and provide a way to think about these issues. The framework has three core ingredients: governments that are potentially opportunistic and may want to capture foreign capital in crises, heterogeneous foreign investors with varying degree of flightiness, and slow building of reputation of issuing governments in the eyes of foreign investors. The framework is tractable and allows a number of generalizations including competition among issuing countries and two-way capital flows.

We interpret the policy choices of China as trading off building reputation as a country capable of providing the global store of value and risking a disruptive foreign capital flight. Letting in foreign investors helps build reputation for the issuer in global capital markets, but letting in too many foreign investors, particularly flighty ones, can be counterproductive by causing crises as the investors pull out in times of stress. Crises are costly both directly because they lead to costly liquidations, and also indirectly because attempts to limit a flight of capital via ex post capital controls on outflows lead to a loss of reputation. In our model, the reputation of a government in the eyes of foreign investors is the perceived probability that the government will not impose ex-post capital controls. In practice, this captures investors’ fears of repatriation risk, the possibility that they will not be able to “get their money out of the country.” The aim of the government is not to lower overall repayment to foreigners, as in a sovereign default, but instead to temporarily lock-in foreign capital to prevent costly unwinding of positions.

To capture the gradual opening up of markets to different type of investors, we introduce two classes of investors in the model. One class, stable investors, is less flighty in a crisis, in the sense of requiring less collateral in a crisis to roll over the debt. We view this class as capturing the behavior of central banks, sovereign wealth funds, but also some private investors that have particularly long-horizons and stable funding (e.g. endowments and other non-profit institutions). The other class, flighty private investors, captures the majority of private investors like mutual funds, ETFs, and hedge funds.

We develop a dynamic reputation model in the spirit of Phelan (2006) and Amador and Phelan.
in which a country, like China, chooses which classes of foreign investors to allow into its domestic bond market and how much to borrow from each type it lets in. Following negative aggregate shocks, foreign investors demand high collateral to roll over existing debt, forcing some assets to be liquidated to repay debt that cannot be rolled over due to insufficient collateral. Liquidating assets is costly, and the government is tempted to introduce ex-post capital controls to limit the flight by foreigners. However, the expectation that these controls might be imposed is precisely the reputational problem of the country: the more foreigners expect the country to impose the controls ex-post, the worse the terms of credit are ex-ante.

Consistent with our empirical findings, the government only gradually opens the domestic bond market to foreigners. At low levels of reputation, the government chooses to only borrow from stable investors. At this stage of the internationalization process, the flighty private investors are too costly to allow into the domestic market. If the government does not institute ex-post capital controls on existing stable investors following a bad shock, then reputation increases over time and the interest rate schedule subsequently offered by foreigners becomes more attractive, increasing the government’s desire to borrow more from foreigners. As reputation builds, the value of letting more foreigners in becomes sufficiently high that the government allows flighty private investors into the domestic market. Importantly, the action of letting in private flighty investors itself increases the government’s reputation, since it is a disproportionately expensive action to take for a government intending to impose ex-post controls.

Our model provides a rationale for China’s gradual approach to internationalization of its markets, a gradualism that fits with the philosophy of “crossing the river by feeling the stones.” This saying refers to crossing a river safely by touching each stone one steps on, and captures the idea of improving policy via experimentation and gradual reforms. Gradualism in the model occurs both within each class of investors, since foreign participation builds gradually as reputation improves, and across classes with reforms that let in new classes of investors.

Establishing the credibility of being an international currency issuer, like the strong reputation the US currently has in global markets, is a slow and arduous process. Throughout modern history, many would-be contenders, like Japan or the Eurozone, have failed to displace the dominance of the dollar. Whether or not the Renminbi will become a reserve currency is also uncertain. The model captures this dynamic in several ways. Reputation can only be built in the fire of a crisis. In normal times, when foreigners do not flee from the country’s debt, the government is not tempted to tamper with foreign debt holdings. The lack of temptation also means that no reputation is built. Since crises are infrequent, so are opportunities to build reputation. In this respect, the behavior of governments during crises is a salient moment for investors to update their beliefs on the type of government they are facing. This updating is particularly strong for a country like China at the beginning of the internationalization process, because investors are unsure whether China will resist the temptation to impose controls on capital outflows in the face of a capital flight.

As reputation builds, and investors become more sure a government will not impose capital
controls, it becomes more difficult to build it further and many governments decide that further gains in reputation are too small to justify not imposing capital controls in the next crisis. Those governments that trigger the controls lose their reputation with investors, thus resetting their reputation cycle. The model points out that the evolution of the Renminbi as an international currency is unlikely to be a straight line; rather there will be crises and there may be set-backs in reputation, with foreign investors fleeing and China potentially introducing new restrictions on foreign investors. The stationary distribution of the model shows that countries endogenously spend most of the time at low levels of reputation and instituting policies in crisis that indeed confirm such low reputation is warranted.

The model is tractable and can help make sense not only of new situations, like China’s internationalization, but also the behavior of established players like the US and their past trajectory. We develop a model of competition among issuing countries and investors who specialize in holding assets issued by lower or higher reputation governments (i.e. developed or emerging market debt). Competition has a deep interaction with reputation building since countries’ choices feature an interesting complementarity: if a country’s competitors impose capital controls today and reset their reputation, then that country has higher incentives not to do so since tomorrow at a higher level of reputation it will capture a larger share of the market (face a better residual demand curve). We show that competition lowers the incentives to build a higher reputation by limiting the future benefits of becoming a reserve currency. In the extreme, committed governments could provide such high levels of competition as to deter any attempt by opportunistic governments to build reputation. More generally, we show that competition induces countries like China, currently at low levels of reputation, to spend more time (in a stationary distribution sense) at low levels of reputation. An established reserve currency issuer, like the US, can deter an up and coming competitor like China by issuing more safe debt to foreigners thus satiating world demand more and leaving little space for the competitor.

Finally, we extend the model to include two-way capital flows. Both gross foreign assets and liabilities grow in reputation, and crises with losses of reputation feature two-way retrenchment, a sharp contraction in both gross assets and liabilities. A country like China can start as a large net foreign creditor at low levels of reputation. Even if the country has a high saving rate so that in equilibrium it is a net foreign creditor, its government chooses to borrow from foreigners while at the same time investing abroad in order to build reputation. Reputation is like a pledgable asset, it is valuable because one can borrow against it. The higher its value, the more the country wants to lever against it. As reputation builds, the net foreign assets position deteriorates and established reserve currency issuer tend to be net foreign debtors.

Related Literature. The internationalization of the Renminbi is an important global macroeconomic development that has attracted much policy attention but surprisingly little formal analysis, either empirically or theoretically. In a similar spirit to this paper, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti...
(2011) documented a number of stylized facts about the nature of China’s economic growth strategy and provide a theoretical framework consistent with the observed patterns. Our focus is more directly related to the literature on China’s bond and currency market reforms like Song and Xiong (2018), Cerutti and Obstfeld (2018), Prasad (2017), Mo and Subrahmanyam (2020), and Lai (2021) and papers included in the handbook by Amstad, Sun and Xiong (2020). Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2017) and Brunnermeier et al. (2022) focus on China’s gradualistic approach to financial markets reforms.

There is a recent theoretical literature on the international monetary system, mostly focusing on established international currencies like the the US dollar and euro (Farhi and Maggiori (2018), He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt (2019), Gopinath and Stein (2021), Choi, Kirpalani and Perez (2021), Choi, Kirpalani and Perez (2022)). An important exception is Bahaj and Reis (2020) who focus on the early process of jump-starting the Renminbi as an international currency. They focus on the unit of account and payments role of a currency and examine the role of the introduction of PBoC swap lines in leading the Chinese Renminbi to be adopted in the global payments system.

Our model of dynamic reputation is related to foundational work by Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and Barro and Gordon (1983), and in particular to papers that consider changes in the commitment types over time (Phelan (2006), Amador and Phelan (2021b)).

Diamond (1989, 1991) mixes dynamic reputation and adverse selection to study the dynamics of reputation acquisition in financial markets and the choice between bond and loan financing.

Finally, our focus on the temptation that a government faces in imposing ex-post capital controls and the presence of stable and flighty investors is related to the literature studying asset fire sales, liquidity, and heterogeneous investor bases (Caballero and Simsek (2020), Clayton and Schaab (2022), Coppola (2021)).

2 Background on China’s Bond Market

We begin by providing a brief overview of China’s bond markets. For more comprehensive introductions to the market, see Amstad and He (2020) in Amstad, Sun and Xiong (2020), or Schipke and Zhang (2019). Today, China’s market is the third largest in the world, behind only the United States and the Euro Area. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the remarkable growth in China’s bond market over the last 15 years, the value approaching nearly $20 trillion at the end of 2020. In the last ten years, the size of China’s bond market surpassed that of the U.K. and Japan. The other large markets in Figure A.1 are the closest to the textbook case of free capital movement, thus making China an interesting stand out due to the combination of market size and segmentation from the rest of world capital markets.

China’s central government had long been the largest issuer in domestic bond markets, with

\footnote{See also Cripps et al. (2004), Tadelis (1999), and Mailath and Samuelson (2001). Fourakis (2021) introduces reputation with type-switching governments into a quantitative sovereign debt model.}
China Government Bonds (CGBs) used as the de facto proxy risk-free rate in local bond markets. The second most important category had long been policy-bank bonds, the bonds of the large Chinese state-affiliated policy banks (Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China). The bonds of these banks are generally assumed to be implicitly guaranteed by the central government. Recently, both of the categories were supplanted by local government bonds. The rest of the market, which is much smaller than the above three governmental or quasi-governmental set of issuers, is composed of bonds issued by firms, either State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the form of enterprise bonds, corporate bonds by private firms, or bonds issued by commercial banks.

Through much of its development, China’s bond market was essentially closed to foreign investors. That began to change in the early 2000s. Rather than open its domestic bond market to all foreign investors at once, China instead pursued a gradual liberalization policy. China’s policy of opening up began by allowing in foreign investors with strict limits on the size of investment via quotas and regulating the type of investors that could enter via special programs with demanding application processes and often lengthy lock-up periods. Over the last 20 years, China reduced each of these barriers gradually, allowing larger investment scale, a greater variety of foreign investors, and increasingly allowing investors to quickly take their money out of the country.

The liberalization process took a major initial step in 2002 with the introduction of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program. Under this system, following a fairly onerous registration and application process, investors could gain access to domestic stock and exchange-traded bond markets. However, most of the foreign investment via QFII was in the Chinese stock market as the exchange-traded bond market is a small share of the overall bond market. In these early stages, the quotas were small and only a narrow range of investors actually gained access to the market. Importantly, QFII investment was originally subject to a one-year lock up period. In 2009, this was lowered to three months for “pension funds, insurance funds, mutual funds, charitable funds, endowment funds, government and monetary authorities and open-ended funds.” (ASIFMA (2021))

In the 2010s, China significantly broadened direct access to the domestic bond market, allowing foreign participation in the China Interbank Bond Market (CIBM). The primary participants were central banks and other official investors, like sovereign wealth funds, and they could directly access the interbank market. In 2013, QFII and RQFII participants were allowed access to the interbank market (Kai (2019)). In 2015, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) allowed full access without a quota to the interbank bond market for long-term investors such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds (Amstad and He (2020)). These reforms helped meet the requirements for the Renminbi’s use.

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2 The Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) was introduced in 2011, allowing investors to use RMB to enter the market rather than foreign currency. The programs were merged in 2020.

3 Amstad and He (2020) note that 90% of foreign investment through these programs went to the stock market, with the small remaining share going to bonds.

4 The Chinese government was explicit that these relaxation of restrictions were only for long-term in-
inclusion in the SDR basket in 2016. Quota restrictions were removed for all investors with the launch of CIBM Direct in February 2016 (Kai (2019)), but this form of access still required direct access to China’s bond markets with its accompanying regulatory and registration hurdles (Schipke et al. (2019)).

These hurdles were significantly lowered in 2017 with the introduction of Bond Connect. Unlike earlier programs, Bond Connect is based offshore in Hong Kong and can be accessed via standard trading platforms like Bloomberg without the registration requirements of QFII or CIBM Direct. The ease of access into the Chinese market via Bond Connect was seen as an important reform to facilitate China’s inclusion in global bond indices such as the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Index and the JP Morgan Government Bond Index - Emerging Markets (GBI-EM). In order to be included in these indices, bonds must be freely tradable, there cannot be substantial capital controls, and in some cases hedging instruments need to be available. In its 2018 press release announcing the inclusion of RMB bonds, Bloomberg wrote: "In order to be considered for inclusion in the Global Aggregate Index, a local currency debt market must be classified as investment grade and its currency must be freely tradable, convertible, hedgeable, and free of capital controls. Ongoing enhancements from the PBoC have resulted in RMB-denominated securities meeting these absolute index rules." While these criteria could arguably have already been met for official sector investors investing through CIBM Direct prior to Bond Connect, it was only recently private investors were deemed to reach that level of access. Indeed, whether the Chinese bond market is freely investable for most foreign investors today is still a matter of contention. FTSE only added Chinese bonds to its World Government Bond Index (WGBI) in October 2021 and following this decision, for instance, Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (the largest tracker of the WGBI) subsequently decided to track a version of the WGBI index excluding China, arguing that market access was still too incomplete for them to invest.⁷

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⁵In preparation for the launch of Bond Connect, PBC’s Announcement [2016] No.3 extended the category of foreign institutional participants eligible to access the interbank bond market from the Foreign Central Bank-Type Institutions (including foreign central banks or monetary authorities, international financial organizations and sovereign wealth funds), QFIIs and RQFIIs to all qualified foreign institutional investors, including “other medium and long-term institutional investors” and changed the tone from “investors shall act as long-term investors” to “PBC encourages an overseas institutional investor to make medium and long term investments”.

⁶Bloomberg.

⁷See Sano and Galbraith (2019) for details. The President of the GPIF, Masataka Miyzono, explained “Chinese government bonds cannot be settled in an international settlement system that can be used for other major government bonds. The market’s liquidity is still limited compared with the size of GPIF’s investment scale. Trading of futures is not allowed for foreign investors.”
While each step of these reforms has its own intricacies, one can understand China’s bond market liberalization as beginning by allowing in a subset of long-term investors with restrictions on investment amounts and withdrawals, loosening these restrictions for subsets of investors over time, before moving toward free access to a range of global investors. This gradualism is consistent with the philosophy of “crossing the river by touching the stones,” moving by incremental policy reforms to develop the economy while maintaining economic stability. As we document below, these reforms have overall been accompanied by inflows of foreign investment in Chinese bond markets, starting with official foreign investors and, more recently, growing amounts of private investment.

3 The Renminbi in International Portfolios

In this section, we document the rise of Renminbi-denominated bonds in international investment portfolios. From the beginning of 2014, foreign investment in onshore RMB bonds rose from under $100 billion to nearly $640 billion at the start of 2022. The largest increase came in 2020, where foreign holdings increased by nearly $200 billion. Appendix Figure A.II plots the rise of foreign ownership of RMB-denominated bonds issued in onshore capital markets at a monthly frequency.

The process was gradual and features some setbacks. There were two significant instance of foreign capital outflows over the last decade. The first occurred during the financial market turbulence of 2015-2016: between July 2015 and February 2016 the value of foreign holdings declined from $128 to $101 billion dollars, a 21% decline. This was a period of Chinese stock market volatility and depreciation of the Renminbi, and China intervened heavily in its financial markets. In particular, regulators introduced suspensions of share-trading following market drops and restricted domestic firms and investors from moving capital abroad. Despite the market turmoil and the sizable outflows, China did not introduce restrictions on foreign investors, including those in the bond market, from exiting the country. In fact, government officials at the time publicly reinforced China’s commitment to the opening up process and explicitly characterized capital controls as an unwanted regression in that process. Some market participants, however, still argued that the possibility of future restrictions acted as a deterrent to foreign investment in China. Inflows resumed and

8See, for instance, Danese (2016), who writes of the differential restrictions on outflows: “This is important since, as a result of capital outflows, Chinese authorities have been clamping down on all existing channels for moving capital out of the country. This has included suspending issuance of new quotas for outbound programmes, such as the qualified domestic institutional investor (QDII) scheme, as well as issuing window guidance to banks restricting how much foreign exchange (FX) corporates can remit out of the country. For CIBM, the rules did not include any such provisions, possibly in a bid to assuage concerns by index provider MSCI, which decided in June not to include A-shares in its emerging market index.”

9See SAFE (2016) or SAFE (2015): “(...) the policy orientation of foreign exchange administration to support the development of the real economy and promote trade and investment facilitation remains unchanged. (...) While controlling abnormal capital flows, the SAFE has been dedicated to prudential management by economic and market means, and will continue to do so in the future. This way of administration will continue for ongoing and ex-post regulation, so as to build a macro-prudential management framework, rather than the traditional capital control model.”.

10See Weinland (2017), who writes in the Financial Times, “China’s restraints on capital outflows have
Figure 1: Composition of Foreign Ownership of Chinese-Issued RMB Bonds

Notes: Figure plots our estimated breakdown of foreign ownership of RMB denominated bonds into central bank reserves and private holdings. Data on reserves are from IMF COFER and private holdings are from IMF CPIS. See Appendix A.I for details.

accelerated after this outflows episode. The most recent period of outflows began in January 2022 and appears to be ongoing at the time of writing, with much of the data to analyze it still to be released.11

Figure 1 decomposes foreign ownership of Chinese Renminbi bonds issued by China-resident entities into two components, central bank reserves and private investment. The initial rise in foreign investment is largely driven by central bank holdings.12 It is only in 2019 and 2020 that we see a more substantial increase in private foreign investment in RMB bonds.

Figure 2 plots the estimated private ownership of RMB bonds by investor country (excluding investment from Hong Kong and Macau).13 We find that the largest private foreign holders of RMB

11Market commentary mentions fears, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of sanctions spillover to China, but also deterioration in China’s fundamentals and raising rates in the United States and other advanced economies.

12By far, the largest disclosed holder is the Central Bank of Russia. In 2017 and 2018, Russia dramatically cut its holdings of USD reserves and moved into RMB and EUR, apparently in response to U.S. sanctions and general wariness of relying on the dollar-based financial system. In particular, Russia increased its holding of RMB denominated bonds from under $1 billion in the second quarter of 2017 to around $67 billion in the second quarter of 2018. Reserve holdings themselves may also underestimate the true importance of the Renminbi as a reserve asset. As discussed in Bahaj and Reis (2020) and Bahaj and Reis (2021), China has opened a number of swap lines with central banks around the world. Therefore, even if central banks do not hold Renminbi in their current reserves assets, they may be counting on Renminbi liquidity in a crisis.

13CPIS is not limited to private investment and includes public investment in the form of sovereign
are the Euro Area, United States, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan.

These aggregate investment figures raise the question of what investors are actually purchasing within the class of RMB bonds. Using data from China Central Depository and Clearing, the top panel of Appendix Figure A.III shows that China Government Bonds (CGBs) account for 67% of foreign investment in China, with 30% of investment in Policy Bank Bonds (PBBs), even though these two classes only account for a combined 62% of the total bond market. Importantly, these are the two categories that are either direct liabilities (CGBs) or assumed to be implicitly guaranteed (PBBs) by the Central Government. By contrast, only 3% of foreign investment goes to the 38% of the market with significant private credit risk. These patterns highlight that conditional on investing in RMB, foreign investors mostly hold the safer assets denominated in that currency.

Foreign investment in RMB bonds is, of course, not the only way that foreign investors can lend to China. In Appendix A.II, we document the changing importance of offshore RMB bond issuance in Chinese borrowing, as well as the relative importance of direct onshore RMB finance and tax haven based dollar funding. In particular, we see that in mutual fund investment in China, the share investment in Chinese bonds denominated in RMB issued offshore (the CNH market) fell from over 90% in 2013 to under 10% by 2020. Despite this rise in the relative importance of onshore relative to offshore RMB financing, Appendix Figure A.V demonstrates that throughout the full sample period private foreign investors continued to invest more in China in foreign currency via its wealth funds, government pension funds, and state-owned enterprises (while excluding central banks’ reserve holdings). In this sense it may be more accurately described as all non-central bank holdings.
3.1 Selecting the Foreign Investor Base

In the previous subsection, we documented the sources of the recent inflows into the Chinese bond market. Here, we turn to understanding how China selected which type of investors would be able to invest in its bond market over time. To do so, we create a new monthly dataset of the investor composition of the four access methods for the Chinese bond market discussed in Section 2: QFII, RQFII, CIBM Direct, and Bond Connect. For each of the programs, the regulatory agency either directly reports the investor name and the month that particular investor gained access to the program, or they release a series of monthly reports of investors with access, and we infer the month of access based on the first appearance on the regulatory filing. Based on investor name, we merge these investor lists with Factset to collect investor information, such as country of residency, nationality, and industry classification. We then classify them as “Stable” investors, “Flighty” investors, or “Banks.”

Figure 3 displays the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of investors’ entry into the Chinese

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14“Stable” investors include central banks, legislative bodies, international organizations like the IMF, university endowments, non-profits, pension funds, and insurance companies. “Flighty” investors are those in the investment advice or portfolio management industry. “Banks” include investment banks, commercial banks, and broker dealers.
bond market for Stable and Flighty investors from 2003 to 2021. It shows a striking difference between the entry pattern for the two types of investors, with Stable investors generally entering earlier in the sample period followed by a rapid increase in Flighty investors over the most recent years. At the launch of RQFII and CIBM Direct, we observe increased entry of the Stable investors. By contrast, in the wake of the introduction of Bond Connect and China’s inclusion in key bond indices, we observe a quicker entry of the Flighty investors.

We view these patterns as the result of conscious policy choices by the Chinese government that selected and grew its foreign investor base over the last two decades. As discussed above, the early entry and growth of the Stable investors was engineered via quota programs in which each investor separately applied for market access, while the later entry and growth of the Flighty investors is largely the result of more open and lightly regulated access programs like Bond Connect that allows access without any lock-up period. Our model, introduced in Section 4, both draws from this evidence in featuring two different classes of foreign investors, one stable and the other flighty, and provides an explanation of why China has followed this sequential opening-up strategy to internationalize its bond market.

3.2 EM, DM, and Renminbi Bonds in Private Portfolios

The progressive integration of the Chinese domestic bond market into global capital markets would represent a potentially large shift in the set of investable assets. We investigate below whether these new assets are attracting capital from private investors that specialize in developed markets or emerging markets bonds. We use micro-data on portfolio investment from foreign investors via mutual funds, ETFs, and insurance companies domiciled in over 50 countries, excluding China. These data include for each fund or insurance company their complete worldwide holdings at the security level. We supplement the data with information on the asset class, currency, market of issuance, nationality and residency of the issuer and its ultimate parent company, and other security characteristics.

Portfolio Holdings. We start our analysis by examining what other type of foreign currency bonds funds holding bonds in a particular currency are likely to hold. This provides an intuitive way to characterize whether bonds in a given currency, and in particular in Renminbi, are held together with those denominated in developed or emerging market currencies in global portfolios. Focusing

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15Appendix Figure VI repeats the exercise for each of the underlying categories. It shows the heterogeneous process followed by different sub-types of investors in entering this market. In particular, the stable non-profit sector enters the market relatively early on in the liberalization process, whereas the relatively flightier portfolio management sector sees the overwhelming share of entry during the latest Bond Connect period.

16The country of origin of the investment is taken to be the country of domicile of the fund or insurance company making the investment.

17See Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger (2020) and Coppola, Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger (2021) for details on the data and the many sources combined in assembling it.
on portfolio quantities has a specific advantage in this context since investors overall specialize in broad categories, like emerging-market of developed-market focused funds. Since Chinese Renminbi bonds are a relatively new asset for global investors, it is informative to observe which type of investors are buying them. This “revealed preference approach” is likely to work better than looking at ex-post returns of the bonds given the short sample and the possibility of peso problems.

We begin by sorting currencies according to whether they are a developed market (DM) currency or an emerging market (EM) currency, treating the RMB as its own category.\textsuperscript{18} For each fund and currency, we then calculate the share of the fund’s total foreign currency investment in EM currencies, DM currencies, and the selected currency (with that currency omitted from the relevant EM/DM calculation). For each fund, we omit holdings of domestic currency bonds and any equities from the calculations.\textsuperscript{19} We measure the correlation between the share of a foreign portfolio invested in that currency with the share of the remaining foreign currency portfolio invested in EM currencies or DM currencies across the universe of mutual funds and ETFs. More formally, for each fund $i$ and currency $c$, we compute the share of the foreign currency bond portfolio in that currency:

$$\alpha_{c,i} = \frac{\sum_{b \in B_c} MV_{b,i}}{\sum_{c \in FC_i} \sum_{b \in B_c} MV_{b,i}}$$

where $MV_{b,i}$ is the market value of holdings (measured in USD) that fund $i$ has in bond $b$, $B_c$ denotes the set of bonds denominated in currency $c$, and $FC_i$ the super-set of bonds in foreign currency from the perspective of fund $i$. The denominator, therefore, is the value of holdings of foreign currency bonds by fund $i$. In addition, for each fund $i$ and currency $c$ we compute the share of the remaining foreign currency bond portfolio in DM currencies as

$$\alpha_{DM,c,i} = \frac{\sum_{d \in \{DM_i/c\}} \alpha_{d,i}}{(1 - \alpha_{c,i})}.$$ 

We exclude currency $c$ if it is a developed currency, so that $\{DM_i/c\}$ is the set of developed currencies excluding $c$. We re-scale shares by $(1 - \alpha_{c,i})^{-1}$ so that they reflect the portfolio excluding currency $c$. Finally, we compute the summary statistic of interest: the correlation across funds of the share invested in currency $c$ and the share invested in (other) developed currencies

$$\rho_{c,DM} = \text{corr}_i (\alpha_{c,i} , \alpha_{DM,c,i}) ,$$  

(1)

where the notation $\text{corr}_i$ emphasizes that the correlation is cross-sectional over funds $i$ at a point in time. We exclude from our analysis specialist funds in any particular currency, which we define as funds that have more than 50% of their foreign currency bond portfolio in a single currency.

\textsuperscript{18}DM currencies are the so-called G10 currencies, and EM currencies are the ones from countries in MSCI or IMF list of Emerging Markets. See Appendix A.IV.

\textsuperscript{19}We define domestic currency to be the currency of the country in which the fund is domiciled. In the Appendix we explore robustness of this choice by also excluding the currency in which the fund reports its returns.
Appendix A.IV provides more details on the procedure.

Figure 4 reports these correlations using 2020 end-of-year holdings data. We focus on local currency sovereign bonds in our benchmark analysis since most foreign holdings in China are of RMB sovereign bonds. In the appendix, we find similar results for alternative analyses including all bonds in a given currency, all government bonds in a currency, excluding index funds, and weighting by AUM. The top panel calculates correlations using all funds meeting our inclusion criteria and the bottom panel calculates the correlation conditional on positive holdings of local currency sovereign bonds of the currency in question (currency $c$ in the above notation). As one would expect, EM currencies have low and negative correlation with DM shares, as they are mainly held by EM focused funds. For instance, the fact that the share invested in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) bonds has a correlation of approximately -60% with the DM currency share means that funds that invest more in IDR are overwhelmingly likely to have a low share of their portfolio allocated to bonds denominated in DM currencies. Similarly, it is not surprising that major DM currencies, like the Euro and the Dollar, have a positive and high correlation. These patterns reflect the specialization of investors in the data, with some funds more EM and some funds more DM focused.

Given this specialization, it is interesting to ask what type of funds hold a relatively new asset like RMB bonds. Figure 4a shows that the Chinese RMB ranks in between emerging market and developed market currencies in terms of its correlation with DM bond portfolio shares. For example, China ranks in between two of the most developed emerging markets, Israel and South Korea. Figure 4b drops those fund-currency observations in which fund $i$ does not hold any bonds in currency $c$, thus focusing the correlation on the intensive margin decision of how much of a particular currency’s bonds a fund holds (conditional on a positive position). China is even more strongly correlated with developed markets in this case. As we discussed, many developed-market oriented funds have voiced concerns about investing in Chinese bonds, often mentioning repatriation risk. Given the fixed-cost nature of entering a market, especially one with dedicated access programs like China, their view is likely expressed via zero holdings of these bonds. It will be instructive to see how these correlation measures evolve as China either further internationalizes or takes a step-back and re-imposes restrictions.

**Portfolio Flows.** We now turn to understanding what assets investors substituted away from as they moved into RMB starting in 2018. We focus on the active component of portfolio changes in this analysis holding prices and assets under management fixed. To do so, we decompose the change in investment positions into a number of economically interpretable components. The change in the dollar value of investment $\Delta MV_{t,i,b}$ of a particular asset $b$ between time $t$ and $t-1$ by fund $i$, can be split into the within-fund portfolio shift towards that asset ($F_{Within}$), the increase or decrease in investment in that asset driven by fund-level inflows or outflows ($F_{Between}$), valuation effects ($VE_{t,i,b}$), newly created funds purchasing that bond ($F_{NewFunds}$), and a residual ($F_{Residual}$). We write this decomposition as:
Figure 4: Portfolio Similarity with Developed Market Currencies

(a) Local Currency Government Bonds, All funds

(b) Local Currency Government Bonds, Intensive Margin

Notes: Figures report the correlation between the holdings of bonds in each currency and holdings in Developed Markets (DM) currencies. The top panel considers all funds, including those with zero holdings of the currency in question. The bottom panel calculates the correlation for each currency based only on funds that hold some local currency sovereign bonds of the currency. The set of funds for measuring the correlation are restricted to non-specialists (less than 50% of its AUM in any single foreign currency) and have more than $20 million of foreign currency investment.
Figure 5: Decomposition of Change in Renminbi Holdings by Type of Flow

![Diagram showing the decomposition of change in Renminbi holdings by type of flow.]

Notes: Figure implements the decomposition of flows into RMB bonds in equation 2. Flow Within refers to increases in holdings of RMB assets holding fixed the size of funds. Flow Between refers to increases in holdings of RMB assets generated by inflows into funds that own RMB, holding prices and portfolio shares fixed. Flow New Funds refers to RMB bonds purchased by funds that were created in that year. Valuation Effect refers to the change in the market value of holdings coming from bond price and exchange rate changes. Residual includes measurement error and approximation residuals.

\[ \Delta MV_{t,i,b} = F_{t,i,b}^{Within} + F_{t,i,b}^{Between} + VE_{t,i,b} + F_{t,i,b}^{NewFunds} + F_{t,i,b}^{Residual}. \] (2)

Figure 5 displays the decomposition of flows into RMB bonds into the five components as in equation (2). Most of the increase in foreign holdings in 2019 and 2020 came from the Within-fund active reallocation component, which suggests that foreign investors’ entry in the RMB bond market came at the expense of a reduction in the portfolio shares of other assets. In 2020, more than two-thirds of the observed increase in RMB positions stemmed from these Within-fund reallocations, with most of the remaining share coming from the between-fund component, meaning that funds that already invested in RMB attracted more inflows during that year.

At the fund level the Within component sums to zero (as portfolio shares need to sum to 1), so we can write \( F_{t,i,CNY}^{Within} + \sum_{b \neq CNY} F_{t,i,b}^{Within} = 0 \). By zooming in the Within-fund flow, Figure 6 shows that in 2019 and 2020, funds that purchased RMB bonds tended to sell bonds issued in developed market currencies. In 2019, funds purchasing RMB slightly increase their holdings of emerging markets currencies, while in 2020 a small amount of the RMB purchases come from sales of emerging market currency bonds. Overall, the substitution towards RMB bonds in private foreign

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20See Appendix Section A.V for further details on the decomposition.
21In 2019 the second largest component was the flow coming from new funds launched that year, predomi-nately new Taiwanese ETFs that invest solely in Chinese RMB. Liu and Chan (2019) describe how reforms in the Taiwanese insurance industry drove inflows into RMB bond ETFs.
Figure 6: Decomposition of Portfolio Shift by Currency Group

Notes: Figure implements the decomposition of the within component of flows. “CNY” refers to all assets denominated in Chinese Yuan. “Cash” refers to assets classified as so in Morningstar and U.S. Treasury Bills. “DM” refers to cross-border holdings of developed market currencies. “EM” refers to cross-border holdings of emerging market currencies. “Other” refers to other currencies and equities. This figure only consider funds that own some RMB assets.

Portfolios came from movements out of developed market debt.\(^{22}\)

In Appendix Section A.VII, we explore how much of the inflows to RMB bonds were driven by index inclusions. We use data on the index that funds report as their benchmark, and find that inclusion in the Bloomberg Global Aggregate led to more inflows than did the 2020 inclusion in the JP Morgan GBI Index. Because the Bloomberg Global Aggregate is more tilted towards developed country currencies that the EM-currency-focused GBI, the rebalancing of funds benchmarked to the Bloomberg index may help explain why the purchases of RMB were largely financed with sales of DM currencies, with sales of EM currencies to buy RMB only beginning in 2020. The inclusion of China in both a major global and EM-focused bond index may help explain why it occupies an intermediate position between DM and EM currencies in terms of the portfolio correlations.

**Price Evidence.** Evidence on bond returns is hard to provide given the short sample, the likelihood of peso problems (crisis our out of sample), and the possible endogeneity of return dynamics to the size of foreign holdings. We provide here a brief analysis focusing on government bonds, and relegate a fuller treatment to the appendix.\(^{23}\)

We estimate bond return loadings on risk factors that are commonly used in the literature. We

\(^{22}\)In Appendix A.VI we further disaggregate the flows from Figure 6 into U.S. Treasuries and Agencies and Other DM currencies and conduct this analysis at a quarterly frequency.

\(^{23}\)For a comparison of the return and yield curve dynamics in the US and China, see Carpenter et al. (2022).
begin our sample in 2010, the year when China’s peg against the US dollar was first relaxed. We measure quarterly dollar returns of holding a three-month tenor bond in currency $i$ as $R_{i,t+1} = i_t - i_t^* - \Delta e_{t+1}$. We then regress the returns $R_{i,t}$ on a risk factor $f_t$ to estimate the currency-specific loading on the factor, $\beta_i$, from a linear regression $R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i f_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$.

Figure A.X reports the regression coefficient $\beta_i$ for a range of countries. We consider two risk factors. The first factor, $HML$, follows the work of Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) and constructs the return of investing in the currencies in the top 25% of currencies in terms of their interest rate and shorting the bottom 25%. The bottom panel runs the same regression but uses the quarterly log change in the VIX as the factor. Since an increase in HML occurs in good times and a spike in VIX in bad times, the rankings in the top and bottom panels are roughly reversed. In both cases, we find that RMB bonds in sample are estimated to be among the safest, if not the safest, returns. Of course, much of the measured safety of RMB come from the fact that the exchange rate was managed against the US dollar (and a basket of other currencies) throughout the sample period, making it among the least volatile currencies in the world. It is important to emphasize that both the portfolio quantity and price evidence are statements about the market behavior over a short sample in which internationalization was starting to occur. As the model in the next Section emphasizes, market beliefs about safety of these assets might turn out to be quite wrong ex-post when crises occur and China could decide to either directly or indirectly penalize foreign investors. Obviously, should those events materialize the return dynamics of the bonds will look dramatically different.

4 Reputation in the International Monetary System

We organize the empirical patterns documented above around three stylized facts that inform our theory. First, the Chinese domestic bond market has progressively opened-up to foreign participation. Second, this gradual opening up progress was shaped by government policies aimed at selecting an investor base: starting with stable long-term investors and progressively letting in flightier private investors. Third, by the time private flightier investors were let in, foreigners did not exclusively hold RMB debt as part of emerging market debt portfolios, but also as part of developed market debt portfolios.

In this section we explain these facts via a dynamic model of a country internationalizing its bond market. We think of a country like China that has the potential of becoming the provider of a reserve currency, e.g. economic size, geopolitical importance, etc., but that at an early stage does not have the reputation to provide a safe store of value. The model helps us think about how the country might build this reputation over time, the setbacks it might face, and the gradual policies it might choose. Through the lens of the model, we provide both a deeper view of the existing empirical patterns and frame our thinking about possible future evolution of the international

\footnote{Jermann et al. (2019) provide a detailed analysis of China’s exchange rate regime.}
4.1 Model Setup

The model is infinite horizon and time is discrete \( t = 0, 1, \ldots \). Within each date \( t \), we embed a financial intermediation model with costly liquidations that generates both a benefit from letting in foreign investors and an ex-post cost in case of a capital flight from these investors. Across dates \( t \), we develop a dynamic reputation model in which governments trade off the immediate benefit of imposing capital controls to combat a capital flight with the loss of reputation that this leads to in future periods.

Each date \( t \) is divided into a beginning, middle, and end of the period. At the beginning of \( t \), long-term investments are undertaken. These long-term investments mature at the end of period \( t \) and are financed with short-term debt that has to be rolled over in the middle of period \( t \). In the middle sub-period, a state \( s \in \{H, L\} \) is realized, where \( H \) (high) corresponds to normal times and \( L \) (low) corresponds to a crisis. A crisis in this model is a flight of foreign investors who demand collateral (a haircut) to roll over the maturing short-term debt. Figure 7 provides a timeline of date \( t \) and the actions taken at each point in time are described in detail below.

The domestic economy has a government, household, and a financial intermediation sector. At each date \( t \), a new generation of entrepreneurs are born. Entrepreneurs run the intermediation sector, which they finance using a fixed endowment of inside equity and by borrowing from foreign investors. Entrepreneurs die at the end of \( t \) and consume the payoff from their investment. Our focus is on raising financing from foreign investors, and we extend the framework to include domestic investors in the appendix. For expository clarity, we refer to the intermediaries directly rather than the entrepreneurs who run them. For most of the paper we aggregate the intermediation sector, households, and the government and think of actions at the country level. Particularly in the context of China, the boundaries between government and private actors can be blurry in
practice with the presence of policy banks, state-owned firms, and in general high degree of control of the government over private (credit/investment) decisions. As the empirical sections of the paper documented, at this stage of internationalization of China’s bond market, foreigners are concentrated in government debt and the debt of the policy banks, with limited investment of foreign investors in onshore corporate debt. In the model, one can think the funds raised via debt finance as being allocated by the government and financial system directly or indirectly to production.

There are two types of foreign investors: stable investors and flighty investors. These two categories aim to capture in a simple way the economics highlighted in the previous section on different investor characteristics and strategic choices on the part of the country on which investors to let into its bond market at each point in time in the internationalization process. The key distinction between the two types of investors is the haircut they require to roll-over short-term debt, essentially capturing their flightiness during a crisis.

At the beginning of period $t$, the government chooses which types of investors are allowed to participate in the domestic bond market, determining who the country borrows from. In the middle of period $t$, the government can impose ex-post capital controls on net outflows from foreigners, taxing them at rate $\bar{\tau}$. We consider two types of governments, committed or opportunistic, that differ by their willingness to impose these controls. The committed type never imposes a capital control on outflows by assumption, whereas the opportunistic type chooses strategically each period whether to do so. One can think of the two governments as differing by the direct utility loss they face when they impose capital controls, with the committed type facing a much higher loss than the opportunistic type. As in the literature, one can think of this as a stand in for institutional quality.

We chose to model the willingness to impose ex-post capital controls as the defining characteristic of an opportunistic government because it captures a salient feature of foreigners’ fears about investing onshore in China: the ability to “get the money out” in a future crisis. As detailed in Appendix A.VIII, foreign investors in the Chinese bond market emphasize uncertainty over “repatriation risk” and or whether China will “lock the gates” in bad times. While of course there are the standard currency and interest rate risks of investing in RMB, China is not necessarily an outlier on these dimensions. Instead, the dimension in which China appears to be perceived far differently than other countries is the possibility that investors will not be able to get their money out in bad times. We model this as the risk that China institutes an ex-post capital outflow tax, although it could easily be re-framed as a quantity restriction on outflows.

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$^{25}$For instance, a number of funds discuss concerns over the custodian or beneficial ownership arrangement of their bonds purchased via Bond Connect or CIBM Direct. With these untested markets, investors are not sure they will actually be able to sell the bonds they own in all market conditions. Another concern is generally referred to as a “suspension of trading”. Although adopted more frequently so far in equity markets, investors in Chinese bond markets report fears that in times of market stress, China will halt trading on the bond market, making them unable to repatriate their capital.

$^{26}$Outright default, and inflation or exchange rate depreciation are other ways to alter repayments to foreign bondholders. They also carry reputational losses. Ex-ante capital controls, which are allowed in our model, do not carry the same reputational stigma because they are known at the time of investment. Our model captures this notion that ex-post controls are reputationally costly for governments to use.
The government currently in power gets dissolved and replaced with a new one in the next period at an exogenous and constant rate. The current government puts no weight on the welfare of future new governments, meaning that this is akin to governments dying with some probability. We assume that if the low state is realized and the government dies, the new government might be of a different type. This exogenous type-switching, introduced by Phelan (2006), plays an important role in the dynamics of reputation in our model even for small probabilities of type-switching. Formally, we assume that in both the high and low state, a fraction $\epsilon^O$ of opportunistic governments and a fraction $\epsilon^C$ of committed governments die. In the high state, governments are replaced by a new government of the same type. In the low state, governments that are replaced switch type, that is committed governments that die are replaced by opportunistic governments and vice versa. Deaths and replacements are not observable to investors. We assume $1 - \epsilon^C - \epsilon^O > 0$.

4.2 Foreign Investor Base and Capital Flight

At the beginning of period $t$, the representative intermediary finances investment using an endowment of inside equity $A > 0$ and short-term debt $D_t$, due in the middle of period of $t$, from foreign investors at an interest rate $R_t$. The interest rate $R_t$ depends on which investors the country borrows from and how much it borrows. We denote $R_t$ to be the promised yield and $\tilde{R}_t$ to be the actual return, which differs from the promised yield when the government imposes capital controls in the middle of period $t$. A debt roll-over problem arises because the project is long-term, maturing at the end of period $t$, and the debt is short-term, maturing in the middle of period $t$.

4.2.1 Foreign Investor Base

Both stable investors, indexed by $i = s$, and flighty investors, indexed by $i = f$, are risk neutral, valuing investment decisions for their expected returns. Investor types are assumed to be observable to the government, as they are driven by institutional features. For example, the Chinese government can observe which investors are official and likely to be stable, such as foreign central banks or sovereign wealth funds, and which are private and likely to be flighty, such as hedge funds or active mutual funds. Once access is granted to a class of investors, however, they all are able to participate in the same domestic bond market and face the same interest rate and collateral provisions. Formally, we assume that the government can choose which types of investors are allowed to participate in the bond market, but the government cannot offer different contracts to different investors nor price discriminate investors it allows to participate. This means that investors of both types receive the same yield, return, and collateral. This assumption is intended to capture

\footnote{While we focus on exogenous switching of the type of government, there are, of course, interesting political economy considerations in becoming an international currency (see Frieden (2016) and Broz and Frieden (2001)).}

\footnote{Appendix A.XIX.1 considers an extension that also allows borrowing from domestic savers at the same interest rate. In that extension domestic borrowing is a wash with inside equity, and we therefore take the simpler approach here of only considering inside equity.}
the idea that in practice the way that a government lets in a new type of investor is to undertake the reforms necessary for that type of investor to be able to effectively invest their capital. These reforms will then apply to the entire market, not just to the new investor type. We view this as capturing the spirit of the evidence in Section 2 and Section 3.1 documenting the gradual process by which China has progressively and selectively allowed different type of foreign investors into its domestic bond market, both by directly restricting the type of investors eligible for a given program, and by adopting policies like a fixed lock-up period which only certain types of investors can realistically agree to.

The focus of this paper is on the internationalization of the Chinese domestic bond market. We highlighted in Section 3 that there is also an offshore (or international) market for Chinese bonds, some of which are denominated in the offshore Yuan, the CNH. One can think of the offshore market as an early experimentation with foreign investors, especially flighty ones. To maintain simplicity, the offshore market is not the focus of the theory because ultimately it is the size and depth of the domestic market that might lead China to become an important player in the international monetary system.

Both classes of investors also have a quadratic cost of lending, modeled in reduced form as a bond in utility function. The lending decision at the beginning of date $t$ by investor type $i \in \{s, f\}$ is given by

$$\max_{D_t^i} E[\tilde{R}_t - \bar{R}]D_t^i - \frac{1}{4} \theta D_t^{i2}$$

where $\tilde{R}$ is an outside option investment return and $\theta$ a slope coefficient. The first order condition that determines the interest rate schedule of type $i$ is

$$E[\tilde{R}_t] = \bar{R} + \frac{1}{2} \theta D_t^i.$$ 

Investors of each class $i$ are in an overlapping generation, whose second generation arrives in the middle of period $t$. For simplicity, the second generation of investors has a perfectly elastic supply of funds regardless of the state. Their outside option in the high state has return $R^H$, meaning that $R^H$ is the required interest rate for debt rollover in the high state. In the low state, the outside option is $R^L < R^H$. We denote the amount of debt that the second generation provides as $D_t^H$ and $D_t^L$ in the high and low state, respectively.

To roll over debt, the two types of investors require a different haircut on the inside equity value of the projects in the middle of date $t$ if the low state is realized. We describe the haircut in more detail in the next subsection, but here we note that stable investors require a lower haircut, $h^s \in (0, 1)$, than flighty investors, that is $h^f > h^s$. This is the sense in which the two classes of investors are differentially flighty: flighty investors require higher collateral to be posted in a crisis to convince them to roll over debt. We assume that the country cannot discriminate between investors.

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29In the Appendix, we allow both the outside option and slope to differ by class of investors, but many of the results are best understood in the simpler leading case of homogeneous coefficients considered here.
on collateral requirements: if the country lets in flighty investors, all investors must be offered the higher collateral rate.

We next turn to writing the ex-post return that investors realize as a function of the chosen ex-post capital outflow charge, \( \tau \).

\[
\tilde{R}_t(\tau) = \frac{R_tD_t - \tau D^L_t - (R_tD_t - D^L_t)\tau}{D_t} = R_t(1 - \tau).
\]

Intuitively, there are two costs to the first generation of investors when the country imposes an ex-post capital control. The first is the direct fiscal cost of the outflow tax on any repatriated capital, \((R_tD_t - D^L_t)\tau\). The second is the indirect cost that arises from the lower interest rate on rollover and the bargaining between the two investor generations. Since the second generation has an outside option of \(R^L\), but the domestic interest rate is \(R^L - \tau\), the second generation would experience a loss \(\tau D^L_t\) from lending in the domestic economy. By contrast, the first generation loses an additional \(\tau D^L_t\) from the outflow tax applied if no foreign debt is rolled over. Our bargaining assumption therefore says the second generation agrees to roll over \(D^L_t\) of debt in exchange for a compensating transfer payment of \(\tau D^L_t\) from the first generation.\(^{30}\)

We define \(M_t\) to be the probability that investors assign to the government not imposing capital controls, conditional on the low state being realized:

\[
M_t = \Pr(\tau = 0|s = L). \tag{3}
\]

It is a combination of the probability that the government is committed and so never imposes the capital control, and the probability that the government is opportunistic but chooses not to impose the capital control. The probability \(M_t\) is a key endogenous object of the dynamic problem across dates \(t\), but it is taken as given when solving the static date \(t\) problem. Conditional on this probability \(M_t\), the expected return of the first generation of investors is given by

\[
E[\tilde{R}_t] = \pi_H R_t + (1 - \pi_H)(M_t R_t + (1 - M_t)R_t(1 - \tilde{\tau})) = \mathcal{M}_t R_t,
\]

where we defined \(\mathcal{M}_t = 1 - (1 - \pi_H)(1 - M_t)\tilde{\tau}\) to be one minus the expected loss per unit of debt from the introduction of ex post capital controls. Notice that \(\mathcal{M}_t\) increases in \(M_t\) and also accounts for the fact that the capital control is never imposed by any government in the high state. Given this characterization of expected returns, we can substitute back into the interest rate schedule of investor type \(i\) at the beginning of \(t\) to obtain the promised interest rate

\[
R_t = \frac{\tilde{R} + \frac{1}{2}bD^i_t}{\mathcal{M}_t}.
\]

\(^{30}\)We assume that revenues from the capital controls are either thrown away or remitted lump sum to all foreigners, including non-participants. This eliminates the direct revenue motive from imposing capital controls and sharpens the focus on rollover incentives channel.
The interest rate schedule both has a lower intercept and also is more inelastic the lower is the probability that capital controls are imposed ex-post. These features will be important in the dynamic problem, as governments recognize that gaining a good reputation can lead to better borrowing terms.

4.2.2 Financial Intermediation and Collateral Constraints

We next turn to describing intermediation in our framework. Our modeling of intermediation aims to be streamlined so that it can capture crucial features of foreign capital flights and inefficient liquidation while remaining sufficiently tractable to be analyzed jointly with the dynamic reputation game. The model combines elements of the liquidity shocks literature (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997, Farhi and Tirole 2012) and of collateral constraints models (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). At the beginning of date \( t \), intermediaries invest their endowment of inside equity \( A \) and proceeds from debt financing \( D_t \) in an illiquid long-term project. The long-term project has a scale \( I_t \) and a unit cost, so that the financing constraint of the intermediary is \( \sum I_t = A + D_t \).

The project has a gross return per unit \( Q \geq 1 \) in the middle of the date, which does not depend on the state, transforming its scale to \( QI_t \).\(^{31}\) The project yields no payoff at the middle of \( t \), but yields 1 unit of the consumption good per unit of remaining scale at the end of \( t \), so that the final payoff is \( QI_t \). We think of \( Q \) as the return on investment that is maintained to maturity. The intermediary can liquidate the project prior to maturity in the middle of \( t \) at a constant price of \( \gamma \in (0,1) \), which does not depend on the state. As a result, \( \gamma QI_t \) is the maximum value of liquidation in the middle of the date. Although the payoff of the initial project does not depend on the state, the investment opportunities and credit conditions in the middle of \( t \) depend on the state.

In the high state, \( s = H \), the economy is in a boom. The intermediary has valuable new opportunities and credit markets are frictionless. The intermediary can roll over any debt at the interest rate \( R_H \). The intermediary also gains access to a more valuable investment project, which converts 1 unit of the consumption good in the middle of \( t \) into \( R_H \) units of the consumption good at the end of \( t \). We assume that \( \gamma R_H > 1 \), so that the intermediary optimally redeploy all of its existing assets to the new project in the high state. As a result, its payoff in the high state is given by
\[
V^H_t = R_H \left( \gamma QI_t - R_tD_t \right),
\]
which does not depend on its debt rollover choice since the borrowing rate and return on the new project are both \( R_H \). We assume that \( R_tD_t \) is rolled over without loss of generality. In the high state, rollovers and liquidations are all voluntary and driven by the presence of attractive new projects. The model gets most of its action from the crisis state described below.

\(^{31}\)Nothing is lost by normalizing \( Q \) to 1, but a value higher than one is more in line with observed positive rates of return and interest.
In the low state, \( s = L \), the economy is in a bad state. The intermediary does not have a valuable new investment opportunity, and credit markets are constrained. Define \( L_t \) to be assets that are (forcibly) liquidated prior to maturity in the low state. Forced liquidations occur because a collateral constraint limits debt rollover, meaning that the intermediary has to repay part of its initial debt by liquidating assets in the middle of \( t \). Formally, the intermediary faces a collateral constraint on debt rollover, given by

\[
(R^L_t - \tau)D_t^L \leq (1 - h_t)(QI_t - L_t),
\]

where \( h_t = h^s \) if the only investors present are stable \( (D^f_t = 0) \) and \( h_t = h^f \) if both stable and flighty investors are present \( (D^f_t > 0) \). Recall that flighty investors require a higher haircut than do stable investors, \( h^f > h^s \). A higher haircut means that less of the remaining value of the projects (i.e. the part that was not liquidated) can be used as collateral for new short-term debt. The way in which we formulated the constraint also implies that imposing ex-post capital controls slackens the constraint by depressing interest rates on new debt in the middle date. Intuitively, countries are tempted to impose capital controls ex-post in a roll-over crisis to capture existing foreign savings and alleviate the rollover problem. This formulation of the constraint is a tractable and convenient way to convey these economics. We solve the model assuming the constraint (in the low state) always binds, and then verify it does so.

In the middle of period \( t \), the intermediary must repay debt either by rolling it over or liquidating assets, yielding a budget constraint \( D^L_t + \gamma L_t = R_t D_t \). Combining the collateral constraint and budget constraint and substituting into the final payoff, \( QI_t - L_t - (R^L_t - \tau)D^L_t \), of the intermediary, we obtain the value in the low state as

\[
V_t^L = \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R^L_t - \tau}} \left( \frac{\gamma QI_t - R_tD_t}{\text{Liquidation Value of Inside Equity}} \right). \tag{5}
\]

As in the high state, the value of intermediation in the low state depends on the inside equity of the intermediary evaluated at the liquidation value: \( \gamma QI_t - R_tD_t \). Intuitively, these are the funds at the intermediary’s disposal entering the middle period of the date. In the high state, equation (4) shows that the value of intermediation is a multiple \( R_H \) of inside equity because all long-term projects are (voluntarily) liquidated in favor of new investment opportunities that return \( R_H \). In the low state, equation (5) shows that the multiple takes value \( \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R^L_t - \tau}} \). The numerator in this multiple, \( h_t \), measures the collateral value of the inside equity of the intermediary if projects were all liquidated. The denominator, \( \gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R^L_t - \tau} \), grosses up this value for the effect of liquidations. On the one hand, liquidating one unit of the long-term project raises resources \( \gamma \) that can then be used to repay maturing debt. On the other hand, a liquidated investment lowers the collateral that can be used to raise new debt and tightens the debt roll over constraint by \( \frac{1-h_t}{R^L_t - \tau} \). For (forced) liquidations
to occur in equilibrium, we assume $\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R^L - \tau} > 0$. Imposing the capital control, $\tau = \bar{\tau}$, reduces the denominator by reducing the interest rate $R^L - \tau$ and leads to a larger net worth multiplier.

Putting $V^H_t$ and $V^L_t$ together, we have the total expected value of intermediation given by:

$$E[\tilde{V}_t] = \pi_H V^H_t + \pi_L V^L_t = \left(\pi_H R^H + \pi_L \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R^L - \tau}}\right)\left(\gamma Q I_t - R_tD_t\right),$$

which depends on whether or not the government imposes the capital control in the low state, $\tau \in \{0, \bar{\tau}\}$. As will become clear below, the tractability of the model arises in good part from the above equation: the ability to summarize the subgame value of intermediation as a multiple of inside equity.

### 4.2.3 Optimal Policy of the Committed Type and Flow Indirect Utility

The solution of the model can be analyzed by first determining what the committed type optimally chooses to do in each date. Opportunistic types then decide to either mimic the committed type or deviate. Therefore, we start by analyzing the problem of debt issuance at the beginning of date $t$ by the committed type. Recall that the type is not known to investors and consider the case of a belief $M_t \in [0, 1]$ that the government will not exercise the capital control in the low state in that date. The decision problem of the committed government is to choose a debt issuance $D_t$ to maximize the expected value $E[\tilde{V}_t]$ with $\tau = 0$, subject to the interest rate schedules and collateral demands by investors.

While the committed type optimally chooses issuance given the beliefs of the investors, we do not allow the committed type to strategically use its choices to alter investor beliefs in either the current or future periods. In essence, the committed type does not choose actions under the knowledge that opportunistic types might endogenously react to those choices and thereby cause investors to update their beliefs about the government that they are facing. This simplification is common in the literature on dynamic reputation.

We characterize the optimal debt policy of the committed type in the Lemma below.

**Lemma 1** There exists a unique opening up threshold $M^* \in [0, 1]$ such that optimal policies are

$$D^s(M_t) = \frac{1}{b} \gamma Q M_t - \bar{R}$$

$$D^f(M_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & M_t \leq M^* \\ D^s(M_t), & M_t > M^* \end{cases}$$

$$R_t(M_t) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\bar{R}}{M_t} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q$$

See proof in Appendix A.IX. There is a single crossing point at $M^*$ where the committed government shifts from borrowing from only stable investors to also borrowing from flighty investors.
The intuition is that as the probability that investors assign to ex-post capital controls decreases \((M)\) increases), the interest rate schedule becomes more favorable, i.e. it shifts downwards and flattens, and the country’s desired borrowing increases. At some point this shift is large enough that the benefit of letting in the flighty investors in terms of lower borrowing costs outweighs the cost of higher flightiness, a higher haircut, in a possible crisis. The heterogeneity in haircuts acts as a fixed cost and generates a threshold rule in the borrowing schedule.

The optimal policy rules are intuitive. Consider first the case of \(M_t \leq M^*\), where the committed type only borrows from stable investors. If the committed type acted as a competitive borrower, taking the interest rate as given, then the interest rate would equal the liquidation value of the project \(R_t = \gamma Q\). Instead, the committed type accounts for the impact of its borrowing on the interest rate: it equates marginal benefit and marginal cost of borrowing. As a result, it borrows less than in the competitive case and faces lower interest rates. As is common in monopolist problems of this (functional form) type, it borrows half as much as in the competitive case and the equilibrium interest rate is an arithmetic average of the competitive rate \(\gamma Q\) and the rate that would have been paid on the first unit of debt \(\bar{R}_{M_t}\). Optimal debt issuance features an upward discontinuity at \(M^*\). Once the flighty investors are let in, the committed type borrows equally from both classes of investors.\(^{32}\)

Allowing the committed type to take into consideration its market impact has two advantages for us. First, it connects to the economics of reserve currencies as special assets whose issuers receive an exorbitant privilege via monopoly rents and opens up the possibility of studying competition among issuers (Farhi and Maggiori (2018); Choi et al. (2022)), something we return to in Section 6. Second, it allows for some degree of ex-ante macro-prudential policy to have already taken place in the model, sharpening the difference between ex-ante prudential measures and ex-post capital controls. Intuitively, a competitive intermediary sector would issue too much debt and reach the competitive interest rate, not internalizing its impact on the equilibrium borrowing rate. The government behaves as a monopolist and imposes ex-ante controls on intermediary borrowing in order to force them to internalize the price impact of borrowing (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017); Farhi and Werning (2016); Bianchi and Lorenzoni (2021)).\(^{33}\)

The government could also consider a number of other ex-post policies that would interact with ex-post capital controls. Bailout policy is a particularly relevant one since the government could prevent liquidations by bailing out the intermediation sector, formally bypassing the credit constraint. Such bailouts have fiscal costs (either via direct taxation, or via the accumulation of precautionary reserves) and can induce future moral hazard, so that there is a policy trade off. For example, one can think of the U.S. bailing out its financial intermediaries during the 2008 financial crisis.

\(^{32}\)In the Appendix we derive these optimal policies allowing for heterogeneous demand curves from the two classes of investors.

\(^{33}\)In the model, liquidations happen at an exogenous price \(\gamma\). If we made the price a decreasing function of the size of liquidation \((\gamma(L_t))\), then the model would feature pecuniary externalities in the spirit of the macro-prudential literature. In our baseline, instead, the desire of the government to limit borrowing ex-ante compared to the competitive equilibrium is driven by the monopoly rents.
crisis while not tampering at all, and in fact supporting, the payoff and market access to US Treasuries by foreigners. We keep these policy alternatives in the background of the formal model.

We define $V(M_t)$ to be the flow indirect utility of the committed type in the low state:

$$V(M_t) = \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R_L}} \left( \gamma Q I(M_t) - R(M_t) D(M_t) \right),$$

where $I(M_t), R(M_t),$ and $D(M_t)$ are the optimal policy rules described above. An opportunistic government chooses the same rules at the beginning of date $t$, since not doing so would reveal the government type before any debt is even raised in the date. However, the opportunistic government might deviate ex-post in the middle sub-period by imposing capital controls. Since the value of exercising ex-post capital controls in the low state for the opportunistic government is

$$V^\tau(M_t) = \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R_L}} \left( \gamma Q I_t(M_t) - R_t(M_t) D_t(M_t) \right),$$

we find that the gain induced by imposing the capital control is a proportional increase in indirect utility for the opportunistic type. In particular, we can define $V^\tau(M_t) = g(h_t)V(M_t)$, where

$$g(h_t) = \frac{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R_L}}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R_L}},$$

(6)

We have $h_t(M_t) = h^s$ when $M_t \leq M^*$ and the economy is only open to stable investors and $h_t(M_t) = h^f$ when $M_t > M^*$ and the economy is also open to flighty investors. We express $g$ as a function of $h_t$, rather than $M_t$, to maintain exposition clarity.

In the main body of the paper, we make the following simplifying assumption: $R^H = \frac{h_t}{\gamma - \frac{1-h_t}{R_L}}$. This means that the return on the new project in the high state depends on whether the government has opened up to flighty investors. This assumption allows the flow utility of the committed type in the high state to be written as a scaled version of its flow utility in the low state, $V_t^H = g(h_t)V(M_t)$. This simplification carries a lot of tractability at little economic cost and is relaxed in Appendix A.XIX.2.

5 The Dynamics of Reputation Building

Section 4.2 solved the date $t$ sub-game of a committed type government that faces investor beliefs $M_t$ that the government will impose the capital control. We now turn to the dynamic problem of

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34 For example, we can impose the off-path beliefs that investors ascribe the lowest possible reputation $M_t = 0$ to governments that do not mimic the committed type’s debt issuance decision. If an opportunistic type reveals itself at the beginning of $t$ by choosing a different issuance strategy, it can be assigned a reputation lower than $\epsilon^O$ because its type cannot switch to being committed until the end of $t$ – that is, investors know for sure it is opportunistic. We could also impose further punishments, such as a sharp nonlinearity in the interest rate schedule at reputations below $\epsilon^O$. 

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the opportunistic government.

The opportunistic government discounts the future at the effective discount factor $\beta^s(1-\epsilon^O) = \beta$, which accounts for both its subjective discount factor and its probability of being replaced. We define $\pi_t$ to be investors’ prior belief entering date $t$ that the government is the committed type, with $\pi_0 = \epsilon^O$ being the prior belief at date 0. This prior belief at date 0 means that investors enter into the game believing all governments start as opportunistic except for an initial fraction $\epsilon^O$ that switched to being committed.\(^\text{35}\)

If an opportunistic government wants to avoid revealing its type before raising debt, it needs to mimic the debt issuance strategy of the committed government at the beginning of period $t$. However, it has a strategic choice of whether or not to impose capital controls on outflows if the economy enters the low state. If the low state is realized and the opportunistic government does not impose capital controls, investors’ posterior belief that the government is committed rises. This occurs because, as we will show, only a fraction of opportunistic types forgo capital controls conditional on a low state occurring. No updating of beliefs occurs in the high state since there is no temptation for an opportunistic government to impose capital controls and governments that are replaced following the high state are known to be succeeded by governments of the same type. The model of dynamic reputation in the presence of exogenous type switching is in the spirit of Phelan (2006) and Amador and Phelan (2021b).\(^\text{36}\)

The model is designed to capture the idea that reputation as an international currency issuer can only be built in the “fire” of severe crises. In normal times, there is little (in fact nothing) that investors learn about the government type and how it would behave in a future crisis. One can think of the low state as rare, thus emphasizing that building reputation as an international currency issuer is a slow process in calendar time, with long-spells of tranquil markets and no reputation building, and short but intense episodes of crisis when issuers are tested by the markets.

We denote by $m_t \in [0,1]$ the endogenous fraction of opportunistic governments that do not impose the capital control at date $t$ if the low state is realized. Following the low state occurring, investors’ beliefs evolve according to Bayes’ rule. If a total fraction $M_t = \pi_t + (1-\pi_t)m_t$ of all governments do not exercise capital controls in the low state, then the posterior belief of investors that a government that did not impose the capital control in the low state is the committed type is given by

$$\pi_{t+1} = \epsilon^O + (1-\epsilon^C-\epsilon^O)\frac{\pi_t}{M_t}. \quad (7)$$

This accounts for the fact that a fraction $\epsilon^O$ of remaining opportunistic types switch to being committed at the end of the period, while a fraction $\epsilon^C$ of committed types switch to being opportunistic. Because $0 \leq m_t \leq 1$, then $\pi_t \leq M_t$ and the highest possible posterior belief is $\pi_{t+1} = 1 - \epsilon^C$, which

\[^{35}\text{We can initialize the model from other prior beliefs } \pi_0. \text{ In these cases, the model will feature one different transition path to an initial graduation step, at which point all opportunistic governments will have reverted to beliefs } \epsilon^O \text{ and will continue on the cycle described below.}\]

\[^{36}\text{Lu (2013) extends Phelan (2006) to consider a committed type that optimally chooses tax policy.}\]
happens only when $m_t = 0$ and all opportunistic governments choose to impose capital controls. The posterior belief is bounded below one due to the fact that a committed government is replaced and is succeeded by an opportunistic government with probability $\epsilon^C$.

If the government does impose the capital control, then its type is revealed to be opportunistic. The posterior belief reverts to $\pi_0 = \epsilon^O$, which is the probability that the opportunistic government is replaced by a committed government. If the government faced the high state, then priors and posteriors coincide, that is $\pi_{t+1} = \pi_t$.

In our model, the belief $M_t$ that the government will impose the capital control turns out to be a natural variable in which to express solutions, rather than the belief $\pi_t$ that the government is the committed type. This is because the interest rate schedule depends on $M_t$, rather than directly on $\pi_t$. We refer to $M_t$ as the “reputation” of the government, and refer to $\pi_t$ as “beliefs” about the government’s type. Under this terminology, a government having a good reputation means investors think it is less likely that the government will impose capital controls on them.

We focus on the uncertainty that investors face about a country like China and abstract from uncertainty that the country might have about investor behavior. In practice, we believe China can observe the behavior of large investors, like foreign central banks or large investment management group, in many other countries that receive foreign portfolio investments. Investors, on the other hand, face the unique situation of a very large country beginning to open up its markets under the shadow of substantial political risk and a lack of transparency. Therefore, while China has a myriad of ways to learn about investors’ tendencies in related contexts, it is hard to see how investors can assess what the Chinese government is likely to do in a future crisis other than by observing how it acted in past and current crises. It is this uncertainty and learning that our model focuses on.

**Dynamics of Reputation in Equilibrium.** Since the model features reputation cycles with potentially long spells without reputation updating, it is useful to distinguish calendar time, indexed by $t$, and steps in the reputation cycle, indexed by $n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. Each step $n$ might occur over multiple calendar dates $t$ as the country cycles over the reputation, growing it and then resetting it. Similarly, the calendar length between two steps in the cycle, $n$ and $n + 1$, is stochastic and depends on the next arrival of a crisis. In what follows we keep track of cycle steps rather than calendar dates.

We conjecture and solve for a Markov equilibrium of consisting of a cycle defined by two steps, $N^*$ and $N$. Resetting the cycles corresponds to returning to step $n = 0$ and occurs when a government imposes capital controls and reveals itself to be opportunistic. The step $N^*$ is the first step at which the government lets in flighty investors in addition to stable investors. As such, we refer to it as the “opening up step” of the domestic bond market. More formally, for steps $n < N^*$ we have $M_n < M^*$, meaning that the economy is closed to flighty investors. For steps $n \geq N^*$ we have $M_n > M^*$ and the economy is open to flighty investors.

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37 Future work could allow for such uncertainty, for example, along the lines of higher order beliefs in which the country is uncertain about what its reputation is with the investors.
At all steps \( n < N \), a fraction \( 0 < m_n < 1 \) of opportunistic governments choose not to impose the capital control and continue to the next step of the cycle. The remaining fraction \( 1 - m_n \) choose to impose capital controls and revert to the beginning of the cycle. At step \( N \), all opportunistic governments impose the capital control, \( m_N = 0 \), and revert to the beginning of the cycle. As in the previous literature, we refer to \( N \) as the “graduation step,” at which a committed type government gains the highest possible beliefs and reputation. Committed types that continue to each step \( n > N \) either switch types and graduate, or remain committed and continue at the constant beliefs and reputation, \( \pi_{N+1} = M_{N+1} = 1 - \epsilon^C \).

### 5.1 Strategic Choices of Opportunistic Governments

Given the conjectured equilibrium, we need to determine the policy rule of the opportunistic government. Define \( W(M_n) \) to be the value function of the opportunistic government with reputation \( M_n \). In our conjectured Markov equilibrium, an opportunistic government at step \( n \) of the cycle that does not impose the capital control in the low state achieves value

\[
W^0(M_n) = \pi_H \left( g(h_n)V(M_n) + \beta W(M_n) \right) + (1 - \pi_H) \left( V(M_n) + \beta W(M_{n+1}) \right).
\]

Recall that if the high state is realized, then no governments impose the capital control and there is no change in beliefs. In this case, the continuation value is just the (lifetime) value function at step \( n \) of the cycle. By contrast if the low state is realized, then a government that does not impose a capital control progresses to the next step of the cycle and receives the continuation value from reputation increasing to \( M_{n+1} \).

If instead the government chooses to impose the capital control in the low state, then it achieves value

\[
W^\tau(M_n) = \pi_H \left( g(h_n)V(M_n) + \beta W(M_n) \right) + (1 - \pi_H) \left( g(h_n)V(M_n) + \beta W(M_0) \right).
\]

In the high state, the government does not impose the capital control and receives exactly the same value as above. By contrast in the low state, by imposing the control the government achieves an increase in flow utility to \( g(h_n)V(M_n) \), rather than only \( V(M_n) \). However, this comes at the cost of loss of reputation: the government resets to the beginning of the cycle and achieves continuation value \( W(M_0) \), rather than \( W(M_{n+1}) \).\(^{39}\)

There is no dynamic inconsistency within a date between the beginning of the date issuance decisions and the middle of the date imposition of capital controls. Intuitively, this is because

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\(^{38}\)Our graduation step is analogous to the graduation date of Amador and Phelan (2021b). We use the term step is to indicate that our graduation is defined in terms of the number of low states realized ("steps").

\(^{39}\)In the model, the imposition of capital controls fully reveals the type of the government and resets the reputation to the beginning of the cycle. It is possible to weaken this feature by having the committed types also impose some baseline degree of capital controls (see Amador and Phelan (2021a)).
investors know the probability that a government will impose the capital control, but not whether a specific government will impose the capital control. This means that a government can be thought of as having made a decision regarding capital controls at the beginning of the date. The value function at step $n$ is therefore given by

$$W(M_n) = \max_{\tau \in \{0, \tau\}} \{ W^0(M_n), W^\tau(M_n) \}.$$  

In our conjectured equilibrium, opportunistic governments play (identical) mixed strategies such that a fraction $m_n$ of opportunistic governments do not impose the capital control at step $n < N$ while a fraction $1 - m_n$ impose the capital control. For this to occur, it must be the case that opportunistic governments are indifferent between imposing and not imposing the capital control, that is for $n < N$ we have

$$W(M_n) = W^0(M_n) = W^\tau(M_n).$$  

Using that $W(M_0) = W^\tau(M_0)$, we obtain the expression for $W(M_0)$

$$W(M_0) = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} g(h_0)V(M_0). \quad \text{(8)}$$

This condition says that the lifetime value of a (single) mixing opportunistic government at the beginning of the cycle is equal to the value it would achieve if it followed the strategy of imposing the capital control at every date forever. Although the value function of the opportunistic type grows in the cycle step as reputation builds, that is $W(M_1) > W(M_0)$, the indifference condition ensures that this growth is perfectly balanced by the excess value of imposing the capital control today.

Similarly, we can use the indifference condition $W(M_n) = W^0(M_n) = W^\tau(M_n)$ and the Bellman equation at step $n < N$ to characterize the transition path.\footnote{Note that for all steps $n + 1 < N$, both $W(M_{n+1}) = W^\tau(M_{n+1})$ and $W(M_{n+1}) = W^0(M_{n+1})$ are valid Bellman equations due to indifference. However, at step $N$ graduation occurs, and hence $W^\tau(M_N) \geq W^0(M_N)$ in our conjectured equilibrium. Therefore, $W(M_N) = W^\tau(M_N)$ is the valid Bellman equation at $N$.} Combining these, we obtain

$$V(M_{n+1}) = \frac{g(h_n)}{g(h_{n+1})} \rho(h_n)V(M_n) + \frac{g(h_0)}{g(h_{n+1})} V(M_0) \quad \text{(9)}$$

where we have defined $\rho(h_n) = \frac{1 - \pi H \beta \frac{g(h_n)}{g(h_n)} - 1}{\beta \frac{g(h_n)}{g(h_n)}}$. Equation (9) characterizes the indifference path of our conjectured equilibrium in terms of flow utility $V(M_n)$, rather than in terms of the value function $W_n$. It tells us – given an initial reputation $M_0$, opening up step $N^*$, and graduation step $N$ – what the path of reputation $M_1, ..., M_N$ must be to maintain indifference up until the graduation step. This path is characterized by an AR(1) process in flow utility $V(M_n)$. However, as we describe in detail below, the coefficients of the AR(1) process change when the economy opens up due to the change in investor composition. We build more intuition for this equation as we decompose it into
its dynamics in the different regions.

To simplify notation, we will denote \( \rho^s = \rho(h^s) \) and \( \rho^f = \rho(h^f) \). Notice that \( \rho^f < \rho^s \) since \( g(h^f) < g(h^s) \).

### 5.2 A First Pass At Solutions: Homogeneous Investors

To build intuition for the model dynamics, we consider first the simpler case in which the foreign investors are homogeneous. Formally, we set \( h^s = h^f \) so that the haircut is identical across the two investor groups. The transition dynamics of equation (9) simplify to:

\[
V(M_{n+1}) = \rho^f V(M_n) + V(M_0).
\]

The transition path of flow utility \( V(M_n) \) follows an AR(1) with a constant coefficient, \( \rho^f = \frac{1 - \pi H \beta}{\beta g(h^f) - g(h^f)} \). The rate of convergence decreases in the discount factor \( \beta \), reflecting that as opportunistic governments become more patient they require smaller increases in reputation to be willing not to impose the capital control. It increases in the value \( g(h^f) \) of imposing the capital control, reflecting that a higher value increases the foregone benefits of imposing the control today and so requires a larger increase in reputation to maintain indifference. Finally, the rate of convergence falls as the low state becomes less likely, since a higher probability of the high state means a government gets a higher expected value in continuation for a given reputation.

The opportunistic government in our conjectured equilibrium must be willing to graduate at step \( N \). This requires that \( W^T(M_N) \geq W^0(M_N) \). We know that after graduation, \( M_{N+1} = 1 - \epsilon C \).

Therefore, graduation requires that

\[
V(1 - \epsilon C) \leq \rho^f V(M_N) + V(M_0).
\]

Intuitively, this equation states that graduation occurs because the flow utility that would be required to maintain indifference, \( \rho^f V(M_N) + V(M_0) \), exceeds the maximum flow utility \( V(1 - \epsilon C) \) that can be achieved at the highest possible beliefs and reputation. Once the transition path would exceed this threshold, indifference can no longer be maintained and graduation occurs. Graduation cannot occur at a prior point on the indifference path. If graduation occurred at a step with \( V(1 - \epsilon C) > \rho^f V(M_N) + V(M_0) \), then an opportunistic government would be indifferent between imposing the capital control and continuing to a reputation \( M_{N+1} < 1 - \epsilon C \). But this would mean the opportunistic government strictly preferred continuing to reputation \( 1 - \epsilon C \), rather than graduating at \( N \). In our conjectured equilibrium, the graduation step \( N \) is determined, starting from the initial reputation \( M_0 \), as the first step \( N \) at which condition (11) is satisfied.

The conjectured equilibrium of this model consists of a graduation step \( N \), a path of reputation \( M_0, ..., M_N \), and a path of beliefs \( \pi_0, ..., \pi_N \) such that: (i) reputation evolves by the indifference condition (10); (ii) beliefs evolve according to Bayes’ rule in equation (7); (iii) all opportunistic
governments are willing to graduate at \( N \) as in condition (11); (iv) \( \pi_n \leq M_n \) for \( n < N \); and (v) \( M_N = \pi_N \), consistent with all types graduating at step \( N \). We refer to this type of equilibrium as a graduation step Markov equilibrium.\(^{41}\) The proposition below characterizes this equilibrium.

**Proposition 1**  There exists a unique graduation step Markov equilibrium.

Proposition 1 (see proof in the Appendix) verifies that a graduation step Markov equilibrium does in fact exist, and that it is the unique equilibrium of this form. Intuitively, uniqueness arises because the path of reputation described by equation (10) and the path of beliefs described by equation (7) have different responses to a change in the initial government reputation \( M_0 \). An increase in initial reputation \( M_0 \) means that all future reputations \( M_n \) must be higher to maintain the indifference condition. By contrast, a higher initial reputation means that posterior beliefs \( \pi_1 \) are lower, as more opportunistic governments are not imposing the capital control. This means that the future path of beliefs is also everywhere lower. In other words, the path of reputation \( M_n \) increases at every \( n \) in the initial reputation \( M_0 \), whereas the path of beliefs \( \pi_n \) determined by Bayes’ rule falls at every \( n \) in the initial reputation \( M_0 \). This gives rise to a crossing point of these two paths at any conjectured graduation step \( N \). The terminal condition of graduation, equation (11), then pins down the step \( N \) at which these two paths not only cross, but also graduation is feasible, giving rise to existence. At this point, a lower initial reputation would be required to graduate at a later step, due to the indifference path. However, a lower initial reputation implies that beliefs build faster, and so overshoot reputation. This gives rise to uniqueness.

**Numerical Illustration.** Figure 8 presents a numerical example of the equilibrium. Since investors are homogeneous, the opening up date is \( N^* = 0 \) by definition. In this example, graduation occurs at \( N = 10 \). The upper left panel plots the evolution of reputation \( M_n \) and beliefs \( \pi_n \). Beliefs and reputation are close to each other at \( n = 0 \) because, at this point, investors’ are almost certain the government is opportunistic; in this example, prior beliefs at \( n = 0 \) are \( \pi_0 = \epsilon^O = 0.01 \). Intuitively, most governments at \( n = 0 \) are those that exercised capital controls last period, thus revealing themselves to be opportunistic, and the only uncertainty about their type this period is due to the exogenous switching probability. At \( n = 0 \) there is no reputational cost to imposing the capital controls because the posterior belief would coincide with the prior, and a large increase in reputation is required for opportunistic governments to be willing to forgo imposing capital controls. Furthermore, since the belief that the government is the committed type is very low, a small fraction of opportunistic governments mimicking generates a large increase in posterior beliefs and future reputation. This can be seen in the top left panel of Figure 8 in which a large gain in reputation \( M_n \) occurs moving from \( n = 0 \) to \( n = 1 \). The top right quadrant shows that this is supported by a relatively low value of the mimicking probability \( m_0 \). As beliefs build, reputation exceeds beliefs as

\[ \text{If } \rho^I > 1 - \frac{V(O)}{V(1-C)} \text{, the proof of Proposition 1 additionally shows that it must be the case that } N < \infty. \]
Figure 8: Equilibrium Reputation Cycle: Homogeneous Foreign Investors

(a) Reputation and Beliefs $M$ and $\pi$

(b) Mimicking Probability $m$

(c) Interest Rate $R$

(d) Debt Issuance $D$

Notes: Numerical illustration of the equilibrium of the model when foreign investors are homogeneous. The $N$ dashed-red line is the graduation step.

more opportunistic governments are willing to defer employing capital controls to capitalize on the higher reputation and higher future benefits of imposing capital controls. This willingness declines as graduation approaches, reflecting the exponential convergence of the reputation building process.

The bottom left panel of Figure 8 shows the decline in the equilibrium interest rate $R_n$ as reputation of the government improves. The bottom right panel shows the corresponding increase in foreign debt as the reputation improves. At higher reputation the government contemporaneously sustains more foreign debt and lower interest rates which is intuitive since higher reputation is a shift downward in the interest rate schedule.

This homogeneous-investors version of the model already captures salient empirical features documented in Sections 2 and 3. Foreign entry into the Chinese market is a slow building process. In the model, investors “experiment” with this new market: they start with a cautious view ascribing a low reputation to the country. They then test the country commitment during crises: they pull out their capital and pay attention to the reaction of the Chinese government and the well functioning
of the bond market. If during these crises the Chinese government lets foreigners take their money out unimpaired, foreign investors positively update on the future prospects of investing in Chinese bonds. The model makes sense of the 2015-16 v-shape episode of capital outflows, again visible in Appendix Figure A.II. In the midst of economic and financial turmoil in China, foreigners liquidated more than 20% of their Chinese bond holdings without the Chinese government locking the gates to foreign capital.\footnote{As the crisis passed, foreign capital flows returned to China with the overall foreign bond holdings increasing well past their pre-2015 peak.\footnote{To further connect the model with the empirical patterns of reform and sequential investor entry of Section 3.1, we next turn to analyzing the equilibrium of the heterogeneous investor model.}}

42 As the crisis passed, foreign capital flows returned to China with the overall foreign bond holdings increasing well past their pre-2015 peak.\footnote{In fact, the Chinese government decided to intervene by blocking domestic savers from exporting capital. A decision that we view, in part, as being motivated by fears that restrictions on foreigners would have damaged China’s reputation in global markets at a time when China was actively pushing for internationalization.}

5.3 Model Equilibrium with Stable and Flighty Investors

We now analyze the model with heterogeneous investor types. We assume that $\epsilon^O < M^* < 1 - \epsilon^C$, so that a committed government with reputation $\epsilon^O$ would not open up whereas a committed government with reputation $1 - \epsilon^C$ would open up. A number of different combinations are possible, with opening up preceding or following graduation, as well as different timing for both events. Formally, our conjectured equilibrium has an opening up step $0 \leq N^* \leq N + 1$ and a graduation step $N$. If $N^* = 0$ then the economy opens up immediately, whereas if $N^* = N + 1$ then the economy only opens after graduation.

If $N^* = 0$, then the transition dynamics are the same as in Section 5.2. If $N^* = N + 1$, the economy follows the transition dynamics of Section 5.2 up to a change in the definition of the graduation condition in equation (11).\footnote{The simplicity of the model implies that the level of holdings is purely a function of reputation. This can be relaxed by making the outside option $\bar{R}$ or the slope of the demand curve $b$ time varying, thus allowing for changes in the demand for Chinese bonds that do not depend solely on reputation.}\footnote{Since the economy is closed to flighty investors at $N$ but open at $N + 1$, the graduation condition in this case is $V(1 - \epsilon^C) \leq \frac{\rho}{\rho^f} \{\rho V(M_N) + V(M_0)\}$, where the RHS is the required promised flow utility to maintain indifference at the opening up date (see equation (13)).} Therefore, we focus attention here on characterizing the transition dynamics when $0 < N^* \leq N$: the cycle starts with only stable investors, reputation builds up for some time, then the government opens up to flighty investors, reputation builds up for more time until eventually the government imposes capital controls and the cycle restarts.

When $0 < N^* \leq N$, the transition dynamics of the model from equation (9) can be divided into two regions: a region with only stable investors and one with both investors. At the boundary between these two regions, a jump occurs in the dynamics.

The first region covers the cycle steps before the economy opens up to flighty investors. When $n + 1 < N^*$ (if nonempty), the economy has not yet opened up at either $n$ or $n + 1$. In this case, the haircut is that demanded by the stable investors, $h_0 = \ldots = h_n = h_{n+1} = h^s$, and the transition
dynamics in equation (9) reduces to the transition dynamics governed by the stable investors:

\[ V(M_{n+1}) = \rho^s V(M_n) + V(M_0). \]  

(12)

The dynamics in this region carry the same intuition as the dynamics in the one investor model.

At the point of opening up to flighty investors, the economy is not open to them at \( n = N^* - 1 \) but is open to them at \( n + 1 = N^* \). This means that \( h_0 = ... = h_{N^*-1} = h^s \) but \( h_{N^*} = h^f \).

Therefore, the transition dynamics of equation (9) generate

\[ V(M_{N^*}) = \frac{g(h^s)}{g(h^f)} \left( \rho^s V(M_{N^*-1}) + V(M_0) \right). \]  

(13)

The opening up step \( N^* \) has the same transition dynamics as before opening up, but is scaled by the relative value \( g(h^s)/g(h^f) \) of imposing the capital control before and after opening up. We have that \( g(h^s) > g(h^f) \): for a given inside equity, imposing capital controls before rather than after opening up increases the government utility more. Intuitively, this occurs because flighty investors are more inelastic (require a higher haircut) in their debt rollover decisions in the crisis state, thus making imposing capital controls ex-post less advantageous for the government. Opening up is a disproportionately expensive action for the opportunistic types to take. In reputation games, taking this type of expensive action comes with a jump up in reputation.

Formally, this manifests as a larger increase in the flow value \( V(M_{N^*}) \) relative to the dynamics before opening up. This is because the lower proportional value of exercising the capital control must be offset by a larger increase in the baseline value \( V(M_{N^*}) \) which that proportional increase is weighed against. Since the proportional value of imposing the capital control falls by \( g(h^f)/g(h^s) \), flow utility must increase by the same proportion \( g(h^s)/g(h^f) \) in order to maintain indifference. In other words, the transition dynamics of the value of the opportunistic government of imposing capital controls, \( g(h_n)V(M_n) \), are the same at and before opening up.\(^{45}\)

Our model captures the notion that investors welcome these “opening up” decisions from China, which in the data correspond to the reforms that increase market access to foreigners described in Section 3.1. The model provides a rationale for the pattern in Figure 3 where these reforms lead to more foreign participation in local bond markets by progressively flightier investors. The model captures both the gradualism of reforms, the sequencing (starting with stable and then going to flightier investors), and the bunched entry (the jump up at opening up). The gradualism occurs because at low levels of reputation it is too expensive to open up to flighty investors. China first “experiments” with only stable investors and waits for investors to form a higher opinion, a higher reputation, of the functioning of its domestic bond market. When reputation is sufficiently high, China pursues reforms that broaden market access to flightier foreign investors. These reforms are

\(^{45}\)We can alternatively express the transition dynamics of the problem as \( g(h_n)V(M_n) = \rho^s g(h_n)V(M_n) + g(h_0)V(M_0) \), which expresses them in terms of the value \( g(h_n)V(M_n) \) to the opportunistic government of imposing the capital control.
viewed positively by investors in the sense that they lead to higher reputation for the country. The higher reputation is associated with more participation even at low interest rates, a shift downward and flattening of the investors demand curve. The bunched entry at the point of reform, like the entry observed after the introduction of Bond Connect and the accompanying reforms that led to index inclusion, occurs because of the fixed cost nature of reforms in our model.

The second region is the cycle steps after opening up but before the graduation step, \( N^* < n + 1 \leq N \) (if nonempty). In this region, the economy is open at both \( n \) and \( n + 1 \), so that \( h_0 = h^s \) and \( h_n = h_{n+1} = h^f \). As a result, the transition dynamics of equation (9) are

\[
V(M_{n+1}) = \rho^f V(M_n) + \frac{g^s}{g^f} V(M_0).
\]  

(14)

Intuitively, a government that imposes the capital control at \( n \) also benefits from the higher proportional value of imposing the capital control when it resets to reputation \( M_0 \). This leads to the scaling of \( V(M_0) \) by \( g(h^s)/g(h^f) \). The rate of convergence also shifts from \( \rho^s \) to \( \rho^f \), reflecting that the smaller proportional value of imposing the capital control slows the required increases in reputation needed to make the government willing not to impose the capital control today. This captures the notion that building reputation as a reserve currency issuer gets progressively more difficult later in the game, once reputation is already high, since the large stock of reputation acts as a commitment device. The presence of the flightier class of investors accentuates this dynamic by decreasing the gains further from imposing capital controls.

The model offers an explanation for the seemingly puzzling observation that despite the Chinese Bond Connect platform having no limits on northbound flows (foreign capital inflows into China), foreign investors after a period of bunched entry did not immediately go “all in” into Chinese bonds. As we documented in Section 2, some prominent investors kept being underweight China compared to the size of its bond market (or the weight in benchmark bond indices). In the model, very much like in the homogeneous investor case, away from reform dates (the open up step) reputation evolves slowly and even in the best case scenario of no major crises and capital controls not being instituted, it takes time for investors to choose to increase their positions.

Finally, opportunistic governments must be willing to graduate at \( N \), that is they must find imposing the capital control to be preferable. The required condition for graduation at \( N \) is given by\(^\text{46}\)

\[
V(1 - \epsilon^C) \leq \rho^f V(M_N) + \frac{g(h^s)}{g(h^f)} V(M_0).
\]  

(15)

The intuition is analogous to the one investor model (equation (11)). Maintaining indifference requires an increasing path of reputation \( M_n \). Graduation occurs at the step \( N \) where the reputation

\(^{46}\)Note that equation (15) is correct even if \( N^* = N \), that is opening up and graduation coincide and the transition dynamics of equation (14) never apply on the equilibrium path. This is because graduation is governed by the evolution of reputation that would be required to maintain indifference, and hence by equation (14).
implied by the indifference path (14) exceeds the highest possible reputation $1 - \epsilon C$.

The conjectured equilibrium of this model consists of a graduation step $N$, an opening up step $N^*$, a path of reputation $M_0, ..., M_N$, and a path of beliefs $\pi_0, ..., \pi_N$ such that: (i) reputation evolves by the transition dynamics in equations (12, 13, and 14); (ii) beliefs evolve according to Bayes’ rule in equation (7); (iii) all opportunist governments are willing to graduate at $N$ as in condition (15); (iv) $\pi_n \leq M_n$ for $n < N$ (that is, $0 \leq m_n \leq 1$); and (v) $M_N = \pi_N$. As before, we refer to this as a graduation step Markov equilibrium. The proposition below characterizes this equilibrium.

**Proposition 2** There is at most one graduation step Markov equilibrium associated with an opening up step $N^*$.

The model with heterogeneous investors might feature multiple equilibria with different opening up steps, but given an opening up step there is at most one equilibrium of this form associated with that step. In some sense, the logic of uniqueness of the equilibrium in the special case of homogeneous investors carries over to this set-up with multiple classes once the opening up step is fixed. The multiplicity, if present, arises from setting two different opening up steps. Technically, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises from the fact that reputation grows faster before opening up, but the jump up of reputation upon opening up is smaller the longer opening up is postponed. Intuitively, at a conjectured opening up date there might be two possible outcomes. The first is that the economy opens up and reputation experiences a larger jump according to equation (13), carrying it to $M_{N^*} > M^*$. This then rationalizes the decision of committed governments to open up at $N^*$. However, it can also be possible that if there were no jump and equation (12) governed the dynamics, we would have $M_{N^*} < M^*$. This in turn rationalizes the decision of committed governments not to open up.

**Additional Heterogeneity in Investor Demand Curves.** To focus on our core point on differences in investor flightiness, our baseline model assumes the only difference between investors is their required haircut. However, in reality, there may be other dimensions along which investors differ. In Appendix Section A.XX, we allow for further heterogeneity in terms of parameters of the demand curve, like slope and intercept, as well as capping the total amount of financing that can be obtained by some investors. This allows for a richer characterization of heterogeneity and highlights the fixed-cost component of reforms that open up to further types of investors.

**Numerical Illustration.** Figure 9 provides a numerical example of the equilibrium. In this case, the economy opens up at $N^* = 2$ and graduates at $N = 5$. The dynamics before opening up are similar to those in the one investor class case. At low levels of reputation letting in the flighty investors is sub-optimal since total desired borrowing is small.\(^{47}\) While beginning with low reputation

\(^{47}\)This numerical example uses the more general heterogeneity in demand curves described in Appendix A.XX including a limit on the amount stable investors can invest ($\bar{D}_s$).
and borrowing only from stable investors, as reputation builds further and consequently the interest rate schedule shifts downwards, desired borrowing increases to the point that the government decides to let in the flighty investors. As discussed above, the decision to open up endogenously causes a jump up in reputation since it is disproportionately expensive for the opportunistic governments to mimic this decision. Reputation build-up slows down substantially after opening up as seen in the top left panel of Figure 9. The bottom right panel of Figure 9 confirms the intuition that the government upon opening up to flighty investors wants to borrow a lot more. The bottom left panel shows that the equilibrium interest rate falls together with this debt increase.

After opening up, foreign debt continues to increase and interest rates continue to fall, but the movements are much less pronounced since further build up of reputation occurs slowly. Eventually, much like in the one investor case, the economy reaches a level of debt and reputation at which further gains would be too small and all opportunistic governments decide to impose capital controls if a crisis occurs, thus restarting the reputation cycle.

Notes: Numerical illustration of the equilibrium of the model when foreign investors are heterogeneous. The $N^*$ dashed-green and $N$ dashed-red lines are the opening-up and graduation steps, respectively.
The model shows how hard it is to build a reputation toward being a reserve currency. At a basic level, the rule of law and financial market development are important characteristics, on which China still has much progress to make. But being an international currency goes even further, it is a promise to foreign investors of a store of value in a crisis. Many government actions, such as ex-post capital controls, but also currency depreciation and/or inflation, can impair such a promise without constituting a deviation from the rule of law per se. Investors buying an international currency do so for its safety and liquidity and we think of these characteristics as being very sensitive to the reputation of the government. This view drove the focus of the paper on foreign investment in domestic currency bonds, rather than equity of foreign direct investment where there is no expectation of stable returns regardless of the level of financial development or reputation.

The heterogeneous investor model highlights the importance of building the investor base, starting with stable investors, in the early phases of internationalizing the bond market of what could become an international currency. We think of the demand for the country’s bonds by stable investors even at low levels of reputation as a special characteristic of countries that could become a reserve currency, like China. Most other countries, like many emerging markets, do not have this option and instead open up directly facing flighty investors. Some developed countries, like Australia, only attract reserve managers when they already have a very high reputation. At each point in history only a handful of countries are possible contenders for a reserve currency role and researchers have long debated these countries necessary characteristics such as size, importance in trade, military power, institutional quality, and fiscal capacity (Eichengreen et al. (2017)). The heterogeneous investor model captures this idea as the presence of these characteristics for China (e.g. size, and military power) is why the stable investors are demanding the bonds even at low levels of reputation, and instead focus on the endogenous build up of reputation.

It is also interesting to reflect on how the model speaks to earlier episodes of countries building reputation toward becoming a global reserve currency. In this respect, we think of the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, policy of having the newly created federal government assume the debt of the states. The policy aimed at building a solid reputation as a borrower for the newly created United States (Sargent (2012)). Similarly, we think of the later efforts by New York Federal Reserve Governor Benjamin Strong to build an investor base for the trade-bills (bankers acceptances) market in dollar in New York to rival the liquid and safe markets for these bills in sterling in London. Such efforts were instrumental into making the dollar a reserve currency (Eichengreen (2011); Broz (2018)). The need to maintain reputation was also a motivation behind England’s misguided return to the gold standard at the pre-war exchange rate level in the 1920s.49

48Hamilton (1790) extols the virtues of governments that maintain their promises to creditors: “States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and trusted: while the reverse is the fate of those, who pursue an opposite conduct. […] The credit of the United States will quickly be established on the firm foundation of an effectual provision for the existing debt.” Chernow (2004)[pg 298] remarks: “With this huge gamble, Hamilton laid the foundations for America’s future financial preeminence”.

49The Cunliffe Committee, charged in 1918 with studying the possible international monetary arrangements after WWI, stated in its interim report: “The uncertainty of the monetary situation will handicap
Countries have, at various times, suffered losses of reputation as a provider of reserve currencies. England suffered a blow to its reputation with the sudden devaluation of the pound in 1931 and never recovered its role as a reserve currency provider. The US went off gold in 1933 and then again in 1972. In particular, the Nixon administration in 1971 reneged on a promise of free convertibility of the dollar into gold, restricting this ability only to official (“stable”) investors and excluding the private (“flighty”) investors. Immediately after 1973 there was an attempt by foreign investors to diversify away from the dollar, but, perhaps due to the lack of viable alternatives, the dollar quickly regained and maintained its status.\(^5\)

To further connect the model with the empirical patterns of investor specialization in different assets in Section 3.2 and to analyze the competition between a new entrant like China and an established player like the US, we next turn to developing a version of the reputation model in which multiple countries compete in issuing debt in world markets.

### 6 Reserve Currency Competition

The model considered so far featured a single country facing a set of investors. An important feature of becoming an international currency is that a country at the beginning of the cycle faces competition from both other “aspirants”, those at the same low level of reputation, and from countries that are already established, those at high levels of reputation. For example, China is entering now, but faces competition from the US as an established reserve currency issuer. Theoretically, the interaction between reputation building and competition is an interesting area due to complementarities. For example, the value to a country of future higher reputation increases if current competitors lose reputation but decreases if entrenched players issue more. Both occur because the actions of others affect the residual demand curve that the country faces for its debt at future levels of reputation.

We now extend our baseline model to study competition between countries and multiple investors with different portfolio preferences. For example, some investors might be developed market specialists while others might be emerging market specialists as we documented in Section 3.2. In this section, we assume that all investors demand the same haircut \(h\).

There is a measure one of countries, indexed by \(j \in [0, 1]\). Countries are identical in the sense that they have the same fundamentals, but may be at different reputation levels \(M\). We denote \(\mu\) to be the distribution (measure) over reputation levels among countries. The distribution \(\mu\) is an

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\(^5\)The model could be extended to include behavioral biases in the updating of reputation in the form of wedges in equation (7). In particular, it would be interesting to consider a set-up in which investors, conditional on not observing ex-post capital controls in a crisis, become overly optimistic about the government being the committed type. Once they observe a country being a safe investment for a while, they think it will always be safe.
endogenous object, but is taken as given by individual countries and by investors.

We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which $R_j(M) = R(M)$ for all $j$ at reputation $M$, that is all countries at the same reputation post the same interest rate, and investors choose $D_{ij}(M) = D_i(M)$ for all $j$. In this sense, we are treating the problem as if there is a representative committed government of reputation $M$ that is choosing an issuance decision. Similarly, we define the decision problems of opportunistic governments as functions of their reputation $M$ but not of their identity $j$. For brevity, we henceforth suppress the $j$ notation.

In addition to the debt issuances of the set of countries, we introduce an asset $S$ that is in fixed supply $S$ and that is sold competitively. Its endogenously determined return is $R^S$. This asset serves as a common factor across investors.

### 6.1 Specialist Investors: Asset Demand and Aggregation

A model with multiple assets of varying reputation, that is the debts issued by each of the countries, also allows us to study heterogeneity in investors portfolio holdings. Consistent with Section 3.2, we allow investors to specialize in assets of varying levels of reputation. In the data, some funds specialize in risky emerging market debt and others in safe debt issued by developed countries. Formally, we assume that there is a set of investors, $i \in \{1, ..., I\}$, each of equal size $\frac{1}{I}$. Investor $i$ takes the distribution $\mu$ of countries, the posted interest rates $R$, and the return $R^S$ as given. She chooses her debt portfolio, $D_i$, and asset holdings, $S_i$, in order to maximize her utility,

$$
(R^S - \bar{R})S_i + \frac{1}{2} \int E[\tilde{R}(M) - \bar{R}]D_i(M)d\mu(M) - \frac{1}{8}b\left(\lambda S_i + \int \omega_i(M)D_i(M)^2d\mu(M)\right)^2
$$

where $\omega_i : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, \infty)$ is a weighting function that depends on $i$, and where $\lambda$ is a weight on the holding cost of $S_i$. The weights $\omega_i$ are investor specific and akin to taste (higher or lower holding cost) for particular assets.\(^{51}\)

**Demand Curves for Assets.** Given the preferences of investor $i$, we can write the demand curve of investor $i$ for $S_i$ from her first order conditions as

$$
R^S - \bar{R} = \frac{1}{4}b\lambda(\lambda S_i + \int \omega_i(M)D_i(M)^2d\mu(M)).
$$

We sum this equation over all investors to obtain

$$
R^S - \bar{R} = \frac{1}{I} \int S + \sum_i \int \omega_i(M)D_i(M)^2d\mu(M)).
$$

\(^{51}\)Equation (16) is the analog of investor preferences in the previous section, with the exception that $i$’s portfolio holding costs are no longer separable across countries and reputation levels. The Lebesgue integrals in the equation are defined over the distribution $\mu(M)$. The baseline model with a single investor is a special case of this model in which we assumed that holding costs were separable across countries, that $\omega_i(M) = 1$, and that $I = 1$. 

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The above two equations tell us that the marginal portfolio holding cost of investor \( i \) is equal to the return on asset \( S \) relative to the outside option, \( R^S - \bar{R} \). Likewise, the average portfolio holding costs across investors is also equal to \( R^S - \bar{R} \). This common factor across investors induces much tractability, as it will become clear below.\(^{52}\) For simplicity, we set \( S = 0 \), so that asset \( S \) is in zero net supply, and normalize the holding cost \( \lambda = 1 \). Under these assumptions, we define the average portfolio holding cost from above:

\[
b^* = 2(R^S - \bar{R}) = \frac{1}{2} b \int \left[ \frac{1}{T} \sum \omega_i(M)D_i(M)^2 \right] d\mu(M), \tag{18}
\]

where we multiply by two without loss for convenience in the derivations that follow.

The first order condition for investor \( i \) for debt purchase from a country of reputation \( M \) with a promised interest rate \( R(M) \) is

\[
E[\tilde{R}(M)] = \bar{R} + \frac{1}{2} b^* \omega_i(M)D_i(M) \tag{19}
\]

This demand curve has the same form as in the baseline model, except that \( b^* \omega_i(M) \) replaces \( b \) as the slope of the demand curve. The demand curve is affected not only by overall debt issuance, \( b^* \), but also by the reputation-specific holding costs \( \omega_i(M) \) of investor \( i \). For example, an investor \( i \) that specializes in reputation \( M \) might have a low holding cost \( \omega_i(M) \), and hence have a relatively flat interest rate schedule for debt of that reputation level.

The model features a very tractable aggregation to a representative investor. Consider the problem of a committed government that currently has reputation \( M \). As in the baseline model, this committed government internalizes the effect of the promised interest rate \( R(M) \) on the demand schedules (19) of all investors. Given nondiscrimination in interest rates between investors, equating the demand schedules of two investors gives us

\[
\omega_i(M)D_i(M) = \omega_1(M)D_1(M) \tag{20}
\]

for all \( i \). A country of reputation \( M \) raises different debt amounts from different investors only to the extent that their holding costs \( \omega_i(M) \) differ. The term \( b^* \) drops out since it is common across investors. The total amount borrowed by a country of reputation \( M \) is given by

\[
D(M) = \omega_i(M)D_i(M) \frac{1}{T} \sum_j \frac{1}{\omega_j(M)}. \tag{20}
\]

From here, it is useful to define

\[
\frac{1}{\omega(M)} = \frac{1}{T} \sum \frac{1}{\omega_i(M)}. \tag{21}
\]

Equation (21) defines \( \omega(M) \) as a measure of the average holding cost \( \omega_i(M) \) across investors. It defines the average taste, \( \frac{1}{\omega(M)} \), of investors for debt of that level of reputation. Substituting equations (20) and (21) into equation (18), we obtain:

\[
b^* = \frac{1}{2} b \int \omega(M)D(M)^2d\mu(M).
\]

\(^{52}\) An analogy might be drawn with money in the utility function frameworks and the cashless limit; a modeling tool that has proved very tractable in macro theory.
An optimizing country of reputation $M$ chooses total issuance as if it was facing a representative investor with demand schedule:

$$\mathbb{E}[\hat{R}(M)] = R + \frac{1}{2} b^* \omega(M) D(M). \quad (22)$$

The aggregate demand schedule depends on average holding costs $b^*$ and reputation specific taste $\omega(M)$. When other countries increase issuance to the investors, the residual demand curve faced by a specific country for its debt worsens. The effect occurs through a common component, $b^*$, to which countries of varying reputation $M$ are heterogeneously exposed via the taste $\omega(M)$. Countries at levels of reputation that investors find less attractive, a high $\omega(M)$, are more exposed to increases in $b^*$.

### 6.2 Country Issuance Decisions

We define $D^{NC}(M)$ to be the optimal debt issuance of a committed government with reputation $M$ in the baseline model (i.e. no competition and homogeneous investors), as defined under Lemma 1, when that government faces slope $b$. Equation (22) then tells us that the solution here is simply

$$D(M) = \frac{b}{b^* \omega(M)} D^{NC}(M), \quad (23)$$

and moreover we know that the equilibrium promised interest rate is $R(M) = \frac{1}{2} R + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q$, as in the baseline model. The proof follows exactly as in Lemma 1, except that we no longer have to account for $M^*$ since investors here are assumed to be homogeneous in terms of haircuts. Intuitively, optimal debt issuance here is scaled up or down relative to the model without competition by the relative slopes of the demand curves in the two cases. As the slope steepens due to competition ($b^*$), equilibrium issuance falls. Substituting equation (23) into the expression for $b^*$, we write

$$b^* = b \left( \frac{1}{2} \int \frac{1}{\omega(M)} D^{NC}(M)^2 d\mu(M) \right)^{1/3}. \quad (24)$$

This expresses $b^*$ as a function of the equilibrium stationary distribution $\mu$ over reputations.

### 6.3 Equilibrium and Stationary Distribution

We have so far mapped the decision problem of committed governments in the model with competition into the same decision problem in the model without competition. We now show that this mapping of the model can be tractably extended to solve for the problem of opportunistic governments in the dynamic reputation model. Mapping into the dynamic reputation model involves solving for both the reputational dynamics and also the distribution $\mu$ over reputations. In particular, the distribution will be atomic with atoms at $M = \{M_0, ..., M_N, 1 - \epsilon C\}$, and with no mass at
any point in \([0, 1]\) that is disjoint with \(M\). \(M\) is the reputation cycle.

As in the baseline model we conjecture a graduation step Markov equilibrium. The transition dynamics in this model have the form

\[
V(M_n, b^*) = \rho V(M_{n-1}, b^*) + V(M_0, b^*),
\]

capturing the fact that the transition dynamics now depend on the distribution \(\mu\) through \(b^*\). A key point of tractability of this competition model is that \(b^*\) is a sufficient statistic for the distribution \(\mu\) when solving the dynamic reputation model. For a given \(b^*\), there exists a unique graduation step Markov equilibrium. We obtain this result as a corollary of Proposition 1.53

The conjectured equilibrium of this model consists of a slope \(b^*\), a discrete set of reputations \(M\), and a distribution \(\mu\) over that set such that: (i) the set \(M\) is the cycle of the unique graduation step Markov equilibrium associated with \(b^*\); (ii) the distribution \(\mu\) is the stationary distribution from that graduation step Markov equilibrium; (iii) \(b^*\) is equal to the marginal portfolio holding cost of investors, that is equation (24) holds.54

A remarkable point of tractability of this model is that \(b^*\) is a sufficient statistic for determining the equilibrium reputation cycle and stationary distribution, leaving only the consistency condition (24) to verify. In Appendix A.XVII, we leverage this insight to show that holding all parameters fixed except for \(b\), every \(b^*\) can be obtained as a solution of a model with competition for some unique value of \(b\).

Competition affects the dynamics of the model both by affecting the optimal debt policy for a given reputation path and by affecting the path of reputation itself. Intuitively, competition lowers the value of becoming a reserve currency because, in the presence of competitors, the residual demand curve for debt is not as attractive (steeper) for the issuer. Most potential candidate countries stay at low levels of reputation, that is they do not become reserve currencies, and even those that emerge as reserve currencies find being one less valuable than in the absence of competition. To unpack these effects it is useful to consider some special cases before turning to the full effect of competition on the stationary distribution.

We consider first the special case of no inside equity, so that all projects are fully debt financed.

**Proposition 3** Assume that inside equity is zero, \(A = 0\). Then, there exists a unique graduation step Markov equilibrium of the model with competition. The reputation vector \(M\) and distribution \(\mu\) are the same as those in the unique graduation step Markov equilibrium in the model without competition but with holding costs \(\omega\). Competition lowers the optimal debt issuance but does not affect the evolution of reputation.

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53The only material difference to the form of \(V\) is that the model with competition involves the weights \(\omega\), and otherwise replaces \(b\) with \(b^*\). The proof of Proposition 1 only made use of \(V\) being increasing and continuous. Once we assume that \(V(M_n, b^*)\) is increasing and continuous, the proof of Proposition 1 therefore extends immediately this setting. We have already assumed continuity. A (stronger than necessary) sufficient condition for \(V(M, b^*)\) to be increasing in \(M\) is that \(\omega\) is nonincreasing in \(M\).

54Appendix A.XVIII characterizes the stationary distribution \(\mu\).
In this limiting case, competition lowers equilibrium debt issuance but has no direct impact on the reputational dynamics. The reason is that absent inside equity, the entire value of the government comes from debt issuance. Because \( b^* \) has the same proportional impact on the demand curves of all reputation levels, it drops out of the transition dynamics absent inside equity, leading to the limiting result.

In the general case with \( A \geq 0 \), the transition dynamics are

\[
V^\omega(M_n) = \rho v A \frac{b^* - b}{b} + \rho V^\omega(M_{n-1}) + V^\omega(M_0),
\]

where \( V^\omega \) is the indirect utility function when there is no competition and there are weights \( \omega \), and where \( v = \frac{h}{\gamma Q} \gamma Q \) is the marginal value of inside equity in the low state.\(^{55}\) In the limiting case of \( A = 0 \), these transition dynamics collapse to those of the model without competition, as highlighted by Proposition 3. When \( A > 0 \), the above equation shows that reputation builds more quickly when competition is higher, that is \( b^* \) increases relative to \( b \). Intuitively, the government’s value can be thought of as a combination of value from inside equity and value from external debt. As competition becomes more fierce, the value of external debt declines relative to the value of inside equity, making it less costly for a government to forego its current reputation level (all else equal). This means that a larger reputational gain is required to induce the opportunistic government to be willing to forgo capital controls today.

This observation gives rise to our second interesting limiting case: that committed governments can provide sufficiently fierce competition to force immediate graduation by opportunistic governments.

**Proposition 4** There exists a threshold \( \overline{b}^* \) such that if and only if \( b^* > \overline{b}^* \), there is a crowd out equilibrium of the competition model in which \( M = \{\epsilon W, 1 - \epsilon C\} \) and all opportunistic governments immediately graduate.

Intuitively, competition in this case is sufficiently fierce that opportunistic governments cannot build sufficient value from reputation. As a result, they immediately impose capital controls and graduate. Proposition 4 expresses the result in terms of a threshold on the sufficient statistic \( b^* \). The proof of Proposition 4, see Appendix A.XIII, shows that this threshold is given by

\[
\overline{b}^* = \left( 1 + \frac{V^\omega(1 - \epsilon C) - (1 + \rho) V^\omega(\epsilon O)}{\rho v A} \right) b.
\]

A similar expression holds in the model without competition and provides a restriction on a set of parameters, including the slope of the demand curve \( b \), to avoid immediate graduation \((N = 0)\). In particular, the model without competition requires that \( (1 + \rho) V^\omega(\epsilon O) \geq V^\omega(1 - \epsilon C) \) for immediate graduation to occur. If the model without competition features immediate graduation, then the

\(^{55}\)See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.

47
model with competition also features immediate graduation. The threshold above shows that even if the model without competition has a nonzero graduation step, sufficiently strong competition can force immediate graduation.

We now turn a numerical illustration of the general case. Figure 10 plots the stationary distribution of reputation for a country in the model under two configurations. In the first configuration, there is a single issuing country cycling over its reputation. The distribution $\mu$ is degenerate at each point in time and for simplicity we assume $\omega(M)$ constant in $M$. This configuration is equivalent to the baseline model of Section 5.2 with homogeneous haircuts. For this configuration, Figure 10 panel (d) plots the stationary frequency that the country spends at each level of reputation. The country spends most of the time at low levels of reputation highlighting how difficult it is to emerge as a reserve currency in the model.

In the second configuration, there is a unit mass of issuing countries. All parameters are otherwise identical to the first configuration, including $b$ and $\omega(M)$. For this configuration, Figure 10 panel (d) plots the stationary frequency that a country, drawn at random ex-ante, spends at each level of reputation. Given the law of large numbers, this frequency also coincides with the stationary cross-sectional distribution $\mu$. Compared to the first configuration, the country now spends more time at lower levels of reputation and graduates sooner. Indeed, Panel (a) shows that reputation at $n = 0$ is lower under competition, but then grows faster leading to an early graduation. The faster growth is consistent with the lower mimicking probability at $n = 0$ under competition. More opportunistic types reveal themselves at $n = 0$ leading to a higher stationary mass point there (see Panel (d)). Panel (c) confirms that debt issuance per country falls due to competition. Overall, these features highlight that competition deters a country currently at a low level of reputation, like China, from building reputation up into being a reserve currency.

**How Can the U.S. Deter China From Becoming a Reserve Currency?** In the model of competition we studied above, countries take the reputation cycle and distribution as given, in the spirit of monopolistic competition models. It is interesting to consider here the incentives of a country to manipulate the cycle. We consider the following leading example. Suppose there was a large country known to be committed forever, so that its reputation is $M = 1$ and constant. Assume that this country chooses issuance taking into consideration its effect on the reputational cycle $M$, distribution $\mu$, and other countries’ issuance $D(M)$, that is its effect on $b^*$. In terms of the model developed in this section, it is convenient to make this country (the US) the issuer of the outside asset $S$ which we previously took as being supplied exogenously at $\bar{S}$. Hence, this country faces the demand curve in equation (17). As it increases issuance $S$, the first term in the demand curve, $\lambda S$, leads to the usual monopolist effect: the country internalizes that

\[56\] Both distribution feature an increase in mass at the highest reputation that is achieved after graduation. This level of reputation is identical in the two configurations and given by $1 - \epsilon_c$. The graduation step is an absorbing state for committed types, so that a mass of probability builds up in the model at that level of reputation.
Figure 10: Competition and the Stationary Distribution

(a) Reputation $M$

(b) Mimicking Probability $m$

(c) Debt Issuance $D$

(d) Stationary Distribution

Notes: Numerical illustration of the model with or without competition. Panel (a) plots the reputation cycle $M$. Panel (b) plots the mimicking probability $m$. Panel (c) plots debt issuance. In panels (a), (b), and (c), the $N^C$ dashed-blue and $N^{NC}$ dashed-red lines are the graduation steps of the model with competition and no competition, respectively. Panel (d) plots the stationary distribution of the two models.
its own interest rate goes up as it issues more debt. More interestingly, higher issuance $S$ also affects the second term, $\sum_i \omega_i(M)D_i(M)^2d\mu(M)$. The country chooses higher issuance if this latter effect is negative. Intuitively, this occurs because the country internalizes that an increase in its issuance decreases the competition it would face by the entrants (countries like China going through the reputation cycle), thus improving its own residual demand curve. Appendix A.XIV provides full details, and here we sketch the effects. When the graduation step $N$ is locally constant in $b^*$, we can write

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial b^*} \int \omega(M)D(M)^2d\mu(M) = 2\sum_n \omega(M_n)D(M_n)\frac{\partial D(M_n)}{\partial b^*}\mu(M_n)$$

$$+ \sum_n \frac{\partial \left[\omega(M_n)D(M_n)^2\right]}{\partial M_n}\frac{dM_n}{db^*}\mu(M_n) + \sum_n \omega(M_n)D(M_n)^2\frac{d\mu(M_n)}{db^*}$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Stackelberg</th>
<th>Effect on Reputation Building</th>
<th>Effect on Stationary Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\partial}{\partial b^*} \int \omega(M)D(M)^2d\mu(M)$</td>
<td>$2\sum_n \omega(M_n)D(M_n)\frac{\partial D(M_n)}{\partial b^*}\mu(M_n)$</td>
<td>$\sum_n \omega(M_n)D(M_n)^2\frac{d\mu(M_n)}{db^*}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are three effects. The first is a traditional Stackelberg competition effect: for given reputation cycle $M$ and stationary distribution $\mu$, an increase in $S$ pushes up the borrowing rate and lowers issuance by all other countries. This encourages more issuance by the US, since the US internalizes that part of the increase in $S$ is offset by a reduction in issuance by other countries. In the special case of no inside equity $A = 0$, this is the only effect (see Proposition 3).

The second is the effect of $S$ on the equilibrium reputation cycle. Even though the graduation step $N$ is locally constant, the cycle reputation levels $M_n$ change as $S$ increases. In the appendix, we show that we can write this effect as a combination of two competing effects,

$$\sum_n \frac{\partial \left[\omega(M_n)D(M_n)^2\right]}{\partial M_n}\frac{dM_n}{db^*}\mu(M_n) = (1-\Delta_0) \frac{1}{\eta_0} \frac{1}{b^*-b} \sum_{n>0} \Omega_n + \Delta_0 \frac{\partial M_0}{\partial b^*} \sum_n \Omega_n$$

| Effect on Reputation Building | Faster Reputation Building, $>0$ | Lower Initial Reputation, $<0$ |

There are two effects of competition on the reputation cycle. The first is that for a given initial reputation, reputation builds more quickly. This pushes up issuance and lowers the value of increasing $S$. The second effect is that the initial reputation is lowered, which pushes down issuance and increases the value of increasing $S$. These two effects are weighted by $\Delta_0 = \frac{V(M_0)}{V(M_0)+\rho A \frac{1}{\tau}}$, which is the relative share of value from reputation building that derives from initial reputation as opposed to competition.

Third, an increase in $S$ changes the distribution $\mu$. As $b^*$ increases, $M_0$ falls, meaning that $m_0$ also falls and an opportunistic governments of low reputation is less likely to build past its initial reputation. Further, the results from Proposition 4 still apply here, the US can choose such a high level of issuance to force all opportunistic competitor countries (the new entrants) to graduate.
immediately.

6.4 Investor Portfolios and an Empirical Proxy for Reputation

The presence of multiple investors and assets allows us to characterize what types of investors hold a country at a given point in its reputation cycle. From the demand curves derived above, we have $D_i(M) = \frac{1}{\omega_i(M)} \omega(M) D(M)$. Consider a single country with reputation $M$. The (infinitesimal) portfolio share of investor $i$ in that single country is given by

$$\alpha_i(M) = \frac{1}{\omega_i(M)} \omega(M) D(M) AUM_i.$$

It is useful to consider the correlation of portfolio shares across funds, and we consider the simplest case of assuming funds are equally sized ($AUM_i$ constant for all $i$). We consider fixing a reference set of assets, say those with high reputation, denoted $M^r$. Then we can derive the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** The portfolio share correlation across investors $i$ for assets of reputation $M$ with a reference set of reputation $M^r$ is

$$\text{corr}(\alpha_i(M), \alpha_i(M^r)) = \text{corr} \left( \frac{1}{\omega_i(M)}, \frac{1}{\omega_i(M^r)} \right).$$

Proposition 5 provides the theoretical counterpart to equation (1) and the empirical evidence on portfolio shares in Figure 4. It tells us that the correlation between portfolio shares in two different reputation levels is exactly the correlation of the inverse holding cost weights of investors. In a model in which investors tend to specialize in certain reputation levels, this correlation tends to be high when $M$ and $M^r$ are close. Proposition 5 provides a simple and empirically implementable way to track the reputation rank of a country by estimating the correlation of portfolio shares.$^{57}$

Mapping Proposition 5 into Figure 4 requires taking the set of developed currency government bonds (DM) to be the reference set. We think of the reference set as having a high reputation $M$. Then the figure shows that indeed the correlation is positive and high for government bonds denominated in currencies of some notoriously high reputation countries such as the US, Switzerland, and Great Britain. Similarly, the correlation is negative for emerging markets like Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. At present, China is in the middle, with a reputation rank estimated in between emerging markets and developed countries. This provides a simple statistic to track over time the evolution of reputation, assuming fund specialization will stay similar. While the time series for China is relatively short, from 2014-2020, we find that China’s portfolio correlation with developed

$^{57}$This connects to the demand system asset pricing framework of Koijen and Yogo (2019), where one can potentially think of reputation as a characteristic that various types of investors value differently.
markets has increased, consistent with an improving reputation (see Appendix A.IV). Interestingly, we see an increase in China’s correlation with developed markets in 2019, at the time of the major increase in foreign inflows.

7 Two-Way Capital Flows

The Chinese government is one of the largest holders of U.S. Treasuries and a major foreign investor in everything from direct financing of infrastructure projects to loans to emerging market economies. At the same time, it is letting foreigners participate in its domestic bond markets. In the model considered so far, we have focused on the decision to borrow from foreigners. We now focus on the interrelated decision of letting domestic savers invest abroad. These two-way capital flows are important in understanding China’s motivation for internationalizing its currency because they distinguish the current account and net foreign asset position (net borrowing at the country level) from the gross assets and liabilities positions and changes in gross positions.

We show that, as reputation builds, increased investment by foreigners in the domestic bond market coincides with increased foreign investment by domestic households (savers). In net, as reputation builds, the country becomes more of a borrower (or at least less of a creditor) from the rest of the world. For example, starting from a large creditor position at low levels of reputation, like China’s present situation, there is a tendency toward becoming a debtor as reputation increases. Intuitively, reputation is like a pledgable asset, it is valuable because one can borrow against it. The more it becomes valuable, the more the country wants to use it to lever up.

We return to the baseline model of Section 5.3 with heterogeneous investors. We generalize that model by assuming that domestic households have an endowment $W$ of liquid wealth at each date $t$. Households also own the intermediation sector, where $E_t = E[V_t]$ is the total value of the intermediation sector. Thus, their total wealth position is $W + E_t$. At the beginning of each date, households can invest an amount $K_t$ in illiquid foreign assets, which pay out $R^K$ at the end of the date. Households invest the remainder $W - K_t$ in illiquid non-intermediary investments, and we normalize the return of these assets to 1 for simplicity. In the main text we assume that shares in the intermediaries cannot be traded, since inside capital $A$ is fixed and domestically held. In Appendix A.XXI, we relax this assumption and show that it generates a jump in both gross assets and liabilities that occurs at the open-up step.

Households have an adjustment cost for sending capital abroad based on their total wealth, given by $\Psi(k_t)(W + E_t)$, where $k_t = \frac{K_t}{W + E_t}$ is the fraction of their total wealth that they send abroad and where $\Psi$ is increasing and convex. Given that households send a fraction $k_t$ of their wealth abroad, their total welfare, including the value $E_t$ of their intermediary equity, is given by:

58See Horn et al. (2021) and Gelpern, Horn, Morris, Parks and Trebesch (2021) for studies on the nature of China’s foreign investment.

59We assume that there is a very large penalty associated with $K_t > W$ and focus for simplicity on solutions in which this constraint does not bind.
\( (R^K k_t - \Psi(k_t) + (1 - k_t)) (W + E_t) \). The optimal private allocation of domestic savings to foreign investment \( k_t \) is constant, that is households always allocate a constant fraction of their total wealth to international investment. This optimal household allocation is given by \( \Psi' (k) = R^K - 1 \).

The government may encourage capital outflows by domestic savers to be higher or lower than the private optimum. On the one hand, the government may value investments that increase demand for the Renminbi as a global currency more so than individual households do, internalizing the benefits of a liquid market for its currency. The benefits might come in the form of a shift downward in the demand curve of foreign investors, who have higher incentives to invest in Renminbi as a result of Chinese foreign investment. The benefits might also arise from gains in geopolitical importance or independence arising from building an international payment system in which the Renminbi is an accepted store of value and means of payment. On the other hand, individual savers may value exporting capital more than the government if they fear that capital held domestically will be captured by the government for its own private benefits. The government may have perverse incentives to restrict private outflows of capital if it can divert part of that capital to its private benefit.

To capture the wedge between private and government incentives, we assume that the government obtains a proportional benefit \( B \) from all savings kept at home, which yields a total benefit to the government of \( B (1 - k_t) (W + E_t) \). A value of \( B > 0 \), can stand in for government corruption, or more benignly benefits from keeping the savings domestic that are not internalized by households. A value of \( B < 0 \), help us capture the extra value attributed by the government compared to households to investments abroad that help build the currency globally. Given the government’s objective, its optimal allocation is \( \Psi' (k_t) = R^K - (1 + B) \). If \( B > 0 \), then the government chooses to send less capital abroad than households would have privately chosen, and it imposes limits on domestic capital flowing abroad concurrently with the limits on inflows by foreigners (this latter part has been the focus of our model so far).

Solving the model with two-way asset holdings follows the same steps as the model solution in Section 5.3. Since \( k_t \) is constant over time, the government’s objective function is an affine transformation of \( E[\tilde{V}_t] \) generating similar dynamics. We further impose a realistic restriction that the marginal value of an additional unit of inside equity is less than two, so that the marginal return on an additional unit of inside equity is less than one hundred percent.\(^{61}\) We summarize the dynamics in the proposition below

\(^{60}\)In practice the government might simultaneously limit some forms of domestic capital outflows and incentivize others. For example, it might limit private holdings of foreign assets and, at the same time, invest abroad via a state owned entity projects that the government selects. In the case of China, for example, there are tight controls on private holdings of foreign securities, but at the same time entities like SAFE and AIIB make large investments abroad using domestic savings. This could be accommodated in our framework by introducing two types of foreign investments, one over which \( B \) is positive and one over which it is negative.

\(^{61}\)For example, this is true if \( R^H \gamma Q < 2 \). See the proof of Proposition A.XVII in the Appendix for discussion of where this condition applies.
Proposition 6  In the model with two-way capital flows, both gross foreign assets and liabilities increase in reputation. The country’s net foreign assets deteriorate as reputation improves.

Appendix Figure A.XVII provides a numerical illustration of two-way capital flows using the heterogenous investor calibration from Figure 9. We set $\Psi$, $R^K$, and $B$ so that 10% of domestic wealth is invested abroad ($k_t = 0.1$). Figure A.XVII shows that as reputation builds, gross flows happen simultaneously: foreigners hold more of the domestic bond market and domestic capital flows abroad.

Foreign assets, $K_t = k(W + E_t)$, increases in constant proportion ($\kappa < 1$) to the equity value of the intermediation sector. Intuitively, as reputation builds, the equity value of the intermediation sector also builds, and so does household net worth, making it more attractive to send more wealth abroad. Foreign liabilities $D_t$ increase faster than the value of intermediation (see proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix). The country is leveraging to extract the highest possible value out of its reputation, and becomes more levered as reputation increases. The net foreign asset position, therefore, deteriorates as reputation increases.

The model can make sense of a country like China that is a net foreign creditor at low levels of reputation: imagine that $W$ is much larger than $E_t$ at low levels of $M$. Even at low levels of reputation the country chooses to borrow some capital from foreigners in order to start building future reputation. As that reputation is built, the desire for borrowing increases faster than the desire to invest domestic savings abroad, leading to a net foreign asset deterioration. The model captures the tendency of countries that are established reserve currency providers, like the U.S., to be net foreign debtors.

This model also rationalizes capital retrenchments (Forbes and Warnock (2012)), the idea that in a crisis both gross assets and liabilities shrink. Consider a country that somewhere along its reputation cycle (i.e. not at the start point of the cycle) is hit by a crisis and imposes ex-post capital controls. Its reputation is reset to the beginning of the cycle. Over the episode, the country would experience a contraction in foreign borrowing, a reduction of its foreign assets, a movement of its current account toward surplus, and a spike in its bond yields.

8 Conclusion

This paper characterizes China’s strategy for internationalizing its currency through controlling the set of investors that can access its bond market. While the Renminbi has a long way to go to rival the dollar as an international currency, with China’s economy approaching the size of that of the United States and its bond market undergoing rapid growth, the integration of its capital market into global financial markets could become a major shift in the international monetary system. We explain China’s gradual approach to liberalizing capital inflows as balancing the desire to gain international currency status against the risks of sudden capital outflows that comes with foreign investment. By beginning with allowing investment from more stable investors and only
later allowing in flightier ones, China has put itself on a path towards becoming an international currency while trying to minimize the risks it faces on the transition path. Whether it is able to achieve this while avoiding costly episodes of capital flight and the imposition of capital outflow controls is an open question. We introduce a model of reserve currency competition in which a number of countries compete to build a reputation as a reserve currency provider. Competition makes it harder for countries to build reputation since it lowers the benefits of a high reputation. Incumbents like the U.S. can discourage new challengers by expanding the amount of safe debt they provide to the rest of the world.

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Appendix

A.I Aggregate and Bilateral Holdings

This section outlines the methodology for estimating the breakdown between central bank reserves and private holdings, and the subsequent split of bilateral holders. Our source for the currency composition of reserve holdings comes directly from the IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), which includes data on foreign reserve holdings of RMB since the fourth quarter of 2016. Prior to that date, holdings of RMB were aggregated into “Other Currencies”. However, a 2015 survey of the IMF (Fund (2015)) found that 0.57% and 0.95% of foreign currency reserves were held in Renminbi in 2013 and 2014 respectively. This gives us the level and share of COFER reserve holdings from 2013 to the present, except for 2015, where we interpolate the share of reserves in Renminbi. The share of reserves in Renminbi is based off the subset of countries that report their currency composition (“Allocated reserves”). The IMF then defines “Unallocated Reserves” as “the difference between the total foreign exchange reserves in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) world table on Foreign Exchange and the total allocated reserves in COFER. It includes foreign exchange reserves of those countries/territories that currently do not report to COFER but whose total foreign exchange reserves are included in the IFS world table.” We estimate non-COFER reserves in Renminbi as the RMB share of allocated reserves (or survey estimates for 2014 and interpolation for 2015) times the amount of unallocated reserves.

For private assets, we combine two types of data sources. First, we use IMF CPIS data for the total amount of bond investment in China and CPIS data on the currency composition of foreign investment in bonds when that is available. However, for many countries, CPIS does not include the currency composition of bond investment, and so we turn to commercial data of global mutual fund, ETF, and insurance data. For countries that do not report to CPIS, we rely on micro-data on holdings of mutual funds and ETFs from Morningstar and U.S. insurance companies from Schedule D regulatory filings previously used in Maggiori et al. (2020) and Coppola et al. (2021). The insurance companies holdings data are provided by SP Global. For countries with sufficient coverage, we measure the share of investment in China that is denominated in RMB over time and use this to estimate the share of investment in China (from CPIS) that is denominated in RMB in CPIS. Because in CPIS the currency data is not restricted to investment in China, it is possible that some of the RMB assets are resident in other countries. We calculate the same quantity in the commercial data, measuring the ratio of RMB denominated bonds to investments in China on a residency basis. In order to use the commercial data when the CPIS data is unavailable, we require that we observe at least 20% of the country’s bond investment in China. For those countries without currency composition data in CPIS or our commercial data, we assume that the share of bonds they purchase in China denominated in RMB is given by the mean currency composition (i.e. we multiply the country’s investment in China by the mean ratio of investment in RMB over investment in China). Results are similar when we instead use the aggregate share (i.e. total RMB holdings over total investment in Chinese bonds).

Finally, we restrict the sum of central bank and private holdings sum to total foreign holdings. For total foreign holdings, we combine data from Chinese official sources (Bond Connect, CEIC)

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1For the U.S. in 2020, we use Treasury International Capital data instead of IMF CPIS data.
2We use CPIS data when available, except for Canada where we use Morningstar data. For Canada, the CPIS RMB holdings are implausibly low, as we directly observe more Canadian RMB holdings in our commercial data. Because our commercial data should be a subset of CPIS, we can be confident that the CPIS number is underestimated.
on onshore holdings with data from the BIS International Debt Statistics on the amount of internationally issued RMB debt outstanding from Chinese issuers in a given year. This assumes that internationally issued RMB bonds are owned by foreign investors. One additional source of uncertainty is that IMF CPIS data on RMB-denominated bond investment does not separate onshore CNY versus offshore CNH investment, or separate RMB bonds issued by Chinese issuers or foreign investors. We are therefore assuming that the RMB denominated debt owned by foreign investors is all issued by China. This would miss any foreign ownership of onshore bonds issued by non-Chinese issuers (so-called “Panda” bonds) or bond issued in offshore capital markets by non-Chinese entities (so-called “Dim Sum” bonds). Finally, for Figures 1 and 2, we scale up or down our interpolations in order to exactly match the total amount of foreign RMB bondholdings (sum of Bond Connect and BIS IDS Chinese issued offshore in RMB).

A.II Offshore Issuance

We discuss the construction of Figures A.IV and A.V. For Figure A.IV, we begin by classifying every single bond issued in CNY and CNH into whether it was issued in onshore Chinese markets or offshore in international capital markets. First, we classify any security denominated in CNH (offshore Chinese Yuan) as begin issued offshore. However, in order to avoid relying entirely on the reported currency, we combine the universe of bonds owned by foreign investors with open-source data from FIGI. We additionally classify all bonds with a security type of Eurobond or Global from FIGI as being issued offshore. We then merge this mapping of all RMB securities into onshore/offshore with the Morningstar data on bond holdings. Dropping any funds domiciled China, we then measure the USD value of end-of-year holdings of onshore and offshore issued bonds, and calculate the share issued offshore in foreign holdings.

For Figures A.V, we utilize the residency-to-nationality algorithm of Coppola et al. (2021) to measure the funds that any Chinese entity on a nationality basis receives. For any bond issued by a Chinese entity on a nationality basis, we classify the source of issuance on a residency basis according to whether it was issued by a Chinese resident entity, a Hong Kong resident entity, an entity based in a tax haven using the Coppola et al. (2021) classification (other than Hong Kong), or in another market (“International”). The top panel reports the dollar level of investment, while the bottom panel focuses on the shares of the total.

A.III Investor Entry Database Construction

We begin by collecting monthly reports provided by the Chinese regulators on access to the programs created for foreign investment described on Section 2: QFII, RQFII, CIBM Direct, and Bond Connect. For each of the programs, we were able to directly obtain investors’ name and date of inclusion or infer based on the first appearance on the regulatory filing. Note that for CIBM Direct, data on entry is only available beginning February 2017 and so we smooth the mass of entrants over the previous year. An important step after the collection of investors’ names was to clean and standardize Chinese and English names. Given the absence of firm identifiers in these reports, we conducted a textual match of the names to the Factset database in order to obtain additional information from the investors. With Factset identifiers we were able to obtain more information about the entity structure (ultimate parent of the investor) and, importantly, their industry classification (NAICS). We then classified all the investors according to the categorization described in the main text. The entity structure obtained from Factset also allowed us to refine some of the NAICS classes. By examining the subsidiaries of the investors we matched and categorized...
as “portfolio managers” or “investment advice” companies, we reclassified these investors to mutual or hedge funds according to the most frequent subsidiary type.

A.IV Holdings Similarity

In this appendix we provide details and additional versions on the calculation of the holdings similarity measure. As discussed in the main text, the objective of this part is to inspect what other type of foreign currency bonds funds holding bonds in a particular currency are likely to hold. Our focus is in the foreign currency (FC) portion of the portfolios, which we define as holdings in a currency that is different than the currency of the country where the fund is domiciled (a sensitivity analysis is conducted below defining as foreign any currency that differs from the one a fund reports its returns). We restrict our sample to funds that have at least 0 million in FC holdings.

For the currency analysis, we classify all the currencies (except the RMB) into developed market (DM) currency or emerging market (EM) currency. DM currencies are G10 currencies, while EM are the ones from the countries in MSCI’s or IMF’s EM list. 3

We start by conducting the analysis for all bonds (as opposed to local currency sovereign debt). Figure A.VIII is analogous to Figure 4 and plots the correlations for each currency with the remaining share of DM currencies debt holdings. Table A.I summarizes the results for the additional versions of the similarity analysis. We compute mean correlation for EM and DM currencies for each specification and compare to the RMB correlation. We consider all bonds, and all government bonds in a currency. We calculate the correlations including all funds, funds that hold of the asset in the currency in question (intensive margin), and excluding indexed funds (using Morningstar classification). The analysis is also conducted using FC AUM-weighted correlations and an alternative FC definition.

The main conclusion from Table A.I is that the Chinese RMB ranks in between emerging market and developed market currencies in terms of its correlation with DM bond portfolio shares regardless of the specification.

We also execute the analysis for every year since 2014 and plot the evolution of the correlations over time in Figure A.IX. We note the gradual increase in the the correlation of RMB shares with DM shares, in particular, the jump in 2019 after the more substantial steps in the opening up to flighty investors. Standard errors for the correlated are calculated via bootstrapping.

A.V Flows Decomposition

This appendix describes our procedure for decomposing the change in investment positions into a number of economically interpretable components and its implementation. Using data at the fund-security level, we compute for each security $b$, fund $i$ and time $t$, the change in the amount owned by a fund as the change in market value between $t−1$ and $t$:

$$
\Delta MV_{t,i,i} = P_{t,i} Q_{t,i,i} - P_{t-1,b} Q_{t-1,i,b}
$$

where $P_{t,i}$ is the market price of the security $b$ at time $t$ and $Q_{t,i,b}$ the quantity owned by a given fund $i$.

3DM currencies are AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY, NZD, NOK, GBP, SEK, USD. EM currencies are BRL, CLP, COP, CZK, IDR, ILS, INR, MXN, MYR, PEN, PHP, RON, RUB, THB, TRY, KRW, ZAR.
Since we do not observe the actual transaction price at which funds buy or sell securities within a period, but only the level of holdings at the beginning and end of each period, we need to make an assumption about the time at which the securities are purchased. Our baseline analysis assumes that all transactions occur at last period’s prices. In this case, we can write the valuation effects on the portfolio as the price change times the quantity owned at time \( t \):

\[
V_{E,t,i,b} = (P_{t,b} - P_{t-1,b}) \cdot Q_{t,i,b}
\]

The term that is particularly important for our analysis is what we call the within-fund portfolio flow: \( F_{t,i,b}^\text{Within} \). It measures net purchases of a particular security, holding fixed the size of the investment portfolio, so it captures the extent to which a fund actively rebalances its portfolio towards security \( i \). We measure this component as

\[
F_{t,i,b}^\text{Within} = \text{AUM}_{i,t} \cdot (\omega_{t,i,b} - \omega_{t-1,i,b})
\]

where \( \omega_{t-1,i,b} \) is the share of asset \( i \) in fund \( i \) at time \( t - 1 \): \( \frac{P_{t-1,i,b}Q_{t-1,i,b}}{\sum_k P_{t-1,i,k}Q_{t-1,i,k}} \). The notation \( x_t \) denotes a variable \( x_t \) measured using last period’s prices.

The within-fund component multiplies the change in the portfolio weight of an asset (\( \omega_{t,i,b} - \omega_{t-1,i,b} \)) coming entirely from changes in asset holdings \( (Q) \) by the AUM of the fund measured at last period’s prices. Importantly, the sum of all within-fund flows is zero by construction at the fund level. Therefore, if we observe positive within-fund flows to RMB bonds, then within-fund flows are negative for other asset types, indicating active rebalancing away from some assets and towards RMB bonds. This allows us to measure which assets funds are substituting away from when they purchase RMB bonds.

The next component is the between-fund component of flows, \( F_{t,i,b}^\text{Between} \); the increase in holdings of security \( b \) by fund \( i \) that would occur for a given amount of overall portfolio inflows (positive or negative) at the fund level. We define this term as

\[
F_{t,i,b}^\text{Between} = \omega_{t-1,i,b} \cdot \text{Inflow}_{t,i}
\]

where \( \text{Inflow}_{t,i} \) is the net inflow of new money to fund \( i \) between period \( t - 1 \) and \( t \). This term captures the market value of an asset a fund would be expected to purchase or sell in response to flows into or out of the fund if it chose to purchase assets in proportion to their existing portfolio weights and thereby keep the portfolio weights unchanged at constant prices.

Finally, \( F_{t,i,b}^\text{NewFunds} \) measures the amount of RMB bonds held by funds at the end of the period that did not exist the previous period. This term is of particular interest in the case of investments in China since new specialist funds are being created with the sole investment objective of holding RMB bonds.

In order to implement the decomposition in equation (2) we use three types of data. First, portfolio holding data from Morningstar and NAICS insurance filings for the US give us the market value at the security level at the monthly, quarterly, or annual frequency. Second, we use security prices for each of the holdings in the dataset, \( P_{t,i} \). We collect the universe of prices of assets held by funds that ever invest in Chinese RMB. Third, we use inflows data into funds at the same frequency as the holding data. We use \( \text{Inflow}_{t,i} \) as directly reported at the fund level in Morningstar Direct.\(^4\)

Under our assumption that all trading occurs at last period’s prices \( P_{t-1,k} \), an alternative mea-

\(^4\)We use the variable “estimated fund-level net flow” in Morningstar Direct.
sure of inflows is the change in asset quantities measured at constant prices:

$$Inflow_{t,i} = \sum_{k \in K} P_{t-1,k} (Q_{t,i,k} - Q_{t-1,i,k})$$

In practice, the two measures differ because trading occurs at different points in time over each observation interval. Therefore, in our benchmark analysis, the residual captures the error induced by the assumption that all new purchases or sales occur at price $P_{t-1}$ and possible other mismeasurement in flows or positions:

$$R_{t,i,b} = \omega_{t-1,i,b} \left( Inflow_{t,i} - \hat{Inflow}_{t,i} \right)$$

One should expect a sizable residual, especially when annual data is used. However, this timing assumption and the accompanying residual should not effect the measurement of the Within component, the largest component and the focus of our attention.

A.VI Portfolio Substitution

Here, we provide additional analysis on the substitution towards RMB in private portfolios.

Alternative Asset Classification. First, we use a more desegregated asset classification to analyze the substitution towards RMB in private portfolios. Figure A.XIV shows funds that actively shifted their portfolio towards RMB bonds tended to substitute away from other DM currency bonds in 2019 and mostly from U.S. Treasuries and Agencies bonds in 2020.

Quarterly Analysis. Second, we conduct the flow substitution analysis at a quarterly frequency in addition to the annual results of the main text. Figure A.XV implements the decomposition of flows into RMB bonds into the five components as in Equation (2). Results are for the subset of funds that report regularly at a quarterly frequency and for a shorter sample period. This confirms the active fund reallocations were responsible for most of the increase in foreign holdings in 2019 and 2020.

A.VII Index Inclusion and Shifting Portfolio Investment

One of the key drivers of this increase in private investment in 2019 and 2020 was the inclusion of Chinese bonds in major bond indexes, and this helps explain the shift out of DM currencies. In particular, in April 2019 Chinese RMB bonds were added to the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Bond Index and in February 2020 Chinese RMB bonds were added to the JP Morgan Government Bond Index - Emerging Markets (GBI-EM). These index inclusions were not sudden decisions of the index providers, but rather the result of a series of significant reforms to market access discussed in Section 2. Restrictions on entry and exit from Chinese bond markets for private investors had long meant that it would be uncertain whether foreign investors could actually achieve the returns of any potential bond index. For instance, if there were quotas and lockup periods, it was not certain whether a fund could make the investments need to follow any index, or whether it could liquidate the investments as needed to satisfy investor redemption demands. The decision of index provides to include Chinese RMB bonds in these indices came with an assessment that these barriers had been sufficiently removed.
In Figure A.XI, we demonstrate the striking effect of index inclusion on holdings of RMB by funds benchmarked to various indices. Prior to 2019Q1, funds that benchmark to the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Index owned approximately no Chinese RMB bonds. There is a steady rise in holdings of RMB by funds that benchmark to this index over the subsequent years, consistent with Bloomberg’s announcement of a 20-month phase-in period, with portfolio weights scheduled to increase 0.30% per month. By contrast, the FTSE World Government Bond Index (WGBI), a major competitor for the Bloomberg index, did not include Chinese RMB bonds in the index until October 2021. Therefore, while one might be concerned that the increase in holdings of RMB bonds by funds that benchmark to the Bloomberg index might not be the causal effect of index inclusion (i.e. the funds were responding to a policy reform or demand shock for Chinese RMB bonds that also caused the index inclusion), in that case we would expect funds that benchmark to the FTSE WGBI to also increase their RMB bond holdings. The fact that they do not demonstrates that the increase in holdings by the funds that benchmark to Bloomberg is caused by the index inclusion decision.

Aside from the benchmark driven rebalancing, the inclusion of China in benchmark indices appears to also account for a large extent of the other inflows. Table A.II lists the largest 25 fund holdings of RMB bonds at the end of 2020. The largest position at $6.32bn dollars is held by the iShares China Bond ETF. While this fund does not benchmark against the Bloomberg Global Aggregate, it actually tracks the Bloomberg China Treasury and Policy Bank Index. This index was introduced in November 2016, and the fund itself was launched in July 2019, shortly after the inclusion of China in the Bloomberg Global Aggregate. As of December 2021, it had nearly doubled its AUM to $12.1 billion, making it the second-largest European exchange traded fund. This is one sense in which above and beyond the flows to China driven by index inclusion, since the creation of country-specific indices appears to be tied to inclusion in the broader world indices, the rise of ETFs and funds that specialize in investing in RMB bonds is also linked to China’s inclusion in global bond indices.

A.VIII Investor Discussion of Risk of Capital Outflow Restrictions

While in the theoretical framework, we model capital outflow controls as a tax on repatriation, as discussed in Section there are a number of ways in practice that the Chinese government could restrict capital outflows by foreign investors. In this section, we document a number of instances that important foreign investors explicitly flag the risk of not being able to get their capital out of China. We primarily rely on the discussion of risks in the "Statement of Additional Information" (SAI) that fund managers file to the SEC. Investors in China frequently feature a separate section of risk disclosures related to China.

In the SAI of the Blackrock Strategic Global Bond Fund, Blackrock discusses risks in China in its 2022 SAI and is quite explicit about how it fears repatriation risks of the kinds we model. They write "The Renminbi (‘RMB’) is currently not a freely convertible currency and is subject to foreign exchange control policies and repatriation restrictions imposed by the Chinese government. The imposition of currency controls may negatively impact performance and liquidity of the Funds as capital may become trapped in the PRC. The Funds could be adversely affected by delays in,

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5Pensions & Investments.
6We find a similar pattern for funds that benchmark to JP Morgan GBI-EM when the index starts to include China. Unlike our analysis above of the Bloomberg index inclusion, we could not identify a rival local currency EM bond index to the JP Morgan one to use as a control group.
7The Financial Times, "Bond ETF inflows slump to lowest level since start of pandemic", December 17, 2021.
or a refusal to grant, any required governmental approval for repatriation of capital, as well as by the application to the Funds of any restrictions on investments." (Page II-41). Blackrock’s SAI continues to discuss a number of additional risks.

- Under the heading "Risk of Investing in the China Interbank Bond Market through Bond Connect," Blackrock writes "The precise nature and rights of a Fund as the beneficial owner of the bonds traded in the China Interbank Bond Market through CMU as nominee is not well-defined under PRC law. There is a lack of a clear definition of, and distinction between, legal ownership and beneficial ownership under PRC law and there have been few cases involving a nominee account structure in the PRC courts. The exact nature and methods of enforcement of the rights and interests of a Fund under PRC law are also uncertain." (Page II-43)

- "In the event that the relevant authorities suspend account opening or trading on the China Interbank Bond Market, a Fund’s ability to invest in the China Interbank Bond Market will be adversely affected and limited. In such event, the Fund’s ability to achieve its investment objective will be negatively affected and, after exhausting other trading alternatives, the Fund may suffer substantial losses as a result. Further, if Bond Connect is not operating, a Fund may not be able to acquire or dispose of bonds through Bond Connect in a timely manner, which could adversely affect the Fund’s performance." (II-44)

PIMCO writes of the risks of investing in China similarly. Its SAI has a has a section on "Investments in the People’s Republic of China" and in the 2021 disclosure, they note

- "Chinese regulators may suspend trading in Chinese issuers (or permit such issuers to suspend trading) during market disruptions, and that such suspensions may be widespread. In addition, certain securities are, or may in the future become, restricted, and a Fund may be forced to sell such restricted security and incur a loss as a result." (Page 51)

- "In addition, there also exists control on foreign investment in the PRC and limitations on repatriation of invested capital. Under the FII program, there are certain regulatory restrictions particularly on aspects including (without limitation to) investment scope, repatriation of funds, foreign shareholding limit and account structure. Although the relevant FII regulations have recently been revised to relax certain regulatory restrictions on the onshore investment and capital management by FIIs (including but not limited to removing investment quota limit and simplifying routine repatriation of investment proceeds), it is a very new development therefore subject to uncertainties as to how well it will be implemented in practice, especially at the early stage... As a result of PRC regulatory requirements, a Fund may be limited in its ability to invest in securities or instruments tied to the PRC and/or may be required to liquidate its holdings in securities or instruments tied to the PRC." (Page 52)

- "Currency repatriation restrictions may have the effect of making securities and instruments tied to the PRC relatively illiquid, particularly in connection with redemption requests." (Page 53)

- Under the heading of "Investing through CIBM Direct," Pimco warns "The CIBM Direct Rules are relatively new and are still subject to continuous evolvement, which may adversely affect the Fund’s capability to invest in the CIBM." (Page 53)

- Under the heading of "Investing Through Bond Connect," Pimco warns "In addition to the risks described under “Foreign Securities” and “Investments in the People’s Republic of China,”
there are risks associated with a Fund’s investment in Chinese government bonds and other
PRC-based debt instruments traded on the CIBM through the Bond Connect program...Trading through Bond Connect is subject to a number of restrictions that may affect a Fund’s investments and returns...While the ultimate investors hold a beneficial interest in Bond Connect securities, the mechanisms that beneficial owners may use to enforce their rights are untested and courts in the PRC have limited experience in applying the concept of beneficial ownership. As such, a Fund may not be able to participate in corporate actions affecting its rights as a bondholder, such as timely payment of distributions, due to time constraints or for other operational reasons." (Page 54)

Similarly, Vanguard includes a section on "Foreign Securities—China Bonds Risk." They write

- "The Chinese legal system constitutes a significant risk factor for investors. The interpretation and enforcement of Chinese laws and regulations are uncertain, and investments in China may not be subject to the same degree of legal protection as in other developed countries. In the event account opening or trading is suspended on the CIBM, a fund’s ability to invest in securities traded on the CIBM will be adversely affected and may negatively affect the fund. Furthermore, if Bond Connect is not operating, a fund may not be able to acquire or dispose of bonds through Bond Connect in a timely manner, which could adversely affect the fund’s performance." (Page B-12)

- "Bond Connect trades are settled in RMB, which is currently restricted and not freely convertible. As a result, a fund’s investments through Bond Connect will be exposed to currency risk and incur currency conversion costs, and it cannot be guaranteed that investors will have timely access to a reliable supply of RMB." (Page B-13)

A. IX Proof of Lemma 1

Take as given a reputation level \( M \). The objective of the committed government is to maximize

\[
V = \left( \pi R^H + \frac{h}{\gamma - \frac{1-h}{R^L}} \right) \left( \gamma Q I_t - R_t D_t \right)
\]

subject to the interest rate schedules

\[
R_t = \tilde{R} + \frac{1}{2} b D^i M_t
\]

For simplicity, we denote \( n(h) \) to be the net worth multiplier on \( V \) when the haircut is \( h \), so that

\[
V = n(h) \left( \gamma Q I_t - R_t D_t \right)
\]

Note that we have \( n(h^s) > n(h^f) \). The problem can be solved by finding optimal strategies if borrowing only from stable investor and if borrowing from both stable and flighty investors, and then finding the maximum between those two options.

**Borrowing only from stable investors.** If the committed type only borrows from stable investors, the net worth multiplier is a constant and hence the committed type can equivalently maximize the liquidation value of inside equity. Given the itnerest rate schedule, this first order
condition is
\[ \gamma Q = R_t + \frac{\partial R_t}{\partial D_t} D_t^s \]

Given \( \frac{\partial R_t}{\partial D_t} = \frac{b}{2M} D_t^s \), substituting in and rearranging obtains
\[ D_t^s = \frac{1}{b} \left( \gamma Q M - R \right). \]

From here, substituting into the interest rate schedule, we obtain
\[ R_t(M) = \frac{1}{2} \bar{R} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q M \]

Finally, we can substitute into the objective function to obtain
\[ V^s(M) = n(h^s) \left( \gamma Q A + \left( \gamma Q - R_t(M) \right) D_t(M) \right) \]
\[ V^s(M) = n(h^s) \gamma Q A + n(h^s) \frac{1}{2b} \left( \gamma Q M - \bar{R} \right)^2 \]

**Borrowing from stable and flighty investors.** If the committed type also borrows from flighty investors, then common interest rate schedules combined with pari passu implies that the committed type borrows equally from both investor types. In other words, we can write the joint interest rate schedule as simply
\[ R_t = \frac{\bar{R} + \frac{1}{2} b \frac{1}{2} D_t}{M_t} \]

Thus, the optimal policy functions are exactly the same as in the stable case, but with a slope of \( b/2 \) rather than a slope of \( b \). Therefore, we get
\[ D(M) = \frac{2}{b} \left( \gamma Q M - \bar{R} \right) \]

with exactly half of \( D_t \) borrowed from stable investors and the other half from flighty investors. Note that the interest rate is
\[ R(M) = \frac{1}{2} \bar{R} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q M \]

exactly as before, since the committed government borrows twice as much but splits it among the two types. Thus, we get out, substituting in, that the value function from borrowing from both types is
\[ V^f(M) = n(h^f) \gamma Q A + n(h^f) \frac{1}{2b} \left( \gamma Q M - \bar{R} \right)^2 \]

**Choosing what type to borrowing from.** We can now characterize what type to borrow from. The committed type only borrows from stable investors when
\[ V^s(M) \geq V^f(M) \]
Let us define
\[ n^{sf} = \frac{n(h^s)}{n(h^f)} \geq 1 \]
which is the relative net worth multiplier of stable versus flighty. Now substituting in the indirect utility functions into the equation, we get
\[ V^s(M) \geq V^f(M) \]
\[ n^{sf} \left( \gamma Q A + \frac{1}{2b} \left( \frac{\gamma Q M - \bar{R}}{M} \right)^2 \right) \geq \left( \frac{\gamma Q A + \frac{1}{b} \left( \frac{\gamma Q M - \bar{R}}{M} \right)^2}{2} \right) \]
\[ \frac{2 - n^{sf}}{2b} \left( \frac{\gamma Q M - \bar{R}}{M} \right)^2 \leq (n^{sf} - 1) \gamma Q A \]

Note first that if \( n^{sf} \geq 2 \), then the haircut difference is so large that it is never desirable to open up. Hence, we can define \( M^* = 1 \) and the proposition follows.

If \( n^{sf} = 1 \), then there is no haircut difference and opening up is immediate. Here, we can define \( M^* = 0 \) and the result follows.

Finally, consider the intermediate case \( 1 < n^{sf} < 2 \). In this case, we need simply to show that the LHS above is increasing in \( M \). To see that this is the case, differentiating in \( M \) we have
\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial M} \left( \frac{\gamma Q M - \bar{R}}{M} \right)^2 = \left( \frac{(\gamma Q)^2 - \frac{\bar{R}^2}{M^2}}{M^2} \right) \tau \]
which is positive whenever
\[ (\gamma Q)^2 > \frac{\bar{R}^2}{M^2} \Rightarrow \gamma Q M > \bar{R}. \]

This parameter restriction is satisfied under the assumption that debt issuance is positive, that is \( D(M) > 0 \). Thus, we obtain a crossing point \( M^* \).

In sum, there exists a unique crossing point \( M^* \) such that optimal policies are
\[ D^s(M) = \frac{1}{b} \left[ \gamma Q M - \bar{R} \right] \]
\[ D^f(M) = \begin{cases} 
0, & M \leq M^* \\
D^s(M), & M > M^* 
\end{cases} \]
\[ R(M) = \frac{\bar{R}}{2M} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q \]
This proves the result.

A.X Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by making two observations about the behavior of a feasible candidate path \( \pi_0, ..., \pi_N \) and \( M_0, ..., M_N \). The first is that the transition dynamics (10) imply that \( M_1, ..., M_N \) all increase in \( M_0 \). The second is that Bayes' rule (7) implies that beliefs \( \pi_1, ..., \pi_N \) decrease in reputation \( M_1, ..., M_N \), and therefore decrease in initial reputation \( M_0 \).
It is convenient to define a candidate equilibrium in terms of the initial reputation $M_0$, with the path of reputation $M_n$ defined from the transition dynamics and the path of beliefs $\pi_n$ defined from Bayes’ rule. Moreover, given a candidate initial reputation $M_0$, we can also pin down the graduation step $N$ as follows.

**Lemma 2** The graduation step $N$ associated with an initial reputation $M_0$ is given by

$$N = \sup \left\{ n \left| \frac{1 - (\rho^f)^{n+1}}{1 - \rho^f} V(M_0) < V(1 - \epsilon^C) \right. \right\}$$

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Suppose that we conjectured a graduation step $N' < N$. Then, at the conjectured graduation step $N'$, the value of waiting one period and then imposing the capital control, rather than imposing it today, is

$$\frac{W^0_{N'} - W^r_{\pi_L}}{\pi_L} = V(M_{N'}) - g^f V(M_{N'}) + \beta \left[ W_{N'+1} - W_0 \right]$$

$$= \left(1 - g^f\right) V(M_{N'}) + \frac{\beta g^f}{1 - \pi_H \beta} \left[ V(1 - \epsilon^C) - V(M_0) \right]$$

$$= \frac{\beta}{1 - \pi_H \beta} g^f \left[ V(1 - \epsilon^C) - \rho^f V(M_{N'}) - V(M_0) \right]$$

$$> 0$$

so that the opportunistic type prefers not to graduate. Note that the supremum representation simply expresses the solution to the equation (10) starting from $M_0$. QED

Lemma 2 implies that once we have a conjecture for $M_0$, we also have a graduation step. We now show that if the terminal condition $m_N = 0$, that is $\pi_N = M_N$, holds, then all intermediate conditions $\pi_n \leq M_n \leq 1 - \epsilon^C$ also hold.

**Lemma 3** If $M_N = \pi_N$ for $N < \infty$, then $\pi_n \leq M_n \leq 1 - \epsilon^C$ for all $n < N$.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** The proof proceeds by induction. By Lemma 2, we have $\pi_N < 1 - \epsilon^C$. Suppose that at date $n+1$, $\pi_{n+1} \leq M_{n+1}$. Then by Bayes’ rule $\pi_{n+1} = \epsilon^O + \frac{1 - \epsilon^O - \epsilon^C}{M_{n+1}} \pi_n$, we have

$$\frac{M_n}{\pi_n} = 1 - \epsilon^O - \epsilon^C \geq 1 - \epsilon^O - \epsilon^C$$

$$\frac{M_{n+1} - \epsilon^C}{M_{n+1} - \epsilon^O} \geq \frac{1 - \epsilon^O - \epsilon^C}{M_N - \epsilon^O} \geq \frac{1 - \epsilon^O - \epsilon^C}{1 - \epsilon^C - \epsilon^O} = 1.$$

The induction is then completed by the terminal condition $M_N/\pi_N = 1$, completing the proof. QED

Given these preliminary results, we can form a candidate equilibrium from an initial reputation $M_0$, which then has a graduation step, path of reputation, and path of beliefs as outlined. For our candidate to constitute an equilibrium of the model, it must be the case that it also satisfies the terminal condition $\pi_N = M_N$ for graduation, in which case it also satisfies all intermediate conditions (Lemma 3) and so constitutes a model equilibrium. We are now ready to prove uniqueness and existence. We begin with uniqueness, and then prove existence.

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8Note that this definition embeds a tiebreaking rule: if there is a date $N + 1$ such that

$$\frac{1 - (\rho^f)^{N+1}}{1 - \rho^f} V(M_0) = V(1 - \epsilon^C),$$

then both $N$ and $N + 1$ are valid graduation steps of our model (i.e., a measure zero set of opportunistic governments can be incentivized to mimic at date $N$). This tiebreaking rule is embedded through the inequality in the supremum. We adopt the convention that $N$ is the graduation step in this case. Note also that this finite series is well defined for $\rho^f > 1$ and $\rho^f < 1$. In the knife edge case of $\rho^f = 1$, we have to instead define the finite series by the usual sum.
A.X.1 Uniqueness

Suppose that $M_0^*$ is an equilibrium with associated graduation step $N < \infty$. Any equilibrium of the model must satisfy $\Delta(N, M_0) = \pi_N(M_0) - M_N(M_0) = 0$. Notice that holding fixed $N$, $\Delta(N, M_0)$ is a decreasing function of $M_0$, since $\pi_N$ decreases in $M_0$ whereas $M_N$ increases in $M_0$ due to the transition dynamics and Bayes’ rule. Therefore, there is no other equilibrium with the same graduation step. Thus any other equilibrium must have a different graduation step. It suffices to show that there cannot be an equilibrium with a higher graduation step.

Suppose that there were another equilibrium with a higher graduation step. At the candidate equilibrium $M_0^{**}$ with graduation step $N^{**} > N$, note that we must have $M_0^{**} < M_0^*$ from Lemma 2. We also recall that $\pi_n$ is a decreasing function of $M_0$ from Bayes rule. Thus, we have for $M_0^{**} < M_0^*$

$$\pi_{N+1}(M_0^{**}) > \pi_{N+1}(M_0^*) = \epsilon^O + (1 - \epsilon_C - \epsilon^O) \frac{\pi_N(M_0^*)}{M_N(M_0^*)} = 1 - \epsilon^C$$

where the last line follows since $\pi_N(M_0^*) = M_N(M_0^*)$, since $M_0^*$ was an equilibrium with graduation step $N$. But then $\pi_{N+1}(M_0^{**}) > 1 - \epsilon^C$, contradicting that $M_0^{**}$ is an equilibrium. Thus, if there is an equilibrium, it is unique. 

A.X.2 Existence

The proof strategy for existence will proceed as follows. We will partition the $M_0$ set into intervals associated with graduation steps. We will then show that for each possible graduation step, there must be a crossing point of $M$ and $\pi$ above $M_0 = \epsilon^W$. Finally, we will show that at one date, this solution must lie in the interval of graduation steps.

We begin with the possibility that $M_0 = \epsilon^W$. If we have

$$\rho^f \geq \rho^{f*} \equiv \frac{V(1 - \epsilon^C)}{V(\epsilon^O)} - 1$$

then we have a trivial equilibrium with graduation at $N = 0$ and are done.

Next, we show existence for $\rho^f < \rho^{f*}$. We will break this into two subcases as follows. We define a threshold value $\overline{\rho}^f$ by

$$V(\epsilon^O) = (1 - \overline{\rho}^f)V(1 - \epsilon^C),$$

which is the threshold rate of convergence such that there is a finite graduation step for any $M_0$ when $\rho > \overline{\rho}^f$. Note that $\overline{\rho}^f < 1$ necessarily.

Existence when $\rho^{f*} > \rho^f > \overline{\rho}^f$.

The first case is the case where $\rho^f > \overline{\rho}^f$, that is $V(\epsilon^O) > (1 - \overline{\rho}^f)V(1 - \epsilon^C)$. In this case, we know there is a graduation step $N < \infty$ associated with $\epsilon^O$. 

In other words, $\overline{N}$ is the largest possible date such that

$$\frac{1 - (\rho^f)^{\overline{N}+1}}{1 - \rho^f}V(\epsilon^O) < V(1 - \epsilon^C).$$

---

\textsuperscript{9}For completeness, note that the above argument rules out $N = \infty$ if a finite equilibrium exists, and also note that if there were hypothetically an equilibrium at $N = \infty$ it must be unique and associated with $\frac{1}{1 - \rho^f}V_0(M_0) = V(1 - \epsilon_C)$.

\textsuperscript{10}If $\rho^f \geq 1$ then this follows trivially, while if $\overline{\rho}^f < \rho^f < 1$ it follows since the limit of the finite series is $\frac{1}{1 - \rho^f}V(\epsilon^O) > V(1 - \epsilon^C)$.
We now define the following indifferent points for each \( n \leq N \). We define \( M_0^n \) for \( n \leq N \) by

\[
\frac{1 - (\rho^f)^{n+1}}{1 - \rho^f} V(M_0^n) = V(1 - \epsilon^C),
\]

that is to say \( M_0^n \) is the highest value of \( M_0 \) such that graduation occurs at date \( n \). Because we have analogously defined \( M_0^{n+1} \) as the solution to

\[
\frac{1 - (\rho^f)^{n+2}}{1 - \rho^f} V(M_0^{n+1}) = V(1 - \epsilon^C),
\]

then we know that the interval \( M_n = [M_0^{n+1}, M_0^n] \) is the set of values \( M_0 \) such that graduation occurs at date \( n \). By convention, we define \( M_0^{N+1} = \epsilon^O \), since all \( \epsilon^O \leq M_0 \leq M_0^N \) lead to graduation at \( N \) (and since any feasible equilibrium must have \( M_0 \geq \epsilon^O \)).

We know there is not an equilibrium with graduation at \( N = 0 \) (given \( \rho < \rho^f \)), and so we start at \( N = 1 \). Note that by construction, we have \( M_1(M_0^1) = 1 - \epsilon^C \) since \( V(M_1(M_0^1)) = V(1 - \epsilon^C) \). However, because \( M_0^1 > \epsilon^O = \pi_0 \), we have

\[
\pi_1(M_0^1) = \epsilon^O + \left( 1 - \epsilon^C - \epsilon^O \right) \frac{\pi_0}{M_0^1} < 1 - \epsilon^C = M_1(M_0^1).
\]

Given we know that \( M_1 \) increases in \( M_0 \), \( \pi_1 \) decreases in \( M_0 \), and \( \pi_1(\epsilon^O) = 1 - \epsilon^C > M_1(\epsilon^O) \), then by continuity there exists \( M_0^{1*} \in [\epsilon^O, M_0^1] \) such that \( M_1(M_0^{1*}) = \pi_1(M_0^{1*}) \). If \( M_0^{1*} \geq M_0^2 \), then \( M_0^{1*} \in \mathbf{M}_1 \) and so is a feasible graduation step. In this case, we have found an equilibrium. If not, then we have \( M_0^{1*} < M_0^2 \) and can proceed as follows.

The proof proceeds iteratively from here. Suppose that at \( N \) we have not yet found an equilibrium for any \( n < N \). By definition, we have \( M_N(M_0^N) = 1 - \epsilon^C \). Taking the solution \( M_0^{(N-1)*} < M_0^N \) from the previous step, we have

\[
\pi_{N-1}(M_0^N) < \pi_{N-1}(M_0^{(N-1)*}) = M_{N-1}(M_0^{(N-1)*}) < M_{N-1}(M_0^N),
\]

and therefore we have from Bayes’ rule that \( \pi_N(M_0^N) < 1 - \epsilon^C \). Since \( \pi_N(\epsilon^O) \geq 1 - \epsilon^C \geq M_N(\epsilon^O) \), then there exists a crossing point \( M_0^{N*} \) at \( N \). If \( M_0^{N*} \in \mathbf{M}_N \) then we are done, and if not we continue. Finally, observe that at \( N = N \) we have \( \mathbf{M}_N = [\epsilon^O, M_0^N] \). Thus if we find an equilibrium before \( N \) we are done. If we have not found an equilibrium at \( N \), then we have \( M_0^{N*} \in \mathbf{M}_N \) and we have found a valid equilibrium. Therefore, an equilibrium exists if \( \rho^f > \rho^f > \rho^f \).

**Case of \( \rho^f \leq \rho^f \)**

In this case, define the point \( M_0^\infty \) as the solution to \( \frac{1}{1 - \rho^f} V(M_0^\infty) = V(1 - \epsilon^C) \). The point \( M_0^\infty \) is the starting point such that \( M_n \rightarrow 1 - \epsilon^C \) as \( n \rightarrow \infty \). Now, consider the infinite sequence generated by starting point \( M_0^\infty \). We have evolution of reputation

\[
\pi_n = \epsilon^O + \left( 1 - \epsilon^C - \epsilon^O \right) \frac{\pi_{n-1}}{M_{n-1}}.
\]

Given the limiting behavior of \( M_n \), the limiting fixed point of beliefs is \( \pi_\infty = 1 - \epsilon^C \). This tells us that \( M_n(M_0^\infty) \rightarrow 1 - \epsilon^C \) and \( \pi_n(M_0^\infty) \rightarrow 1 - \epsilon^C \), so that beliefs and reputation converge to one another in limit. We now prove a result on how this convergence happens.

A.13
Lemma 4 Suppose that \( M_0 = M_0^\infty \). Then if \( \pi_n > M_n \) for some \( n \), then \( \pi_{n+s} > M_{n+s} \) for all \( s \geq 0 \).

Proof of Lemma 4. If \( \pi_n > M_n \), then we have

\[
\pi_{n+1} > \epsilon^O + (1 - \epsilon^C - \epsilon^O) \frac{\pi_n}{M_n} > 1 - \epsilon^C > M_{n+1}
\]

where the last line follows since \( M_{n+1} \) converges to \( 1 - \epsilon^C \) from below. From here the argument follows immediately for all \( s > 1 \) from the same step. QED

Lemma 4 tells us that there are only two possible manners of convergence of \( \pi_n \) to \( \pi_\infty \). The first is convergence from below, in which case \( \pi_n \leq M_t \) for all \( n \). If it happens to be the case that convergence happens from below, then we would have an equilibrium with \( N = \infty \).

Otherwise, suppose that convergence is from above. We denote \( N \) to be the first date at which \( \pi N(M_0^\infty) \geq M_N(M_0^\infty) \) (note the deliberate weak inequality in this definition). This crossing point must satisfy \( \pi N(M_0^\infty) < 1 - \epsilon^C \), since by definition of \( N \) we have \( \pi_{N-1}(M_0^\infty) < M_{N-1}(M_0^\infty) \).

From this, it is not possible for an equilibrium to occur at any \( M_0 < M_0^\infty \). To understand why, for any such point the limiting behavior of the transition dynamics is \( M_\infty(M_0) < M_\infty(M_0^\infty) = 1 - \epsilon^C \), but the limiting behavior of beliefs lies above \( 1 - \epsilon^C \). Thus, we can restrict attention to \( M_0 \geq M_0^\infty \).

First, we note that it cannot be the case that graduation occurs for \( N < N \). To understand why, by definition of \( N \) we have we have \( \pi N(M_0) < \pi N(M_0^\infty) \leq M_N(M_0^\infty) \), so because \( M_N \) is increasing in \( M_0 \) and \( \pi N \) is decreasing crossing must happen below \( M_0^\infty \), which is why, by definition of \( N \), we can restrict attention to \( M_0 \geq M_0^\infty \).

Now, let us take the date \( N \). Suppose first that we have a strict inequality, \( \pi N(M_0^\infty) > M_N(M_0^\infty) \). We know that \( \pi N(1 - \epsilon^C) > M_N(1 - \epsilon^C) \), so we know there exists a crossing point \( M_0^N* \in [M_0^\infty, 1 - \epsilon^C] \). We additionally know that this crossing point satisfies \( M_0^N* < M_0^N \), where \( M_0^N \) is the threshold for graduation at \( N \) as defined in the previous part of the proof. To understand why this is the case, note that by definition \( M_N(M_0^\infty) = 1 - \epsilon^C \) and \( \pi N(M_0^\infty) < 1 - \epsilon^C \), so because \( M_N \) is increasing in \( M_0 \) and \( \pi N \) is decreasing crossing must happen below \( M_0^\infty \). If \( M_0^N* \in M_N \), then we have found an equilibrium and are done. If \( M_0^N* < M_0^{N+1} \), then we can proceed as follows. Define \( N > N \) to be the graduation step associated with \( M_0^N* \), define \( M_n \) in the usual way for \( N + 1 \leq n < N - 1 \), and define \( M_N = [M_0^N*, M_0^N] \). We have that \( \pi_n(M_0^N*) \geq 1 - \epsilon^C > M_n(M_0^N*) \) for all \( N \leq n \leq N \). Because \( M_0^N* < M_0^{N+1} \), then \( \pi_{N+1}(M_0^{N+1}) < \pi_{N+1}(M_0^N*) = 1 - \epsilon^C = M_{N+1}(M_0^{N+1}) \). Therefore, we have a single crossing point \( M_0^{(N+1)*} \). From here, the argument proceeds as in the previous case, where we note that the condition \( \pi N(M_0^{N*}) \geq 1 - \epsilon^C \) tells us that we have not found an equilibrium by date \( N \), then we must have \( M_0^{N*} \in M_N \), yielding a valid equilibrium.

It now remains only to handle the case where \( \pi N(M_0^\infty) = M_N(M_0^\infty) \). We note that although these paths cross, this is not a valid equilibrium because \( N \) is not the graduation step of \( M_0^\infty \). In this case, we know that \( \pi_{N+1}(M_0^\infty) = 1 - \epsilon^C > M_{N+1}(M_0^\infty) \). Therefore, let us consider a point \( M_0' = M_0^\infty + \epsilon \). For sufficiently small \( \epsilon \), by continuity we have \( 1 - \epsilon^C = M_{N+1}(M_0^\infty) > \pi_{N+1}(M_0') > M_{N+1}(M_0') \) and, since \( M_0' < M_0^{N+1} \), we have \( \pi_{N+1}(M_0^{N+1}) < \pi_{N+1}(M_0') \). Therefore, we have a crossing point \( M_0^{(N+1)*} \in [M_0', M_0^{N+1}] \). If \( M_0^{(N+1)*} \in M_N \), we are done. Otherwise, we define \( N \) as the graduation step associated with \( M_0^{(N+1)*} \) and define \( M_N = [M_0^{(N+1)*}, M_0^N] \). From here the proof proceeds exactly as before.

Therefore, we also have an equilibrium for \( \rho' \leq \overline{\rho}' \). This completes the existence proof.
A.XI Proof of Proposition 2

The proof is essentially the same as the uniqueness proof of Proposition 1. Fixing an opening up date $N^* \geq 0$, suppose that $M_0^*$ is an equilibrium with associated graduation step $N \geq N^*$. As in the proof of Proposition 1, any equilibrium of the model must satisfy $\Delta(N, M_0) = \pi_N(M_0) - M_N(M_0) = 0$ and moreover $\pi_N$ decreases in $M_0$ while $M_N$ increases in $M_0$, meaning that there cannot be another equilibrium at $N$. It again suffices to show there cannot be another equilibrium with a higher graduation step.

We can construct the graduation step associated with a pair $(M_0, T^*)$ as

$$N = N^* + \sup \left\{ n \left| \frac{(1 - \rho f) n}{1 - \rho f} + (\rho f)^n 1 - (\rho s)^{N^*+1} \right| g^s \right\} V(M_0) < V_0(0, 1 - c)$$

where the proof follows from the same argument as Lemma 2. Therefore, higher $M_0$ is associated with a lower graduation step. Therefore, as in the proof of Proposition 1, a higher candidate graduation step $N^{**} > N$ has a candidate initial reputation $M_0^{**} < M_0^*$. From here, the contradiction proceeds from exactly the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1.

A.XII Proof of Proposition 3

Assume that inside equity is zero, $A = 0$. Then, there exists a unique graduation step Markov equilibrium of the model with competition. The reputation vector $M$ and distribution $\mu$ are the same as those in the unique graduation step Markov equilibrium in the model without competition but with holding costs $\omega$. Competition lowers the optimal debt issuance but does not affect the evolution of reputation.

We begin with the transition dynamics

$$V(M_n, b^*) = \rho V(M_{n-1}, b^*) + V(M_0, b^*).$$

Recall that we can write

$$V(M_n, b^*) = \nu \left( \gamma Q I(M_n) - R(M_n) D(M_n) \right)$$

where $\nu$ is the net worth multiplier. Using the issuance solutions, we have

$$D(M_n) = \frac{b}{b^*} D^\omega(M_n)$$

where $D^\omega$ is optimal debt issuance without competition but with weights $\omega$. Thus, substituting in we can write

$$V(M_n, b^*) = \nu \left( \gamma Q \left( A + \frac{b}{b^*} D^\omega(M_n) \right) - R(M_n) \frac{b}{b^*} D^\omega(M_n) \right) = \nu \gamma QA \left( 1 - \frac{b}{b^*} \right) + \frac{b}{b^*} V^\omega(M_n).$$

From here, we can substitute in to the transition equation to obtain

$$\frac{b}{b^*} V^\omega(M_n) = \rho \nu \gamma QA \left( 1 - \frac{b}{b^*} \right) + \rho \frac{b}{b^*} V^\omega(M_{n-1}) + \frac{b}{b^*} V^\omega(M_0)$$

$$V^\omega(M_n) = \rho \nu \gamma QA \frac{b^* - b}{b} + \rho V^\omega(M_{n-1}) + V^\omega(M_0)$$

A.15
Finally, suppose that $A = 0$. Then, this transition equation is exactly the same as the transition equation in the model without competition. Thus, we obtain the same graduation step Markov equilibrium $M$ and the same stationary distribution $\mu$. However, issuance is affected since we have $D(M_n) = \frac{b}{\rho} D^\omega(M_n)$.

**A.XIII Proof of Proposition 4**

Recall that the transition equation is

$$V^\omega(M_n) = \rho v A \frac{b^* - b}{b} + \rho V^\omega(M_{n-1}) + V^\omega(M_0)$$

and that there is a unique graduation step Markov equilibrium associated with a given $b^*$. Conjecture an equilibrium with immediate graduation, $N = 0$. This means that $M_0 = e^O$ and that

$$V^\omega(1 - e^C) \leq \rho v A \frac{b^* - b}{b} + (1 + \rho)V^\omega(M_0)$$

Rearranging, we have

$$\left(1 + \frac{V^\omega(1 - e^C) - (1 + \rho)V^\omega(M_0)}{\rho v A}\right)b \leq b^*$$

which gives the result.

**A.XIV Set-up For: “How Can the U.S. Deter China From Becoming a Reserve Currency?”**

To be added...

**A.XV Proof of Proposition 5**

Given that we have $\alpha_i(M) = \frac{1}{\omega_i(M)} \frac{\omega(M) D(M)}{AUM_i}$ and taking $AUM_i = AUM$ to be constant, then we have

$$\text{corr}(\alpha_i(M), \alpha_i(M^r)) = \text{corr}\left(\frac{1}{\omega_i(M)}, \frac{\omega(M) D(M)}{AUM}, \frac{1}{\omega_i(M^r)} \frac{\omega(M^r) D(M^r)}{AUM}\right) = \text{corr}\left(\frac{1}{\omega_i(M)}, \frac{1}{\omega_i(M^r)}\right)$$

given that $\frac{\omega(M) D(M)}{AUM}$ and $\frac{\omega(M^r) D(M^r)}{AUM}$ are constant across $i$, giving the result.

**A.XVI Proof of Proposition 6**

The increases in gross assets and liabilities follows immediately from the fact that $E_t$ and $D_t$ both increase in reputation. For the latter part of the proposition, we have

$$NFA_t = k_t(W + E_t) - D_t.$$

Adopting notation $E_t = n \left[\gamma Q l_t - R_t D_t\right]$, where $n$ is the total net worth multiplier, we can define $v = n\gamma Q$ as the marginal value of an additional unit of inside equity. Using the Envelope Theorem,
we have 
\[ \frac{\partial E_t}{\partial M} = -n \frac{\partial R_t}{\partial M} D_t = \frac{v}{\gamma Q} R_t D_t \frac{1}{M} \frac{\partial M}{\partial M} \]
so that we obtain
\[ \frac{\partial \text{NFA}}{\partial M} = \left[ k \frac{v}{\gamma Q} b R_t D_t - \gamma Q \right] \frac{\partial M}{\partial M} . \]
From here, we note that
\[ \frac{\partial R_t D_t / M}{\partial M} = \frac{\partial}{\partial M} \left[ \left( \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q + \frac{1}{2} \bar{R} \right) \frac{1}{b} \left( \gamma Q - \bar{R} / M \right) \right] = \frac{\bar{R}}{M} \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial M}{\partial M} > 0 \]
so that if \( \frac{\partial \text{NFA}}{\partial M} \bigg|_{M=1} < 0 \), then NFA is everywhere deteriorating as reputation builds. NFA is deteriorating at \( M = 1 \) if \( k \frac{v}{\gamma Q} b R_t D_t - \gamma Q < 0 \). Substituting in for \( R_t \) and \( D_t \) and rearranging, we have the sufficient condition
\[ k < \frac{2}{v} \frac{(\gamma Q)^2}{(\gamma Q)^2 - R^2} \]
Finally, note that \( \frac{(\gamma Q)^2}{(\gamma Q)^2 - R^2} > 1 \), so the result holds provided that \( v < 2 \).

### A.XVII  Competition Solutions

The following proposition associates solutions of the model with competition with the no-competition models that generate them.

**Proposition 7** For every \( b^* \), there exists a unique \( b \) (holding all other parameters fixed) such that there is an equilibrium of the model with competition that generates slope \( b^* \).

Proposition 7 provides a simple way of mapping a model with competition back into the parameters of the model without competition that generates it, in particular the original slope \( b \). To understand Proposition 7, begin with a choice of \( b^* \). From the corollary to Proposition 1, we obtain the unique graduation step Markov equilibrium and cycle \( M \). From there, we obtain the stationary distribution \( \mu \) over \( M \). Finally, we can rearrange the consistency condition to \( b = \frac{\omega(M) D(M)^2 d\mu(M)}{\int \omega(M) D(M)^2 d\mu(M)} \), which gives us the value of \( b \). Given the graduation step Markov equilibrium and its stationary distribution are both unique, \( b \) is also unique. From here, reversing the steps starting from \( b \) yields an equilibrium of the model with competition that generates slope \( b^* \).

### A.XVIII  Stationary Distribution

Consider the discrete set of reputations \( M \) that comes out of the dynamic reputation model associated with \( b^* \). We define the stationary distribution \( \mu \) over \( M \) from the reputation game as atoms over \( M \), whose probabilities are \( \{\mu_0, ..., \mu_N, \mu_{N+1}\} \), where \( \mu_{N+1} \) is the measure of countries that have reached reputation \( 1 - e^C \) (i.e., that were committed types at cycle step \( N \)). We can define this stationary distribution as follows. First consider any step \( 0 < n < N + 1 \). At step \( n \), the mass \( \mu_n \) of countries in the stationary distribution comes from a combination of countries that realize

\(^{11}\)Note that Proposition 7 shows that each \( b^* \) is uniquely associated with a \( b \), but not that \( b \) uniquely maps into \( b^* \).
the high state and don’t change, \( \pi_H \mu_n \), or countries at the prior step that realize the low state but don’t exercise the capital control, \((1 - \pi_H)M_{n-1}\mu_{n-1}\). Observe that when the low state is realized, all countries at step \( n \) either move to step \( n + 1 \) or revert to step 0. Putting these together, we obtain \( \mu_n = \pi_H \mu_n + (1 - \pi_H)M_{n-1}\mu_{n-1}, \) which gives

\[
\mu_n = M_{n-1}\mu_{n-1}.
\]

Step \( n = N + 1 \) is an absorbing state for governments that do not switch type. The flows of types are the same as at steps \( 0 < n < N + 1 \), except that the mass \((1 - \pi_H)(1 - \epsilon_C)\) of committed types in the low state also remain at \( N + 1 \). Therefore, we have We therefore have \( \mu_{N+1} \) given by

\[
\mu_{N+1} = \frac{1}{\epsilon_C} M_N \mu_N.
\]

Putting these together, we have \( \mu_n = \mu_0 \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} M_k \) for \( 0 < n < N + 1 \) and \( \mu_{N+1} = \frac{1}{\epsilon_C} \mu_0 \prod_{k=0}^{N} M_k. \)

Using \( \sum_{n=0}^{N+1} \mu_n = 1 \), we obtain

\[
\mu_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{n=1}^{N} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} M_k + \frac{1}{\epsilon_C} \prod_{k=0}^{N} M_k}.
\]

This characterizes the stationary distribution that arises out of the dynamic reputation model.

**A.XIX Model Extensions**

**A.XIX.1 Domestic Debt Issuance**

Suppose that in addition to inside equity \( A \), there is also an amount \( D^d_t \leq D^d \) available to borrow from domestic households. Households inelastically save domestically at the equilibrium interest rate \( R_t \) (equivalently, the government can apply a tax/subsidy on savings). Moreover, there is financial repression: domestic households are forced to maintain their investment in the bank at date 1 without collateral. It follows immediately that from the government’s perspective, domestic household savings and inside equity are equivalent given financial repression, that is the model is equivalent to one where inside equity is \( A^* = A + D^d \). In the high state, banks earn \( R_H(\gamma QI - R_t D_t + D^d) \) and households receive return \( R_H D^d \), so the total value to domestic intermediaries and households is \( R_H(\gamma QI - R_t D_t) \). In the low state, financial repression forces households to roll over \( D^d \) at interest rate \( R_L - \tau \), which gives final payoff to households of \( (R_L - \tau)R_t D^d \) and reduces final payoff to intermediaries by the same amount.

**A.XIX.2 Transition Dynamics with \( R_H \)**

We now relax the simplifying assumption on \( R_H \) we made in the main text. The indifference condition of the transition dynamics did not depend on the high state, so we have

\[
V(M_t) + \beta W_{t+1} = g(h_t)V(M_t) + \beta W_0
\]

\[
W_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta} \left( g(h_t) - 1 \right) V(M_t) + W_0
\]

A.18
as before. However, the Bellman equation for $W_t$ is now

$$W_t = \pi_H \left( G(h_t) V(M_t) + \beta W_t \right) + \pi_L \left( g(h_t) V(M_t) + \beta W_0 \right)$$

where we have $G(h_t) \equiv \frac{R_H}{\gamma - \frac{1}{1-R_H^t}}$ now in place of $g(h_t)$. Note that $G(h_t)$ is the proportional gain from realizing the high state relative to the low state. From here, we have

$$W_0 = \frac{\pi_H G(h_0) + \pi_L g(h_0)}{1 - \beta} V(M_0)$$

$$W_{t+1} = \frac{\pi_H G(h_{t+1}) + \pi_L g(h_{t+1})}{1 - \beta \pi_H} V(M_{t+1}) + \frac{\pi_L \beta}{1 - \beta \pi_H} W_0$$

Thus, substituting back into the indifference condition, we obtain

$$\left( \pi_H G(h_{t+1}) + \pi_L g(h_{t+1}) \right) V(M_{t+1}) = g(h_t) \rho_t V(M_t) + \left( \pi_H G(h_0) + \pi_L g(h_0) \right) V(M_0)$$

which reduces to

$$V(M_{t+1}) = \frac{g(h_t)}{\pi_H G(h_{t+1}) + \pi_L g(h_{t+1})} \rho_t V(M_t) + \frac{\pi_H G(h_0) + \pi_L g(h_0)}{\pi_H G(h_{t+1}) + \pi_L g(h_{t+1})} V(M_0).$$

Let us now redefine the rate of convergence as

$$\varrho(h_t) = \frac{g(h_t)}{\pi_H G(h_t) + \pi_L g(h_t)} \rho(h_t)$$

and define the expected gain as

$$\bar{g}(h_t) = \pi_H G(h_t) + \pi_L g(h_t).$$

Then, the transition dynamic is

$$V(M_{t+1}) = \frac{\bar{g}(h_t)}{\bar{g}(h_{t+1})} \varrho(h_t) V(M_t) + \frac{\bar{g}(h_0)}{\bar{g}(h_{t+1})} V(M_0),$$

which is precisely the same form as in the main text up to the revised definitions. If there is a single investor, it is the same equation with the new definition of rate of convergence, and the rate of convergence is lower if $G^f > g^f$. It is notable that it is no longer trivial that $\bar{g}^f < \bar{g}^s$. The reason is that $G^f > G^s$ if $R^H$ is a constant, i.e. the proportional gains from the good state are higher when the haircut is larger. As long as the effect of proportional gains from imposing capital controls dominates this latter effect, we have the same jump dynamics as in the baseline model.

**A.XX Further Heterogeneity in Demand Curve**

In addition to the lower haircut, we can extend the model such that stable investors are also preferable to flighty investors from the perspective of investor borrowing costs. However, stable investors are capacity constrained and can only lend $D^s_t \leq D^s_t$. We express the preferability of stable investors by the assumption that they always provide debt at a cheaper rate than the flighty

A.19
investors, up to their debt capacity. Formally, we assume $R^s + \frac{1}{2} b^s \mathcal{D}^s \leq R^f$. This means that the country chooses to borrow from flighty investors only if it wishes to borrow more than the stable investors’ capacity. If it borrows more than $\mathcal{D}^s$, it borrows the full investment capacity of the stable investors, $D^s_t = \mathcal{D}^s$, and the rest from flighty investors, $D^f_t = D_t - \mathcal{D}^s$. As a result, we can express the promised interest rate schedule as

$$R_t = \begin{cases} \frac{R^s + \frac{1}{2} b^s D^s_t}{\mathcal{M}_t}, & D_t \leq \mathcal{D}^s \\ \frac{R^f + \frac{1}{2} b^f (D_t - \mathcal{D}^s)}{\mathcal{M}_t}, & D_t > \mathcal{D}^s \end{cases}$$

(A.3)

The interest rate schedule is discontinuous at $\mathcal{D}^s$ if $R^s + \frac{1}{2} b^s \mathcal{D}^s < R^f$, and has a kink in the slope at $\mathcal{D}^s$ if $b^f \neq b^s$. This interest schedule, together with the assumptions made above on haircuts, means that opening up to flighty investors behaves as if it has a “fixed cost” component in that it makes the interest rate schedule and collateral requirements jump up on all debt when flighty investors are allowed to participate in domestic markets.

We make a single crossing assumption on debt issuance to simplify the analysis. In particular, we assume that there exists a crossing point $M^* \in (0, 1)$ such that optimal debt issuance $D_t(M)$ satisfies $D_t(M) \leq \mathcal{D}^s$ for $M \leq M^*$ and $D_t(M) > \mathcal{D}^s$ for $M > M^*$. Under this assumption there is a single crossing point at $M^*$ where the government shifts from borrowing from only stable investors to also borrowing from flighty investors.

**Deriving Optimal Debt and Interest Rate Schedules**

Given single crossing, the policy rule of the committed government as a function of $M_t$ can be determined by maximizing the liquidation value of the intermediary: $\gamma Q I_t - R_t D_t$.

Given the assumption of single crossing, we have that optimal policy maximizes $\gamma Q I_t - R_t D_t$ separately for $M_t \leq M^*$ and $M_t > M^*$.

First suppose that $M_t \leq M^*$ and so $D_t(M) \leq \mathcal{D}^s$. Then, we have $R_t = \frac{R^s + \frac{1}{2} b^s D^s_t}{\mathcal{M}_t}$, and therefore the FOC for optimal debt issuance at an interior solution $D_t < \mathcal{D}^s$ is

$$0 = \gamma Q - R_t - \frac{1}{2} b^s D_t$$

$$D_t = \frac{\mathcal{M}_t}{b^s} \left[ \frac{\gamma Q - R^s}{\mathcal{M}_t} \right] .$$

Substituting back into the interest rate schedule, we get

$$R_t = \frac{1}{2} \frac{R^s}{\mathcal{M}_t} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q .$$

Finally, note that this is applicable only as long as the debt cap does not bind, so we have a threshold such that if $M_t < M_0 \leq M^*$ then the cap binds. At the cap, the interest rate is instead given by

$$R_t = \frac{R^s + \frac{1}{2} b^s \mathcal{D}^s}{\mathcal{M}_t} .$$

Next, suppose that $M_t > M^*$ and so $D_t(M) > \mathcal{D}^s$. In this case, we have $R_t = \frac{R^f + \frac{1}{2} b^f (D_t - \mathcal{D}^s)}{\mathcal{M}_t}$,
\[0 = \gamma Q - R_t - \frac{1}{2} b_0 D_t\]

\[D_t = \frac{M_t}{b_0} \left[ \gamma Q - \frac{R_t - \frac{1}{2} b_0 D^s}{M_t} \right]\]

Finally substituting back into the interest rate schedule, we obtain

\[R_t = \frac{1}{2} R_s - \frac{1}{2} b_0 D^s + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q.\]

Taking this all together, we have that the optimal issuance decision is

\[D(M_t) = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{M_t}{b_0} \left[ \gamma Q - \frac{R_s}{M_t} \right], & M_t \leq M_* \\
  \frac{M_t}{b_0} \left[ \gamma Q - \frac{R_s}{M_t} \right] + \frac{1}{2} D^s, & M_* < M \leq M^* \\
  \frac{M_t}{b_0} \left[ \gamma Q - \frac{R_s}{M_t} \right] + \frac{1}{2} D^s, & M > M^* 
\end{cases}\]

where \(M_s \leq M^*\) is the point at which the capacity constraint begins to bind. Note that \(M_t(M_t)\) depends on \(M_t\), but that we have suppressed the dependence for notational clarity. The associated interest rate is

\[R(M_t) = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{1}{2} R_s + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q, & M_t \leq M_* \\
  \frac{R_s}{R^* + \frac{1}{2} b_0 D^s}, & M_* < M \leq M^* \\
  \frac{1}{2} R_s - \frac{1}{2} b_0 D^s + \frac{1}{2} \gamma Q, & M > M^* 
\end{cases}\]

### A.XXI Opening-Up Step and Two-Way Flows

In our initial formulation of two-way flows above, the intermediation sector inside equity is fixed and capital sent abroad is drawn from other domestic investments. Foreign assets are a constant percent of domestic wealth. When the country opens up to flighty foreign investors there is a jump up in the total value of the intermediation sector which increases foreign assets via its effect on wealth. Here we allow households to extract some of the intermediation sector inside equity and redeploy the capital abroad. This leads to a more than proportional increase in foreign assets when the country lets in flighty investors. To focus solely on this effect, we assume, for simplicity, that any money kept in the domestic economy is invested in the intermediation sector.

The household now allocates its resources \(W\) each period between bank equity, \(A_t\), and foreign investment, \(K_t\), that is to say \(A_t + K_t = W\). We define the wealth of the household to be \(K_t + E_t\), accounting for its equity wealth and its foreign investment wealth. Given the adjustment cost of sending capital abroad, the welfare of the household can now be written as

\[R^K K_t - \Psi(k_t) \left( K_t + E_t \right) + E_t,\]

where \(k_t = \frac{K_t}{K_t + E_t}\) is the fraction of wealth invested abroad. Notice that \(E_t\) depends on inside equity, \(A_t = W - K_t\), and so is endogenous to \(K_t\). Taking the optimality condition of the committed type
government for foreign investment, we obtain the solution

\[
\frac{\Psi'(k_t) - (R^K - 1)}{\Psi'(k_t)k_t - \Psi(k_t) + 1} = 1 - \left( \pi_H \frac{h_t}{\gamma - 1 - h_t} + \pi_L \frac{h_t}{\gamma - 1 - h_t} \right). \tag{A.4}
\]

Marginal Return on Inside Equity

Equation (A.4) shows that \(k_t\) depends on the marginal return on intermediary inside equity.\(^{12}\) The LHS increases in \(k_t\), so that a decrease in the return on inside equity leads to an increase in foreign investment in percent terms, \(k_t\). Since the marginal return on inside equity falls at opening up due to the higher haircut \(h_t\), this means that foreign investment is a constant \(k^s\) before opening up and is a constant \(k^f\) at and after opening up, with \(k^s < k^f\) indicating that there is a disproportionately large increase in outflows from the domestic economy after opening up.

Intuitively, opening up to flighty investors increases the overall value of the intermediation sector by increasing its scale, but the increase in scale also decreases its marginal returns. Domestic capital moves abroad for two distinct reason: a wealth effect and a rebalancing effect. The wealth effect we described in the model above. Here, we added a marginal decision for domestic households between investing domestically in the intermediation sector or investing abroad. Since the marginal returns at home decrease, the households’ optimally rebalance by investing more of their savings abroad as a fraction of total wealth.

We discuss below how this affects the full dynamics of the reputation model. The opportunistic type must send the same amount of capital abroad to mimic the committed type and retain the same inside equity stake \(A_t = W - K_t\).\(^{13}\) In particular, the new transition dynamics can be written as

\[
V(M_{n+1}) = g^*(h_n)V(M_n) + g^* (h_0) V(M_0)
\]

where we have defined \(g^*(h_n) \equiv \frac{R^K k_{\infty} - \Psi(k_n)}{1 - k_n} \left( \pi_H g(h_n) + \pi_L \right) + g(h_n)\). The transition dynamics are the same as before, except for replacements of \(g(h_n)\) with \(g^*(h_n)\).\(^{14}\) This change has two effects. The first effect is that it further dampens the slope of the AR(1) process both before and after opening up, since \(g^*(h_n) > g(h_n)\) due to the added value from sending a fraction of wealth abroad. Intuitively, as the country begins deriving more value from sending wealth abroad, it needs smaller increases in the value of inside equity to compensate for greater reputation.

The second effect comes from the change in the coefficient on \(V(M_0)\) to \(g^*(h_0)\), from \(g(h_0)\). This coefficient is still equal to one before opening up. After opening up, there are two competing effects that determine whether the intercept is amplified or muted relative to before. The first effect is that the value of imposing the capital control falls after opening up, which lowers not only net worth but also the gains from sending capital abroad. This pushes the constant further towards zero and inserts a negative wedge in the transition dynamics at and after opening up. This reflects the intuition that a country resets its reputation also benefits from a higher proportional value of inside equity in the good state. The second effect arises from the increase in capital sent abroad.

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\(^{12}\)If the (marginal) return on inside equity is one, then the RHS is zero and we obtain the same first order condition as the previous specification with constant inside equity.

\(^{13}\)For simplicity, we assume that the adjustment cost for the opportunistic type is determined based on the market value \(E_t\) that arises if the capital control is not imposed.

\(^{14}\)Notice that the component \(g(h_n)\rho(h_n)\) in the slope of the AR(1) is correct as before, because it comes from the indifference condition which depends only on the low state and hence on \(g\). By contrast, the other terms come from the Bellman equation, which depends on \(g^*\).
$k^f > k^a$, after opening up. This effect is ambiguous on the constant. On the one hand, it dampens the constant because the average return on foreign capital, $R^K - \frac{1}{k_n} \Psi(k_n)$, falls as capital is sent abroad. On the other hand, it amplifies the constant because as more capital is sent abroad, less is retained at home, and so larger higher reputation changes are required to maintain indifference.
Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A.I: The World’s Largest Bond Markets


Figure A.II: Monthly Foreign Ownership of RMB-Denominated Bonds

Source: Bond Connect, CEIC Data.
Figure A.III: The Composition of Foreign Ownership of RMB Bonds

(a) Share of Foreign-Owned and Total Debt, 2021Q4

(b) Share of Outstanding Bonds Owned by Foreign Investors

Notes: Data from China Central Depository & Clearing (CCDC). Top panel calculates the share of the foreign and total investment portfolio in each of the various categories of bonds. The bottom panel reports what share of each bond type is owned by foreign investors.
Figure A.IV: Mutual Fund and ETF Investment in RMB

Notes: The top panel plots the amount of foreign owned RMB denominated bonds that were issued in onshore and offshore markets. The bottom panel plots the share of foreign owned RMB denominated bonds that were issued in offshore markets. Ownership data from Morningstar.
Figure A.V: Mutual Fund and ETF Investment in China, Nationality Basis

Notes: The top panel plots the amount of foreign-owned bonds issued by Chinese entities on a nationality basis by type. "CHN - CNY" denotes CNY denominated bonds issued by Chinese resident entities, "Tax Haven - FC" indicates foreign currency (non-RMB) denominated bonds issued by a tax haven resident Chinese entity, "CNH - FC" indicates foreign currency bonds issued by Chinese resident entities, "HKG - FC" indicates foreign currency bonds issued by Hong Kong resident entities, "Intl - FC" indicates foreign currency bonds issued by an entity issued outside of China, Tax Havens, or Hong Kong, "HKG - RMB" denotes Renminbi denominated bonds issued in Hong Kong, and "Other" is all other bonds. The Bottom Panel plots each type of debt as a share of foreign ownership. Ownership data from Morningstar.
Figure A.VI: Foreign Investors’ Entry in China’s Domestic Bond Market

Notes: This figure plots the share of each investor type that had entered the market by 2021 at a given date at a more refined investor category.

Figure A.VII: Foreign Investors’ Entry in China’s Domestic Bond Market

Notes: This figure plots the share of each investor type that had entered the market by 2021 at a given date breaking down Flighty investors into Mutual and Hedge Funds.
Figure A.VIII: Portfolio Similarity with Developed Market Currencies

(a) All Bonds, All funds

(b) All Bonds, Intensive Margin

Notes: Figures report the correlation between the holdings of bonds in each currency and holdings in Developed Markets (DM) currencies. The top panel considers all funds, including those with zero holdings of the currency in question. The bottom panel calculates the correlation for each currency based only on funds that hold some local currency sovereign bonds of the currency. The set of funds for measuring the correlation are restricted to non-specialists (less than 50% of its AUM in any single foreign currency) and have more than $20 million of foreign currency investment.
Table A.I: Portfolio Similarity: Correlation with Developed Market Currencies Share

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<th>Specification</th>
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<th>DM Average</th>
<th>EM Average</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intensive Margin</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Excluding Index Funds</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
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<td>All Funds, FC AUM-weighted</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
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<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<td>(0.023)</td>
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<td>-0.39</td>
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<td>(0.020)</td>
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<td>(0.057)</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
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<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
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<td>Excluding Index Funds</td>
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<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
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<td>Alternative FC Definition</td>
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<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
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Notes: Table reports the RMB, DM and EM average correlation between the holdings of the asset type and holdings of that asset type in Developed Markets (DM) currencies. All funds correspond to all funds in the sample, including the ones that don’t have any holdings in the currency in question. Intensive margin only include funds that hold some of the asset and currency in question. We use Morningstar’s classification to exclude the index funds in the “excluding index funds” specification. AUM-weighted defines computing the weighted correlation using FC AUM as the weights for the funds. The alternative FC definition considers as foreign the currencies that are not the one a fund reports its returns.
Figure A.IX: Evolution of Correlation with DM Overtime

(a) Local Currency Sovereign Bonds, All funds

Notes: Figures report evolution of the average correlation between the holdings of RMB, DM, and EM currency bonds and holdings in Developed Markets (DM) countries. The top panel considers all funds. The bottom panel subsets to funds that have positive holdings in each currency. The set of funds for measuring the correlation are restricted to non-specialists (less than 50% of its AUM in any single foreign currency) and have more than $20 million of foreign currency investment. Standard errors are computed via bootstrapping. The shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals.
Figure A.X: Returns on RMB relative to EM and DM Currencies

(a) HML

(b) VIX

Notes: 2010-Present. Quarterly returns based on 3m Government bond yields. $\beta_i$ estimated via univariate country-specific regressions of quarterly bond returns on the factor (HML in the top panel, and the log change in the VIX in the bottom panel. Data from Du et al. (2018).
Figure A.XI: Index Inclusion and Foreign Investment in China

Notes: Figure shows the aggregate value of RMB holdings of funds benchmarked to the Bloomberg Global Aggregate Index, the JPMorgan GBI-EM Index, and the FTSE World Government Bond Index. Grey vertical lines denotes the dates of the inclusion of Chinese RMB bonds into the Bloomberg Global Aggregate (April 2019) and the JPMorgan GBI-EM (February 2020).
Figure A.XII: Private Holdings of Renminbi Bonds, Including Hong Kong and Macau

Notes: This figure reports identified private holdings of RMB by investor country. When available, data from CPIS or TIC is used. When countries do not report the currency composition of their bond investment, data on fund holdings from Morningstar are used.
## Table A.II: Biggest Onshore RMB positions of Foreigners in Morningstar

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<td>BBgBarc China Trsy+</td>
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<td>American Funds Capital World Bond Fund</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bloomberg Global Aggregate</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>KGI China Policy Bank 3-10 Year Bond ETF</td>
<td>TWN</td>
<td>BBgBarc China Policy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>Fubon China Policy Bank Bond ETF</td>
<td>TWN</td>
<td>BBgBarc China Policy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>PIMCO GIS Income Fund</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>Bloomberg US Agg</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Privilege Income Partners RMB Debt</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>Bloomberg China Aggregate</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.679</td>
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<td>0.91</td>
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<td>iShares JPMorgan EM Local Govt Bond ETF</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>JPM GBi EM</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>BGF Fixed Income Global Opportunities Fd</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>Not Benchmarked</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>T. Rowe Price Intl Bd Fd (USD Hdgd)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bloomberg Gbl Agg</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>Shin Kong 10-Y China Trs Plc Bak Gnr ETF</td>
<td>TWN</td>
<td>ChinaBond 10y Trsy&amp;Plcy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>American Funds Global Balanced Fund</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Composite with Bbg,Glb.Ag.</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>AB Global Bond Fund</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bloomberg Global Aggregate</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>CSIF (CH) Bond Aggt Glb ex G4 ex CHF</td>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Bloomberg Gbl Agg</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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<td>iShares Core International Aggt Bd ETF</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bloomberg Gbl Agg</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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<td>Eastspring Inv China Bond Fund</td>
<td>LUX</td>
<td>Markit iBoxx ALBI</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>Western Asset Core Plus Bond Fund</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bloomberg US Agg</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>SPDR® Blmbrg Bcly EM Lcl Bd ETF</td>
<td>IRL</td>
<td>Bloomberg EM Lcl</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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Notes: This table reports the funds with the largest investments in Morningstar in RMB in 2020Q4.
Figure A.XIII: Foreign Investment in BRICS Currencies

(a) Global Mutual Fund and ETF Investment

(b) Total US Investment

Notes: The top panel uses all ETF, mutual fund, and money market fund-level holdings from Morningstar. All domestic currency holdings are dropped. The bottom panel includes all U.S. investment in long-term bonds from the Treasury International Capital (TIC) data, reported in Table A6. All data is for end of year.
Figure A.XIV: Decomposition of Change in Renminbi Holdings by Type of Flow, Detail

Notes: Figure implements the decomposition of the within component of flows. “CNY” refers to all assets denominated in Chinese Yuan. “Cash” refers to assets classified as so in Morningstar and U.S. Treasury Bills. “Agencies and Tresuries” are the securities issued by the US Treasury and US Government Sponsored Agencies. “Other DM” refers to FC holdings of other developed market currencies securities. “EM” refers to FC holdings of emerging market currencies. “Other” refers to other currencies and equities. This figure only consider funds that own some RMB assets.
Figure A.XV: Decomposition of Change in Renminbi Holdings by Type of Flow, Quarterly

Notes: Figure implements the decomposition of flows into RMB bonds in equation 2. Flow Within refers to increases in holdings of RMB assets holding fixed the size of funds. Flow Between refers to increases in holdings of RMB assets generated by inflows into funds that own RMB, holding prices and portfolio shares fixed. Flow New Funds refers to RMB bonds purchased by funds that were created in that year. Valuation Effect refers to the change in the market value of holdings coming from bond price and exchange rate changes. Residual includes measurement error and approximation residuals.
Figure A.XVI: Decomposition of Portfolio Shift by Currency Group, Quarterly

Figure implements the decomposition of the within component of flows. “CNY” refers to all assets denominated in Chinese Yuan. “Cash” refers to assets classified as so in Morningstar and U.S. Treasury Bills. “DM” refers to FC holdings of developed market currencies. “EM” refers to FC holdings of emerging market currencies. “Other” refers to other currencies and equities. This figure only consider funds that own some RMB assets.
Figure A.XVII: Two-Way Capital Flows

Notes: Numerical illustration of the equilibrium of the model with both capital inflows and outflows.